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Abstract 
 
This thesis provides an inter-disciplinary study of selected works by Ingmar 
Bergman. I explore how key concepts from Melanie Klein and Jean-Paul Sartre 
apply to the focus on characters in a state of heightened imagination; and the value 
placed on imagination in the construction of these films. This involves recognition of 
the way an active response from the viewer is encouraged. 
 
Klein, Sartre and Bergman also attend to contextual factors that challenge any notion 
of subjectivity as sovereign and the power of imagination is frequently placed in a 
social context. All three figures develop their ideas within specialised fields drawing 
on the influence of others. Chapter 2 shows how Klein’s ideas relate to the influence 
of Freud before exploring how her work can be applied to Bergman’s films through 
the example of Wild Strawberries. Chapter 3 concentrates on Sartre’s early work, 
The Imaginary and considers how this is significant in relation to some of Sartre’s 
better-known philosophical ideas developed during and after the Second World War. 
These ideas will lead to an exploration of The Seventh Seal. 
 
Chapters 4, 5, and 6 focus on three films from distinct parts of Bergman’s career: 
Summer with Monika, The Virgin Spring and Hour of the Wolf.  In Chapter 4 this 
will be preceded by a brief over-view of three more films from the early part of 
Bergman’s career. These chapters explore how Kleinian and Sartrean ideas can be 
incorporated in close analysis, and alongside selected critical responses to the films. 
The analysis integrates key points from Klein and Sartre in a methodology specific to 
film studies. This will include analysis of cinematic elements such as camera work 
and lighting, and recognition of narrative structure and character development.  
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1    The imagination: Bergman, Klein and Sartre 
 
‘And every picture-every one of my pictures are dreams.’ Ingmar Bergman1  
 
‘Everything can happen. Everything is possible and probable. Time and space do not 
exist. On a flimsy framework of reality the imagination spins and weaves new 
patterns.’ August Strindberg2  
 
The final lines of Fanny and Alexander, in which Helena Ekdahl reads the above 
words from August Stindberg to her grandson Alexander, are significant not just as a 
conclusion to this film but as an expression of Ingmar Bergman’s belief in the 
ultimate value of imagination throughout his work. This quotation shows that 
Bergman was able to extract core values from Strindberg without slavishly following 
his other ideas. This is made apparent moments earlier in Fanny and Alexander as 
the grandmother of the Ekdahl family reacts with dismay to her daughter-in-law’s 
suggestion that they should both act in Strindberg’s A Dream Play: 
 
Emilie Ekdahl: I’d like you to read a new play by August Strindberg. 
Helena Ekdahl: That nasty misogynist! 
 
The final words appear to signal that Helena has accepted Strindberg. However, her 
initial objection retains its force as a warning that the famous Swedish playwright is 
flawed in his attitude to women. Nevertheless, in Fanny and Alexander imagination 
is a unique and powerful force as in the quotation. Intermittently verisimilitude is 
punctured by Alexander’s visions of his dead father as a ghost. When Isak rescues 
the children from the bishop an apparently magical agency is introduced, which 
allows the children to be momentarily in two places at the same time, and this agency 
develops as Alexander meets the mysterious Ishmael. This magical agency may or 
may not have a metaphysical cause but appears to be directly related to Alexander’s 
capacity for seeing beyond the immediately perceptible world. Thus, Fanny and 
Alexander demonstrates how imagination is not only an abiding concept for 
Bergman, but also how he can utilise this as a structural element with his narratives. 
Then, near the end, with the reappearance of the bishop, his step-father, in 
Alexander’s imaginary world an unresolved moral tension is signalled. I will look at 
Bergman’s philosophy of imagination in form and meaning in a selection of films 
from different points in his career. 
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Researching this thesis, I set out to explore Bergman’s belief in the power of 
imagination asking initially whether he holds a belief akin to the sentiment of the 
Strindberg quotation in Fanny and Alexander. Although Strindberg is a key 
influence, it became clear to me that Bergman’s work and ideas suggest a wide range 
of possible interpretations.  Although the library of Bergman appreciation, research 
and criticism already revolves around the power of his imagination as an auteur, 
exploration of Bergman’s ideas on imagination, in relation to other artists and 
thinkers, emerged in my study as a subject worthy of further investigation. As a 
consequence, in this thesis I am concerned to explore Bergman’s ideas in relation to 
philosophy and psychoanalytic theory, but also to focus more specifically on the way 
his films include elements that put particular stress on the process of imagining. In 
the close analysis of films Chapters 4, 5 and 6, this will involve recognising the 
structural significance of sections that represent or allude to metaphysics, dreams, 
nightmares and visions. It will also mean considering the way cinematic language, 
and narrative orchestration are used at other points to signify a world beyond, which 
is not transparently observable to all the characters of the diegesis even though it 
may be accessed by an individual character such as Alexander. A good example of 
mise-en-scene used to this effect is the appearance of death as a figure for the knight 
in The Seventh Seal (1956). Also central to Bergman’s focus on imagination is the 
creative use of off-screen elements, which cannot be directly observed by character 
or viewer, ranging from creative use of off-screen cues to more infamous examples 
such as the miracle at the end of The Virgin Spring (1960). This episode, discussed as 
part of Chapter 5, may signify imagination or a metaphysical intervention by God, an 
ambiguity I will return to. Bergman’s need to step beyond a reality strictly dependent 
on observation must also recognise the significance of memory, a mental faculty that 
is closely associated and can overlap, with imagination. Thus, I include flashbacks 
alongside other elements that divert us from a linear narrative anchored in 
observation of the present. This is particularly apparent in, for instance, Bergman’s 
use of a form of imaginative flashback in Wild Strawberries (1957) where the main 
character enters his own memory as an observer. Simple cause and effect linear 
narratives are significantly diverted or interrupted at key moments in Bergman’s 
work, thus signifying his focus on the imagination in the broad sense that I am 
introducing. Because he also maintains narrative fluency these disruptions appear 
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less experimental than more avant-garde film-making, but the appeal to imagination 
is very pervasive, ranging from flashbacks that represent character reflections to the 
way off-screen space is used to make the audience think beyond that which is 
immediately given. 
 
The attention to sequences or elements foregrounding imagination will be tied in 
with a wider enquiry. A scholar who has already written about imagination in 
Bergman’s work in relation to a broader context is Marilyn Johns Blackwell, who 
focuses in the final chapter of her book, on a number of sequences from films, 
including Wild Strawberries and The Seventh Seal, which represent characters 
imagining. In an inspiring and instructive way, Johns Blackwell considers how these 
sequences contribute to the representation of gender.3 For my analysis it is equally 
important to recognise how Bergman relates sequences concerned with his characters 
imagining to the rest of the narrative in which they are situated. It is necessary to 
investigate Bergman’s approach to imagination at the level of meaning because it is 
often figured as a significant value in his work. That is not to say imagination is 
automatically seen as beneficent. After all, the figure of death in The Seventh Seal, 
and the final appearance of the bishop in Fanny and Alexander introduce Manichean 
division into the imaginary realm. Like the miracle in The Virgin Spring, these 
phenomena appear to be ambiguously placed on the borderline of metaphysics and 
imagination, carrying connotations of a power beyond human agency.  However, I 
want to explore the idea that for Bergman the imagination does ultimately carry 
potential for redemption in humanist terms. Here we enter the debates about 
Bergman as a philosophical director and his relationship to religion. While there are 
an enormous range of intellectuals and artists who champion the power of the 
imagination, my research has gravitated towards a more specific comparison between 
Bergman and the work of psychoanalyst Melanie Klein and the philosopher Jean-
Paul Sartre, who are both humanistic thinkers. The comparison of Bergman’s films 
with ideas from these thinkers is intended as an exploratory association and not as a 
claim about the definitive way to read Bergman’s films or the existence of direct 
influence between these figures. However, I do hope that this grouping can make an 
original contribution to understanding of Bergman’s career and the question of how 
film theory should approach this work, sixty-eight years after his film-making career 
was launched with the script of Frenzy (1944).      
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In 1985, subsequent to completion of Fanny and Alexander, Bergman declared that 
this was his last film.4 The retrospective decision to conclude his career with a film 
partly inspired by his own childhood testifies to Bergman’s understanding of himself 
as a director dealing with personal material. By this stage in his career the discipline 
of film studies had fully emerged in higher education. The evolution of the subject 
involved enormous appreciation of the work of directors due partly to the publication 
of Cahiers du Cinéma, a significant agent in the development of Bergman’s 
international reputation. However, the development of film studies as an academic 
discipline also gave rise to a reaction against the auteur theory through the 
emergence of semiotics, structuralism and post-structuralism, as theories applied to 
cinema. The questioning of authorship itself was already apparent in the 1960s, and 
coincided with a relative decline in Bergman’s reputation as a groundbreaking 
director. And yet, critical work on Bergman has rarely strayed away from an 
emphasis on his authorship. Indeed, as Bergman made a range of returns to film-
making after his self-declared retirement, including Saraband, authorship had 
recovered some of its credibility in the discipline and this is reflected in more recent 
work on Bergman. For example, the collection of essays Ingmar Bergman Revisited, 
published in 2008, introduces many new ideas into Bergman research but does not 
seek to challenge the very concept of authorship. Instead, this is deployed in a wide-
ranging and discursive fashion across the essays.5 
 
In this introductory chapter I am concerned to set out general points that set the 
context for the subsequent work in this thesis. I will begin by showing how three 
auteurist responses to Bergman’s work, from the 1950s onwards, challenge a view of 
Bergman restricted to a thematic world-view full of angst and metaphysics. Instead, 
we find that critics as diverse as Jean-Luc Godard, Peter Cowie and Thomas 
Elsaesser move beyond this stereotype to highlight Bergman’s cinematic qualities, 
but also indicate an interest in relating his films to a broader context. This context 
varies including references to other film-makers, culture in general, philosophy and 
psychology. These responses are not indicative of research on Bergman’s 
relationship to Swedish and Scandinavian culture but do give an indication of the 
way Bergman relates to a more generalised European intellectual context. Following 
consideration of points from these critics, I will provide an introductory overview of 
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the careers of Klein, Sartre and Bergman with a view to setting up more specific 
ideas of comparison and contrast. An immediate sense of correspondences and 
differences can be gained from a brief introductory overview of each figure’s 
working life, and some of the concepts that are central to this thesis. After overviews 
of their work I will sketch in a political and intellectual context that suggests a degree 
of convergence in their ideas about society and culture, which I describe as 
‘humanistic’. I will go on to consider how the work of Jacques Lacan, in particular, 
but also structuralism and post-structuralism, in general, challenges the convergence 
of a range of humanist intellectuals, which includes Klein, Sartre and Bergman. I will 
note how that the emergence of structuralism and, subsequently, post-structuralism 
involved a strong turn away from the humanistic philosophy of imagination found 
across the work of Klein, Sartre and Bergman. I am not intending to consider in 
depth here the work of Lacan, but to indicate the tension between his theory and the 
ideas on imagination identified with the three figures on whom I am focussing. In 
order to sharpen this contrast I will briefly resume the work of two critics of ‘the 
structuralist turn’, Arthur Marwick, and José Guilherme Merquoir, who highlight 
what, in their opinion, is a too destructive move in the field of cultural interpretation. 
 
In Chapter 2 I will concentrate on the development of Klein’s ideas with some 
further application to a Bergman work that has been considered of great interest for 
psychoanalysis and psychology: Wild Strawberries. The following chapter will 
concentrate on Sartre and conclude with analysis of a Bergman film that shows a 
strong awareness of the tension between the individual and external reality: The 
Seventh Seal. Chapters 4, 5 and 6 are devoted to extended analysis of three Bergman 
films. The aim here is to explore the relevance of Kleinian and Sartrean ideas whilst 
focussing more intensively on film style and narrative form. 
 
Culture, existentialism and psychoanalysis in Bergman criticism 
The history of criticism and appreciation of Bergman’s oeuvre reveals that 
preoccupation with his originality goes hand-in-hand with reflection on a range of 
contexts. It is true that Bergman criticism has rarely focused extensively on social 
and political factors, but a need to relate his work to ideas of culture, history, 
psychology, and philosophy is frequently apparent. No one, to my knowledge, has 
explored more than a passing affinity between Bergman and Klein’s work. 
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Nevertheless, there is a significant history of psychoanalytical responses to 
Bergman’s work including elements in Robin Wood’s book in 1969, a key auteurist 
reading of the director’s films, and Frank Gado’s Freudian study of the director’s 
entire filmic output.6 These are works I will refer to and discuss in my film analyses 
in Chapters 4, 5 and 6. Existentialism, like psychoanalysis, figures frequently as a 
reference in Bergman’s reception, but sustained book length application of this 
theory is relatively uncommon. Examples of the discussion of existentialist ideas in 
relation to Bergman include Birgitta Steene’s analysis of The Seventh Seal, and Jesse 
Kalin’s argument for the significance of Martin Heidegger (as opposed to Sartre) in 
understanding selected Bergman films.7 Passing references to Sartre can be found 
across writing about Bergman, including, for instance, his interviews, but this is 
frequently a shorthand for evoking an idea of Bergman’s world view rather than a 
sustained analysis of the applicability of Sartre’s ideas. Nevertheless, the concern to 
reference society and culture found in the work of critics and theorists focussed on 
Bergman’s authorship suggests the potential for further analysis of cultural 
influences, including existentialism and psychoanalysis. Here I will focus on just 
three examples from Godard, Cowie and Elsaesser, which suggest the potential of 
placing Bergman in a broader cultural context and one that I feel should include 
reference to existentialism and psychoanalysis. 
  
Bergman’s early works of the 1940s raised searching questions about Swedish 
society, as we shall see later in Chapter 4 when I discuss three films from this period. 
In the 1950s Bergman’s reputation became significantly more internationalised. In 
1958 Godard writes more of a celebration of Bergman’s films rather than an analysis. 
For Godard, Summer with Monika (1953) is an inspiration for modern film-making, 
but he also writes enthusiastically about the range of the director’s output.8 You can 
see why Godard enthuses about the moment in Summer with Monika when the 
Harriet Anderson character addresses the audience directly. As Godard points out, 
here is a disruption of the diegesis used subsequently by the French New Wave 
directors. Godard enthuses about the spontaneity and lack of formula in Bergman’s 
work so that he suggests the audience may love one film and be confused by the 
next. Godard loves the way Bergman transforms his narratives with flashbacks 
speaking of ‘l’importance primordial du « flashback »’.9 Bergman is someone who 
improvises more than the studied approach of other admirable auteurs. The emphasis 
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is also on Bergman’s authorship as a cineaste as well as a writer and dramatist. 
Godard says that as a ‘homme de théâtre’ Bergman adapts the work of others, but as 
a ‘homme de cinéma, il entend rester seul maître à bord….Bergman crée ex nihilo 
aventures et personnages.’10 
 
 
There is concern here with Bergman’s originality in relation to tradition - the fact 
that he has adapted many great plays of Scandinavian literature by such artists as 
Henrik Ibsen and Strindberg - and in relation to other contemporary directors. 
Godard argues that Bergman’s work is distinguished from other directors, including 
Robert Bresson and LuchinoVisconti, because he uses a personal starting point.11 
The method of evaluating a director’s work, through comparison with other film 
directors, is employed here rhetorically by Godard. Nevertheless, it is clear that 
Bergman’s style is favoured because it is personal and also bears comparison with 
the ideas of existentialism. That is, we have the idea of creativity as a very 
spontaneous form of invention. For Sartre, as we shall see, the self is confronted by 
nothingness. In Bergman’s case the laws of the traditional forms that he follows are, 
according to Godard, subverted through pure invention. Godard thinks that Bergman 
reduces traditional frameworks to nothing before he reworks elements from such 
traditions. Godard’s views are conveyed using the rhetoric of modernism and 
existentialism and in particular the love of art that is judged to be throwing away the 
rule-book. The individualistic, existential ethos comes through further in the 
following, as Godard emphasises Berman’s dedication to an individual reality: ‘On 
est toujours seul; sur le plateau comme devant la page blanche. Et pour Bergman, 
être seul, c’est poser des questions’.12 
 
 
For Godard, Bergman’s films do not simply involve an annihilation of preceding 
traditions but also their creative transformation. The notion of bricolage has been 
associated more with post-modernism, but here it is given more depth through 
reference to the author’s creativity and because a new synthesis is achieved through 
the creative influence of earlier styles. Godard refers to Summer Interlude (1951) and 
the way that the flashback structure opens up a narrative that has a mythical 
dimension and a modernist sense of time. Godard refers to a moment in this film 
when he says that through just one look in the mirror Maj Britt Nilsson is 
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transported: ‘comme Orphée et Lancelot à la poursuit du paradis perdu et du temps 
retrouvé.’13 Bergman, according to Godard, creatively draws on a range of artistic 
influences (Guy de Maupassant, Germaine Dulac, and Man Ray are cited) that are 
not restricted to his preoccupation with Sandanavian drama.14 Thus, Godard’s 
response to Bergman evokes existentialism and modernism in its celebration of a 
spontaneous transcendence of existing norms, but nonetheless draws inspiration from 
art and culture as a whole. 
 
Peter Cowie is a film critic who championed Bergman’s work in Britain in the 1960s. 
In 2004 Cowie returns to Bergman’s significance in relation to radical developments 
in film culture in the 1960s. Cowie identifies Bergman as the key cutting edge 
director of the 1950s. ‘Bergman excited the imagination of critics, audiences and 
film-makers alike, more than any director of the fifties…’15 Cowie notes how 
Bergman’s films were represented by influential commentators: 
 
French critics such as Jean Béranger and Jacques Siclier wrote about Bergman 
tapping into the fifties Zeitgeist, and how the dread of nuclear Armageddon 
explained the fervour with which The Seventh Seal was embraced.16 
 
In contrast, Cowie highlights specific qualities of Bergman’s work such as the use of 
flashbacks, and the complexity with which women were represented in his films of 
the 1950s.17 Cowie argues that these elements set the Swedish director apart from his 
contemporaries just as much as his vision of society. Nevertheless, Cowie still retains 
a discursive sense of Bergman’s engagement with society. He refers to Bergman’s 
range of subjects in this period. This significantly moves us away from the stereotype 
associated with the idea of an angst-ridden auteur behind The Seventh Seal. As 
Cowie indicates, the latter was crucial in developing Bergman’s international 
reputation and therefore may have led some audiences to be unaware of his other 
work. Cowie, also, side steps a narrow version of auteur theory in other ways. He 
highlights the talented team that Bergman worked with through the 1950s; later he 
points to the way the films changed in the 1960s with Sven Nykvist taking over from 
Gunnar Fischer as cinematographer; and he develops a comparison with Federico 
Fellini: the two admired each other’s work and showmanship appears to have been a 
factor that they had in common, a point which could lead to a further recognition of 
shared traits with more mainstream entertainment cinema.18 
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For Cowie, Bergman’s film-making represents a new type of psychological cinema, 
which other directors such as Michelangelo Antonioni also became associated with. 
Cowie is struck, in particular, by the fact that Bergman includes in his films 
questions and themes that had previously been explored in the context of other art 
forms. Cowie states: 
 
Bergman broached his metaphysical themes with disarming skill, daring to ask 
fundamental questions - both for himself and of his audience - that one 
associated more readily with poets and novelists, or painters such as 
Rembrandt and Goya.19 
 
 
This captures one of the reasons why interest in Bergman’s work has endured. 
Bergman’s work involves a greater prominence for high art values in cinema. 
Paradoxically, however, this high cultural status can also be read as a popularisation 
of high culture - part of the trend involved in claiming that popular works could 
reach the level of traditional masterpieces, which emerged forcefully in 1960s 
culture. 
 
Cowie suggests that the appeal of uncertainty in the work of 1960s film directors was 
a cultural phenomenon. He conveys the point that ‘anxiety’ became a key subject: 
‘Uncertainty replaced the doughty dedication to post-war recovery and 
emancipation.’20 This extends the idea of ambiguity as a formal quality of the works 
(explained in David Bordwell’s account of art cinema)21 to a sense of more 
engagement with the contemporary society. The influence of existentialism and 
psychoanalysis accords with this questioning sensibility. Recognising this also 
allows a greater sense of the way this uncertainty could be fused or combined with 
radical political commitment. This is clearer in the case of directors such as Pier 
Paolo Pasoloni, Bernardo Bertolucci, and Andrzej Wadja, but it also has some effect 
on Bergman and was vital in his reception. Bergman, like other prominent directors 
of the 1950s and 1960s, such as Antonioni, was seen to represent alienation. So the 
cinema of this period requires an awareness of the content as well as the form. The 
formal innovations of art cinema might after all be read as a drift away from politics. 
However, contrary to this it has been noted how European film-makers inventively 
found means of expression outside cast iron ideologies.22 
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Thomas Elsaesser is more immersed in post-1960s critical theory than Cowie, but his 
discussion of Bergman still retains elements of auteur theory, the significance of a 
modernist aesthetic and film history. Elsaesser has written about Bergman at 
different points since the 1960s. Two relatively recent articles by Elsaesser provide a 
useful introduction to some of the key issues involved in discussing the director’s 
films, but they are also suggestive of the need to re-evaluate Bergman’s work and 
point ultimately to the relevance of a philosophical understanding.23 Elsaesser refers 
to Bergman’s book Images and through a response to this notes some of the key 
aspects of Bergman’s style. Elsaesser notes that Bergman himself is not so revealing 
about his style, but does disclose certain points such as his preference for black and 
white over colour. Elsaesser is slightly disappointed that Images does not include 
discussion from Bergman about camerawork, and a significant element of film style 
which Elsaeeser highlights: namely the way Bergman creates ‘complex fluid action 
spaces’; Elsaesser also wanted more from Bergman’s book on the use of the close- 
up in his work and the soundtrack.24
 
 
Elsaesser makes it clear that interpreting Bergman has moved on from exclusive 
concern with the director’s existential and religious themes, and also the theme found 
elsewhere in art cinema of the opposition between reality and illusion. Bergman 
achieved critical acclaim and acquired funding from Svenski with films dominated 
by such themes. However, Elsaesser argues that it may be that Bergman’s 
international reputation also developed because his films were known for liberal, 
explicit and sometimes shocking treatment of contemporary life.25 As Elsaesser 
notes, our reading of Bergman is determined by numerous contextual factors, but 
what Elsaesser seeks to do is clarify how the work might be extracted from various 
rigid forms of category and stereotype, including Bergman as the voice of Nordic 
gloom, and Bergman as a national monument. These ideas have partly arisen, it is 
argued, due to the economics of world cinema and the need to use authorship and an 
idea of national cinema to achieve a niche in the market.26 
 
Thus, Elsaesser extracts Bergman from the formulaic emphasis on his authorship as 
the source of all meaning in his work and repositions the films with historical 
awareness in relation to the auteur tradition. In the first article he writes: 
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Auteur cinema today may not be dead, but what we mean by an auteur has 
shifted somewhat: for Europe and America, it is no longer about self-doubt or 
self-expression, metaphysical themes or a realist aesthetic….Instead auteurs 
now dissimulate such signatures of selfhood as Bergman sported, even when 
they believe or doubt as passionately as he did.27 
 
 
Undoubtedly, there has been some kind of trend away from attention to themes as 
philosophical in art cinema, and the association of this with overtly personalised 
styles of film-making. The heyday of Bergman, Antonioni and Andrei Tarkovsky 
appears to have passed. From the 1960s onward, the critical trend of structuralist 
theory, and subsequent critical moves, turned the focus away from the auteur as the 
grand centre of significant themes. Elsaesser suggests that Bergman overtly pursued 
this kind of cinema in a particular historical context, and that in contrast, now 
authorship is more concerned with cinematic expression divorced from such themes. 
The films of auteurs such as David Lynch, Jane Campion and Dario Argento have 
themes, but according to Elsaesser these are secondary to the originality of the 
cinematic expression, which he refers to as the creation of a cinematic ‘tour de 
force’.28
 
 
However, just as Godard’s observations went beyond formal appreciation of 
Bergman’s work to suggest an existentialist ethos of spontaneity and cultural 
invention, Elsaesser signifies the need to place the director in a context, including his 
relation to a form of introspective awareness revealed through external cues. 
Elsaesser makes a striking observation of the dialectic between inner and outer 
reality in Bergman’s work. Elsaesser discusses how this is introduced in Persona. At 
the beginning of this film Elisabet Vogler loses her power of speech on the stage. 
She turns from looking at the theatre audience to looking in the direction of the 
camera and thus in effect, as Elsaesser points out, the film audience. Thus, Elsaesser 
suggests that Bergman condenses the relationship between cinema and theatre into a 
silent movement by the character, using this ultimately to represent a psychic 
movement from outer world to ‘an inner revelation of being’, ‘emotional reality’.29 
The film shows that her public self, like her stage self, is related to an inner self. This 
inner self like the backstage in a theatre is hidden from the audience. As Elsaesser 
puts it: ‘...just as the business that habitually goes on backstage in a theatre is 
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necessary in order to produce the “show”, so the chaos of one’s inner self may well 
be the necessary precondition of one’s active “social” life…’30. Elsaesser notes that 
Bergman uses the backstage metaphor for the relationship between internal reality 
and social reality in other films such as Smiles of a Summer Night (1955) and 
Sawdust and Tinsel (1953). For Elsaesser, Bergman demonstrates how cinema can 
explore the phenomena of psychic reality, which are not amenable to perception or 
language.31 Of course, both perception and words are crucial to Persona (1966) but 
more fundamental is the focus on the dialectical movement between inner and outer 
reality. Thus, despite qualifications to the image of Bergman as an auteur defined by 
existential and psychological themes, Elsaesser’s account of Bergman seems to 
suggest that within his work the core concern is of a philosophical/psychological 
nature, and seems to touch on the concerns of existentialism and psychoanalysis. In 
addition Elseasser suggests that the scene from Persona ‘…could serve as a very 
persuasive argument for the auteur theory - a scene whose minimal overt “content” 
reveals a maximum of cinematic meaning.’32 The potency of the scene leads 
Elsaesser to suggest that Bergman’s exploration of psychic reality can, at key points, 
reach beyond the theories of psychology and psychoanalysis: 
 
In his best moments, Bergman manages to render palpable a sense of 
indeterminacy such as it has rarely existed in the cinema since the great silent 
European cinema of the 1920s (the films of Murnau, Lang, Dryer): not 
psychological, nor psychoanalytical, but ‘phenomenal’.33
 
  
 
Godard, Cowie and Elsaesser share a focus on Bergman as the source of meaning in 
his work, but each refuses to identify precisely Bergman’s world-view. At the same 
time, their criticism suggests that we should not abandon ideas from existentialism 
and psychoanalysis. Although Godard, Cowie and Elsaesser are concerned with 
Bergman’s cinematic qualities, and they do not refer directly to existential 
philosophy or psychoanalytic theory, their observations suggest that these fields 
remain critical alongside an awareness of the diversity of cultural influences on 
Bergman’s work. As Elseasser’s observations convey, Bergman’s interest in silent 
cinema and theatre must be included in our appreciation of his ability to represent 
psychic depth, and the dialectic between inner and outer worlds. A comparison with 
Klein and Sartre offers the potential of bringing together diverse ideas about 
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existential and psychoanalytical elements in Bergman’s work. 
  
In this thesis I will accept that we cannot dispense with a focus on Bergman as the 
organising centre of his work. I will, though, note ways in which any simple idea of 
Bergman as the locus of all meanings in his films is qualified, including the way we 
must take account of his collaborators. However, the main aim of the thesis is to 
deepen knowledge of the significance of imagination in Bergman’s films, drawing on 
the body of appreciation and criticism, and by contrasting and comparing Bergman’s 
output with the work of Klein and Sartre. In this way I will expand from Bergman’s 
films and the body of Bergman criticism to make more of the potential psychological 
and philosophical meaning in his work. I will investigate and explore whether these 
three figures converge in their ideas about imagination and the artist and whether 
their work reconceptualises authorship. 
 
The central focus on the imagination is not intended as a return to the romanticist 
mythology of the artist as creative genius. On the contrary Klein, Sartre and Bergman 
are firmly situated within a modernity, which insists that the relationship between the 
artist and external forces is a critical issue and that both sides of this dichotomy must 
be given weight. If we take Bergman as an example of this it is clear that at least at  
certain times in his life, he holds the opinion that art must be subjected to serious 
questioning. This is apparent in different Bergman interviews including for instance 
his discussion of Persona. Bergman mocks his own character’s argument that art can 
be therapeutic, suggests that art is marginal in its political effect, and that artists are 
elevated, too frequently, by their audience. However, his analysis of his own work 
also involves contradictory views, which prevent us seeing his viewpoint as 
straightforward or cynical. In a sense, he seems to say that it is up to the audience to 
decide about therapeutic or other values in the work. When asked if it is ‘legitimate’ 
for an audience to use art in this way Bergman replies: ‘if they can, it’s 
marvellous.’34
 
 
Klein 
Writing of Klein, Julia Kristeva observes: ‘…beneath the apparent self-assurance of 
this woman, who became the leader of a school of thought, lay an exceptionally close 
relationship with anxiety, both in other people and herself.’35 Kristeva goes on to 
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make a comparison between Klein and the philosopher Hannah Arendt:  
 
 ...both of whom emerged from secular Jewish worlds, appropriated Christian 
philosophy, Enlightenment humanism, and contemporary science in a uniquely 
critical and highly personal way. 36 
 
Here are two reasons to look at Klein’s work in a broader context: her personal 
understanding of anxiety and her absorption of perspectives from philosophy and 
science. Fundamental to her place in this thesis is the idea that Klein provides an 
alternative to other ideas because of the significance she attaches to imagination. 
This, however, must be clarified at the outset. Klein puts emphasis on the presence of 
something like imagination in the infant from birth but she calls this ‘phantasy’. The 
New Kleinian Dictionary begins the definition of unconscious phantasy by stating 
that ‘unconscious phantasies underlie every mental process and accompany all 
mental activity.’37  It is admitted that the term phantasy has created confusion and 
given rise to different interpretations. James Strachey, a key early explainer of 
psychoanalytic theory, is said to give us ‘the definitive exposition’ of this concept, 
differentiating ‘fantasy’, meaning  ‘ “caprice, whim, and fanciful invention” ’, from 
‘phantasy’ meaning ‘ “imagination, visionary notion” ’.38 However, as the authors of 
The New Kleinian Dictionary note, many analysts, let alone readers have equated 
phantasy with fantasy, as the latter is defined by Strachey. In Chapter 2 I will place 
Klein’s philosophy of imagination in the context of her commitment to Sigmund 
Freud’s work and the development of her own ideas about infant phantasies. 
 
Klein was born in 1882 in Vienna.39 Janet Sayers explains that Klein’s personal life 
was event filled and traumatic. Her sister Sidonie died when she was young. Later in 
her teenage years her father died and this was followed by the loss of her beloved 
brother Emmanuel, an art student who encouraged her to write fiction.40 Klein started 
analysis with Sándor Ferenczi in 1912 and his interest in child analysis led her to 
analyse her own son.41 Sayers argues that Klein’s analysis of her own son and her 
ensuing work with children, ‘shifted psychoanalysis from Freud’s instinct-based 
approach to one that was more alert to children’s inner images of the relations 
between others and themselves.’42 
 
Klein became separated from her husband after World War One, another personal 
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factor informing her understanding of human problems. As well as noting the impact 
of Klein’s personal life, her work must be related to the context of cultural, social 
and political upheaval. Moving to Berlin in the 1920s she developed her ideas on 
psychoanalysis alongside other pioneers of the discipline and amidst an increasingly 
forceful clash between the ideologies of communism and fascism.  In her first book, 
The Psychoanalysis of Children of 1932, her analysis of her son is included 
alongside other case studies and theory, although he is given a different name.  
Following this, living in London, her reputation as an analyst developed through the 
1930s. However, she experienced further emotional loss again with rejection from a 
daughter, and the loss of a son through an accident in a mountaineering holiday.43 
The importance of Klein’s personal life to her work is made clear by the fact that she 
followed her experience of loss by working on a talk for a meeting in Lucerne on the 
subject of depression.44
 
 
To analyse your own child would clearly be controversial today. Klein’s emphasis on 
analysing children shocked contemporaries in the psychoanalytical movement. A 
very important theoretical divergence had already emerged in the 1920s between her 
approach and that of Anna Freud. This conflict of ideas split the psychoanalytical 
movement leading to a major debate between the followers of both women in the 
1940s. Sayers summarises: ‘She {Klein} rejected Anna Freud’s claim that children 
are too closely involved with their parents to entertain phantasies about them.’45 
Sayers goes on to account for Klein’s divergence from Anna Freud by showing that 
Klein felt that analysis had to engage with and liberate children from negative 
phantasies internalised prior to the Oedipus complex: 
 
Freeing children from inhibition accordingly depends on exposing and 
reducing the harshness of these figures rather than strengthening them, as Anna 
Freud advocated, in seeking to reinforce the child’s superego.46
 
 
 
Klein’s central ideas of the paranoid-schizoid position and the depressive position 
developed from her earlier work. Klein described on the basis of clinical examples 
the way in which, prior to the oedipal phase, the child transfers love and hate on to 
the parental figure, re-internalises these emotions in phantasy and then projects these 
phantasies outward again. This describes how the child from the beginning of its life 
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is torn between oscillating states of love and hate. The instinctive pull of the child 
towards that which it deems as good is challenged by fear of attack and physical 
invasion. For Klein, this state begins with the mother’s breast as an object that may 
be imagined as good or bad. It can thus be related to feeding, but is not strictly 
determined by this because of the over determination played by the child’s projection 
of meaning on to this content. Klein first introduced the paranoid-schizoid position 
formally as a concept in 1946, using it to bring together observations from her work 
up to this point. In 1946 she summarises the key idea underlying this position as 
follows: ‘The vital need to deal with anxiety forces the early ego to develop 
fundamental mechanisms and defences.’47 This involves the child categorising 
thoughts and feelings in a Manichean dichotomy and resorting to extreme patterns 
such as assumed omnipotence or debilitating fear. The New Dictionary of Kleinian 
Thought provides an updated summary of Klein’s key concept as follows: 
 
…paranoid-schizoid mental states play an important part throughout life. The 
chief characteristic of the paranoid-schizoid position is the splitting of both self 
and object into good and bad, with at first little or no integration between them. 
48 
 
This position is according to Klein necessary but also must be overcome or 
transcended. The depressive phase is used by Klein to discuss how the child moves 
beyond the paranoid-schizoid. Again, this occurs very early in an individual’s life, 
beginning in the first year, but continuing to reappear at different points in an 
individual’s life. In effect, for Klein, it is a continual possibility of mental life. It is 
through the depressive position, and a transcendence of it, that Klein provides a 
narrative of integration and redemption based on a primitive concept of compassion. 
I will look at examples from Klein’s writing about this concept in Chapter 2, and its 
relevance to cultural criticism and film analysis; but here let us note again a 
contemporary summary of the ‘depressive position’, which conveys a key element of 
Klein’s concept. Again, for the purposes of an introduction a quote from The New 
Kleinian Dictionary provides a useful overview of the depressive position: 
 
If the confluence of loved and hated figures can be borne, anxiety begins to 
centre on the welfare and survival of the other as a whole object, eventually 
giving rise to remorseful guilt and poignant sadness, linked to deepening of 
love.49
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Klein’s work made a decisive intervention in psychoanalytical theory. As Sayers puts 
it, in relation to the idea of the paranoid-schizoid position:  
 
In describing this process she launched her theory of what she called 
‘projective identification’, involving not so much projecting instincts from 
within us on to others, as Freud had described, but projecting and identifying 
with others on the basis of putting into them loved and hated figures from 
within us.50 
 
 
Thus, Klein’s work points to an imaginary world that informs projection and can be 
altered and cultivated to improve projection. As a consequence, it also continually 
reaffirms an inevitable instability of the ego, a doctrine, which like Freudianism, 
challenges some of the key assumptions behind rationalist discourses. Klein 
describes the infant’s internal imaginary world in terms of ‘internal objects’. Again, 
this is a difficult and controversial idea. One strong appeal of this concept is Klein’s 
emphasis on the role emotion plays in constituting the internal world. This 
perspective will find comparison in the way Sartre and Bergman challenge an 
exclusively rational or linguistic account of subjectivity. 
 
As David Macey notes, there is a lack of scientific evidence for Klein’s claims about 
childhood.51 However, her work set up a significant divergence from Freudianism 
and played an influential role in the development of psychoanalysis through object 
relations theory. There is no evidence that either Bergman or Sartre read or 
understood these developments. Nevertheless, in Klein’s emphasis on the dangers of 
a super ego, we can see both an updating of Freud’s work on this concept, and an 
idea which corresponds with Bergman’s representation of individuals tormented by 
authority figures, either real or imagined; Sartre also takes the struggle against 
authority as an issue that is simultaneously highly subjective and related to external 
determinants. 
 
Klein’s emphasis on children’s play as a source of understanding of the psyche is 
distinctive, and historically significant in the development of child psychology. 
Throughout Bergman’s work we find sensitivity to the subjectivity of children and 
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young people. The concept of ‘play’ runs alongside that of imagination and can be 
used to consider the social implications of actions ignored by adult sensibility. Klein 
attributed the expression of intensely negative emotions to the play she witnessed, 
but also, through the concept of the depressive position, she paved the way for 
constructive recognition of the child’s sense of morality. 
 
Klein’s work was very empirically based and sometimes shockingly direct. Lacan 
criticised Klein’s crude deterministic account of certain observations of child’s play52 
but, as already stated, this work became a foundation for a major development in 
psychoanalysis. It offers the possibility of less emphasis on Oedipal development and 
more account of the child’s relationship to his/her environment, even though Klein 
herself remained completely committed to Freud’s concept of the Oedipus complex. 
The fear that her work fails to take account of material not amenable to empirical 
observation explains something of the gulf between Lacan and Klein’s ideas that has 
frequently appeared.53 But some defenders of Klein hold onto her proximity to 
Freudian work and argue that her work resists reduction to a psychology centred on 
the ego.54 It is indisputable that, for Klein, therapy seeks to integrate the ego, whilst 
mental illness and neurosis stems from the ego in crisis. However, through the 
central role given to what Klein calls phantasy, which I see as a contribution to the 
understanding of imagination, she fully recognises how the ego may be assailed by 
forces that are deep and that require interpretation as well as observation. 
 
Connected to this emphasis on interpretation and the depths of the psyche is Klein’s 
distinctive emphasis on the significance of the maternal. This has not always been 
welcomed, and was criticised by Anna Freud and her followers for the failure to 
analyse the actual roles played by mothers.55 However, in the context of 
psychoanalysis it provides an enormous counterpoint to Freudian and Lacanian 
emphasis on the structural power of the father as a real person and as a concept. The 
structural significance of the maternal in Klein corresponds with the powerful 
position of women in a large number of Bergman’s works. In Sartre’s work we find 
recognition of the maternal most strongly in his autobiographical and literary 
biographical work, including his analysis of Gustave Flaubert’s relationship with his 
mother.56 
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Klein had moved to the UK in the 1930s and stayed to work continuously until her 
death in 1960. Her work lacks explicit engagement with macro social and political 
issues outside her clinical work but at key points this emerges. For instance, this can 
be seen in her comments on punishment in her 1934 essay On Criminality, which in 
Chapter 5 I relate to the treatment of crime in The Virgin Spring. The psychoanalytic 
movement was notoriously inward looking during the Second World War as the 
famous anecdote about a bomb attack illustrates.57 Against this, we can see how 
Klein’s work involved analysis of a psychic reality with serious implications for the 
analysis of division and conflict in society. I will return to this potential for a more 
socially engaged understanding of Kleinianism when I consider further points of 
convergence with Sartre and Bergman. 
 
Sartre 
Sartre was born in 1905 in Paris.58 His father died a year later leaving Sartre to be 
brought up by his mother, and influenced by his patriarchal grandfather; and later, 
deeply resentful of his step-father. His autobiography of 1963 Words recalls his 
childhood including the way he became an intellectual with his grandfather’s books 
dominating his imagination. Sartre sees himself as someone drawn to an abstract 
intellectual and imaginary universe even before he could read. As Sartre puts it:  
 
A Platonist by condition, I moved from knowledge to its object; I found ideas 
more real than things, because they were the first to give themselves to me and 
because they gave themselves like things.59 
 
Whilst continuing his early attraction to intellectual existence Sartre, as a reader, was 
taken, in his childhood, by action adventure stories,60 a fact which provides one 
origin for his later emphasis on heroic individual commitment as a fundamental 
philosophical principle. The study of Sartre in this thesis will demonstrate the 
relevance of existentialism and phenomenology to Bergman and Klein, as well as 
revealing the distinctiveness of a philosophical approach to the imagination. I will 
look in particular in Chapter 3 at his early work The Imaginary, and then at how his 
understanding of this subject develops across some of his subsequent work. 
 
At school Sartre was already highly imaginative, writing stories inspired by the 
detective fiction he adored and acting out the films he saw at the cinema with his 
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mother. As David Drake records:  
 
At local venues as well as the bigger picture houses they watched 
melodramatic adventure films, many of their features borrowed from popular 
literature: the rescuing of damsels in distress, the dastardly machinations of the 
villains and the courage and daring of the heroes.61 
 
 
According to Drake, Sartre’s early fiction, written after he left school, already reveals 
a number of themes and preoccupations that return later, including a strong 
awareness of self-deception as a psychological process, and contempt for the 
bourgeoisie. Drake emphasises how Sartre moved beyond the simple moral binaries 
of the fiction he loved as a child, and in its place emerged a fascination with the lack 
of certainty in human affairs. As Drake tells us: 
 
Life, he observed, was nothing but contingency. He was struck by the contrast 
with what happened in the cinema. In films everything has a significance and 
contributes to the story, which has a beginning, a middle and a (usually happy) 
end. In life, on the other hand, there is no necessity.62   
 
 
While Sartre’s early adult life reveals his precocity and intelligence, it also has been 
recognised that there is a disturbing unstable element at work. Sartre’s study of 
philosophy during the 1930s involved some time spent in Berlin on a scholarship, a 
situation, which brought him into contact with fascism. By this stage Sartre was 
developing his ideas about the individual’s responsibility for his own existence in the 
face of a world where political action could appear absurd in its futility. He is 
preoccupied with the terrible nature of ‘freedom’ that confronts the individual 
consciousness. His early work on the imagination can be regarded as bound up with 
the problem of responding to the negative, annihilating quality of consciousness that 
goes with the possibility of freedom. At the same time this work is influenced by his 
non-conformist lifestyle such that during his work on the imagination he felt 
negatively affected by his experiments with mescalin and the resulting 
hallucinations. Nevertheless, The Imaginary, published in 1940, four years after 
being written by Sartre, is still of interest, particularly when considered in relation to 
his subsequent work.63 It shows Sartre concerned to differentiate his idea of 
imagination from one based on an empiricist philosophy of perception. Yet, at the 
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same time, he wishes to show why the imaginary is not a romantic nether world, or a 
metaphysical realm, but one in which consciousness may discover its own power and 
freedom. Although the positive force of this argument is not explicit in this early 
work it remains a consistent feature through Sartre’s complex career. His novel 
published in 1938 was originally called Melancholia.64 Ultimately named Nausea it 
explores the theme of individual freedom, but encapsulated by the alienated 
consciousness of a protagonist overwhelmed by his discovery of contingency. 
 
In another early work of philosophy Transcendence of the Ego, written in 1936 we 
can see an approach that in some respects appears to share much with post- 
structuralist deconstruction.65 Here Sartre, whilst heavily indebted to Edmund 
Husserl challenges the latter’s emphasis on the unity of consciousness arguing in 
effect that the ego must be continually recreated. This early work, along with Sartre’s 
account of the emotions written in 1939, is relevant to the relativism and emotional 
intensity that we find across Bergman’s work - a point that will be returned to. But 
we also have to note how Sartre chose not to dismantle the heritage of Idealist 
philosophy. During the war Sartre wrote Being and Nothingness. 
 
In Being and Nothingness Sartre developed his insights on freedom using an 
elaborate philosophical discourse that was both original and strongly influenced by 
Idealism. Here we find his development of the concepts of the ‘for-itself’ and the ‘in-
itself’.66 While Sartre gives weight to the material world’s independence through his 
notion of being ‘in-itself’, he retains an opposition with consciousness, conveying the 
independence of the latter and its inherent intentionality with the term ‘for-itself’. In 
between these states, what Sartre terms ‘bad faith’, involves consciousness denying 
its nature and potential as something which is ‘for-itself’ and thus reducing the self 
activating process of consciousness to a fixed state: consciousness becomes an ‘in-
itself’, it becomes like a thing. These concepts signify a profound split in human 
consciousness, but it is wrong to immediately assume that Sartre is irredeemably 
pessimistic about the possibility of synthesis in human consciousness, and following 
on from this that he is pessimistic in relation to morality, political commitments and 
aesthetic value. Sartre retains the sense of agency conveyed in the idealist tradition 
including the Cartesian emphasis on personal reflection as a starting point for 
philosophy, and the Kantian philosophy of the transcendent power of conceptual 
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reason. Perhaps even more significant is his continuing engagement with the 
Hegelian and Marxist understanding of dialectical relationships. This engagement 
suggests that progress must be sought for through greater awareness of conflict 
within the individual and in society.67 All these influences from philosophy count, 
when we weigh up Sartre’s position against the challenge of structuralism and post-
structuralism, because the continuing presence of elements influenced by idealism 
signify a dogged commitment to a notion of meaningful and accessible individual 
decision making. 
 
Undoubtedly, Sartre’s philosophy is complex and not always consistent. Being and 
Nothingness also reveals the influence of Søren Kierkegaard, Heidegger and 
Friedrich Nietzsche. Their work leads Sartre towards a complex understanding of 
subjectivity in which high and elusive standards accompany meaningful individual 
action. The individualism of these thinkers is reflected in Sartre’s insistence that the 
individual must overcome self-inflicted concepts of deterministic causation. In Being 
and Nothingness Sartre infamously does not tell us what constitutes good faith, but 
we may suppose that it must involve authenticity, a concept derived from Heidegger. 
Nevertheless, the continuing presence of the other Idealist thinkers in Sartre’s 
philosophy points to a more socially engaged sense of subjectivity. This was to 
become apparent in Sartre’s Kantian influenced polemic about humanism following 
World War Two, ‘Existentialism is a Humanism’, and in his Hegelian influenced 
engagement with Marxist dialectics in the post-war period.    
 
Sartre’s awareness of the Spanish civil war and the subsequent Nazi occupation 
coincide with development in his ideas. During the war he was released from a 
German prisoner of war camp. Back in Paris he initiated a resistance group involving 
close associates.68 At the same time his career developed in a way, according to 
Drake, that avoided outright confrontation with the Nazi occupier even though he 
managed to smuggle his resistance ideals into his work.69 His work during the war 
continues his preoccupation with individual ‘freedom’ but also moves towards 
articulating how we should respond to this freedom. The Occupation reinforced his 
awareness of freedom as the fundamental issue that confronted humanity, but it is a 
philosophical conception of freedom quite distinct from the economic ideology of 
capitalism. Sartre makes it clear in his War Diaries that his experiences in the war 
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led him to recognize that freedom must be placed in context: 
 
To be authentic is to realize fully one’s being-in-situation, whatever that 
situation may happen to be… This presupposes a patient study of what the 
situation requires, and then a way of throwing oneself into it and determining 
oneself to ‘be-for’ this situation. Of course situations are not catalogued once 
and for all. On the contrary, they are new each time.70 
 
In his overview of Sartre’s work István Mészáros traces the way morally committed 
politics became a growing emphasis of Sartre’s work during the 1950s. Mészáros 
sees a line of continuity alongside transformation in Sartre’s work. The latter became 
more politicised during the late 1940s and 1950s with Existentialism and Humanism 
in 1945, his sympathy for Marxism in What is Literature? in 1948, and in Sartre’s 
involvement with contemporary struggles against imperialism in the latter half of the 
1950s and the early 1960s, Mészáros finds that Sartre made a transition from a ‘self 
oriented subjectivity’ to his more mature philosophy of moral commitment.71 Even 
when he sought a synthesis with Marxism Sartre sought to maintain the significance 
of individual autonomy.72 As Mészáros indicates, Sartre’s early philosophy of the 
imagination does not disappear. It returns most explicitly for instance in his hope that 
the rebellions of 1968 would involve ‘imagination in power’. Meszaros quotes from 
Sartre’s work on Flaubert:  
 
A man is like a leak of gas, escaping into the imaginary. Flaubert did so 
perpetually; yet he also had to see reality because he hated it, so there is the 
whole question of the relationship between the real and the imaginary which I 
try to study in his life and work.73 
 
 
According to Mészáros, Sartre regards Flaubert as someone who makes a choice to 
escape into the imaginary, and this is ultimately contrasted to moral engagement with 
social conditions. For Sartre, the abiding concern is with the problematic of freedom 
and how it is constituted internally in the face of external conditioning. In this way 
Sartre suggests that the imaginary must be reflected on for its potential as a negation 
of society, but also critically because of its potential for self-deception. Mészáros 
quotes Sartre as saying in 1969: ‘I would today accord to freedom the small 
movement which makes of a socially conditioned social being someone who does 
not render back completely what his conditioning has given him.’74 For Mészáros, 
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Sartre’s individualistic understanding of subjectivity and social determinism is 
problematic, but Mészáros recognises how Sartre, from the 1930s to his death, is 
focussed on maintaining a degree of unity in his idea of subjectivity. Discontinuity 
resulting from external social forces is internalised by the individual.    
 
It is not surprising, therefore, that Sartre is drawn in his later career to biography, as 
Bergman is drawn to the personal confessional mode, and Klein worked on abstract 
theoretical issues with her own children. More explicitly than the other two, and 
partly because of his immersion in continental philosophy, Sartre is a dialectical 
thinker, whose thought continually probes contradictions faced by the individual. 
This again is a point that Mészáros develops effectively. With Sartre we will see a 
commitment to the freedom of imagination, and we will see recognition of why this 
faculty should not be idealised, but situated in a realistic context. This, I would 
suggest, is relevant to Bergman because his attraction to representing subjectivity 
also maintains a critical awareness of external determinations outside the individual. 
 
Bergman 
Bergman was born in Uppsala in 1918.75 He was brought up in a strict religious 
household and his father was a pastor who was appointed, early in Bergman’s life as 
a religious minister for the king. In Bergman’s autobiography of 1987 he starts by 
describing the punishment he received as a child. This included being made to wear a 
skirt, and more seriously physical punishment: ‘After the strokes had been 
administered, you had to kiss Father’s hand, at which forgiveness was declared and 
the burden of sin fell away, deliverance and grace ensued.’76 Bergman also describes 
how he was punished by being locked in a cupboard, an experience that was made 
worse when the maid made him think there was ‘a creature’ hiding in the cupboard 
and it would eat his toes.77 These anecdotes provide an explanation for Bergman’s 
preoccupation in his work with themes of shame, humiliation and the power of 
imagination. Very clearly he turns to these incidents and reworks them. His 1968 
film Hour of the Wolf involves the main character describing his terror as a child 
locked in the cupboard and his fear of an imaginary creature. In Fanny and 
Alexander the evil step-father appears to represent in a more grotesque form some of 
the actions of Bergman’s father, described in The Magic Lantern. 
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In Bergman’s first screenplay for Alf Sjoberg’s Frenzy (1944), there is a focus on the 
conflict between a teenage male protagonist and a tyrannical male teacher. 
Bergman’s first film as a director, Crisis, adapted from a radio play concerned a 
charismatic but tragic male protagonist, Jack, who commits suicide. Throughout 
Bergman’s work we find a gallery of flawed and disturbed male protagonists. When 
Bergman announced his retirement, in 1984, the final film Fanny and Alexander 
provided a different take on flawed masculinity in the form of the evil bishop who 
abuses his step-children. Bergman’s flawed, and intermittently dangerous men, do 
not preclude a noted concentration on a sensitive male hero in his early films, for 
whom he frequently used the actor Birger Malmsten. One of Bergman’s earliest films 
that has received extensive critical acclaim and makes notable use of melancholy 
narrative premise is Summer Interlude, the film Godard celebrated, in which the lead 
character is a young woman played by Maj-Britt Nilsson, remembering the summer 
when her boyfriend, played sensitively by Malmsten, was tragically killed in an 
accident in an idyllic island setting. This narrative of young love set in the Swedish 
archipelago compares with Summer with Monika, a film I analyse in depth in Chapter 
4. 
 
During the 1950s and 1960s another actor emerged as a powerful lead for a number 
of Bergman works. Max von Sydow played roles that can be construed as at least 
partly expressive of the director’s personal feelings including Hour of the Wolf, 
which will be analysed in Chapter 6. Bergman’s preoccupation with the flaws of a 
male authority figure, and his concern to project either sensitive or more 
introspective male characters can be related to his conflict with his father detailed in 
his autobiography. In his questioning of self-evident male authority and concern with 
the absence of God, expressed so famously by von Sydow’s knight in The Seventh 
Seal and in other works such as The Virgin Spring (see Chapter 5), Bergman appears 
to gravitate towards existentialism as an alternative. This is the position he conveys 
in his famous lengthy interviews with Stig Björkman, Torsten Manns and Jonas Sims 
made at the end of the 1960s but published in English in 1973. In these interviews 
Bergman describes how he shed his belief in religion in the early 1960s.78 
 
Bergman’s doubts about religion emerged at an early stage. In relation to broader 
historical influences it is also important to recognise, as Vernon Young points out, 
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that Bergman is born at the traumatic historical moment of the end of the First World 
War, is developing his adult consciousness during the Second World War, and 
launches as a film director in its aftermath.79 We need to take account of Sweden’s 
neutrality in both wars and Bergman’s early political confusion. He discusses in his 
biography his adolescent attraction to fascism on a visit to Germany as an exchange 
student. He discusses how the revelation of Nazi atrocities filled him with guilt about 
his own early enthusiasm for Adolf Hitler: ‘I did not realize until long afterwards that 
I was guilty by association only.’80 After the war, amidst tensions in a Gothenburg 
theatre between different sides of the conflict from Sweden and Germany, Bergman 
could not talk about his mistakes regarding fascism. Shame about his early political 
sympathies appears to have made Bergman steer away from overt political content, 
but this is something that he realises was a mistake: ‘I did not mention my 
aberrations and despair, but a strange decision slowly matured. Politics – never 
again! Of course I should have made an utterly different decision.’81 Nevertheless, 
perhaps Bergman did not suppress his new-found political awareness. The argument 
has been made that Bergman’s films have a pervasive questioning of oppressive 
authority structures. Johns Blackwell, for instance, brings together Bergman’s critical 
approach to father figures and religion with a critical approach to dominant structures 
in society. This subversive stance is connected, by Johns Blackwell, to Bergman’s 
early experience of seeing his father work at the King’s court.82 Johns Blackwell 
complements this observation with the suggestion that Bergman represented 
motherhood sympathetically in a range of films because of his close relationship with 
his own mother and also because of his early experience with Swedish silent cinema. 
Johns Blackwell states: 
 
In part because of the influential writings of the feminist Ellen Kay, there 
developed in Sweden in the early part of this century a kind of ‘renaissance of 
motherhood’ that was played out in, among other arenas, the silent films of the 
era...83  
 
 
Emotion and personal experiences are a more self-evident influence on Bergman’s 
creativity than external political structures.Young refers to the anxiety of Bergman’s 
youth, including at the age of 19, significant romantic disappointment, and 
disillusionment with religion and ‘at nearly the same time, though Bergman is unable 
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to place the event - his memory for the chronology of those years is by now confused 
- he also lost by death a very close male companion.’84 The themes of romance, 
bereavement and mourning, which developed into such a major theme in Summer 
Interlude, may owe their setting to the summer which Bergman spent on the Swedish 
islands, at the age of nineteen, when, as Young tells us, he was rejected by a girl 
whom he loved.85 There appears to be an imaginative condensation of romantic and 
mortal loss in this work, which indicates how Bergman reworks his own anxieties 
into his work. 
 
The use of location and the setting of the Swedish archipelago, in some of Bergman’s 
early works, reinforce the point that he is concerned with love from a romantic 
aesthetic perspective. However, the emphasis on nature, passion and imagination is 
continually problematised in his work by the representation of psychological 
conflicts. His lyrical treatment of Swedish landscapes has to be counterbalanced 
against his notable experimentation with a wide range of mise-en-scene including 
treatment of industrial settings (for instance in Port of Call (1948)). By the time we 
get to The Seventh Seal the beautifully lit landscape is pervaded by death and nine 
years later with Persona, a beautiful but bleak landscape is the backdrop to 
psychodrama. This signals Bergman’s divergence from a nostalgic heritage tradition 
in which the landscape is represented as a national treasure, and as a site for a sense 
of coherence at the level of national identity (an argument made by Erik Hedling).86 
For Bergman, the landscape may be beautiful but also it is continually a site of 
conflict, implicated in personal and sometimes social struggles.   
 
Bergman’s biography details his early obsession with theatrical illusion and, closely 
connected to this, his early love of cinematic make-believe. Maaret Koskinen records 
how Bergman played with his own film projector and puppet theatres in his 
childhood, thus creating his own imaginary worlds.87 References to his childhood are 
repeated in a number of films including references to a toy cinematograph in Prison 
(1949) and Persona, two films that otherwise are amongst his most disturbing works. 
Bergman’s internationalism has frequently been noted, in relation to his 
preoccupation with philosophical themes, and his representation of ambiguity, in a 
style, which affords comparison with other ‘auteurs’ of the European art cinema. In a 
special edition of the Swedish film magazine Chaplin, Koskinen develops the 
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argument convincingly that despite disparate Swedish influences Bergman’s work 
transcends its natural roots. This, she argues, is the result of work, which is ‘…a 
peculiar mixture of the abstract and the concrete, the metaphysical and the 
realistic.’88 Koskinen argues that to explain Bergman’s work through Swedish 
culture alone does not sufficiently recognise how Bergman's work is an ‘addition’ to 
the existing cultural reality rather a ‘substitute’ or ‘parallel’; and how right from the 
beginning of his career he graviated towards a European literary tradition and 
universal themes.89 The danger of over-emphasising Bergman’s internationalism has 
also been widely recognised. Scholarship on Bergman has sought to recover some of 
the more specific cultural meanings of his work issuing from Sweden and 
Scandinavia in general as Steene notes.90 Scholarship on Bergman has also sought to 
recognise the interplay between Bergman’s work in cinema with his equally prolific 
theatrical career and his work as a writer and a producer. The theatre-film 
relationship is crucial to understanding his art, including the confessional quality of 
the dialogue, versatile switching between different genres that include comedy, and 
the influence of Strindberg. 
 
Whilst fully recognising the significance of attending to localised influences on 
Bergman’s work, this thesis is premised on the idea that the humanism emerging 
from Bergman’s work, in form and content, and its international connection with 
Klein and Sartre, has not been fully explored despite the frequent assumptions that 
Bergman relates to psychology and existentialism. Relevant to this is recognition of 
Bergman’s diversity as an artist including the interplay between his experience of 
theatre and his openness to different film styles. By way of introduction, it is best to 
simply describe Bergman as an experimenter, or bricoleur, who drew on a wide 
range of styles and remarkably forged a unique and unified style. The focus on two 
films which fully established him as an icon of European art cinema, Wild 
Strawberries and The Seventh Seal, and have received extensive critical analysis, 
potentially obscures the way he incorporates theatrical techniques and multiple filmic 
influences across his other films. In particular, I want to highlight his continuing 
respect for silent cinema. His love of the theatre and silent cinema inform the way 
Bergman thinks, and directs and are very significant in an account of the value he 
places on imagination.   
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In relation to Bergman’s adult life, his own psychological crises, including a number 
of broken marriages, and his visit to hospital with the nervous breakdown that 
preceded Persona, indicate the very real foundations of his psychological themes 
and, hence, the relevance of opening up comparisons and contrasts with Kleinian 
theory. However, just as important to understand is that his life as an artist was 
extremely social and productive with almost continuous involvement in theatre and 
film. Another basic point to make is that Bergman’s regular work with highly 
talented actors, and actresses across film and theatre, and other members of the 
production teams (such as his cinematographers), allowed for a continuity that 
fostered creative excellence. From Bergman’s biography we expect the themes of 
loss and anxiety to appear in his work, but we can also recognise how his creativity 
must be understood as a dialectic that involves a balance between romantic 
melancholy, and a more dynamic and optimistic creative spirit. This combination led 
to his dominance of Swedish cinema and success at international level. 
 
Klein, Sartre and Bergman: connections 
A general overview suggests that each of these figures brought traumatic personal 
issues into their work. This supports a widely accepted cliché about art and 
intellectual life that in some sense suffering is necessary for inspiration, creativity 
and insight. However, this is the starting point for recognising a deeper convergence, 
one that can be related to the Kleinian understanding of modernism developed by 
Esther Sánchez-Pardo. She writes:  
 
Modernist art and literature, with their emphasis on spatialization and the 
relevance of forms, reveal a troubled aesthetic state pervaded with 
melancholia.…Klein echoes a modernist concern with the precarious and 
contingent character of the analytic vocabularies available and more widely 
with the nature of representational discourse itself. 91 
 
This perspective is useful because it relates the apparent focus on traumatic content 
with the formal innovation of modernism and a broader cultural context developing 
most intensely from World War One onwards. However, as already noted, these 
three figures also seek the means of recovery through and from melancholia. This 
occurs either at the level of ideas, clinical practise, philosophical reflection or 
through narrative and character development. I will explore the idea that they share 
what has been called a culture of modernist melancholia, but also a humanistic 
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search for progress, thus relating the individual circumstances of these figures to 
broader historical developments. The shared philosophy is humanist because there is 
a real sense in which each figure seeks positive values beyond localised boundaries 
and thus invokes a sense of universality. Briefly, this is apparent in Klein’s model of 
reparation; Sartre’s search for an existentialist ethics and politics; and the presence of 
a degree of narrative resolution in many Bergman films alongside their emphasis on 
melancholy themes and disjuncture. Although this involves debate and disagreement 
with various commentators who stress the pessimism of each of these figures (for 
instance, Gado’s account of Bergman’s films, and Rustin’s equation of Sartre with 
Lacanian theory92), it is necessary to consider how recovery and renewal are 
represented or constructed by Klein, Sartre and Bergman, even when this is oblique 
or in question. 
 
Another point of comparison is that across their work there is an emphasis on 
psychological depth and reflection, which extends to a more critical engagement with 
their society. Klein is more concerned with a vision of psychic depth than other 
psychological practitioners as can be seen in her challenge to uncover the 
unconscious of children, and her opposition to theories that have no sense of the 
unconscious. For Klein, reflection must grasp the dynamics of unconscious 
phantasies in order that progress can be achieved. Sartre, on the other hand, 
challenges the Freudian concept of the unconscious. However,Sartre maintains an 
emphasis on the efficacy of individual reflection, and this is where he establishes a 
depth of subjectivity in contrast to other philosophies, coming into conflict with 
empirical and positivistic theories, and then in the 1960s structuralism. Bergman’s 
cinema is more concerned with reflection through introspective dialogue and 
psychological themes, thus contrasting with the action based cinema of some 
Hollywood films in particular. Through reflection Bergman characters often 
interrogate their own lives and histories, a classic example being the ruminations of 
Isac Borg in Wild Strawberries. This concern with reflection and depth relates to a 
broader historical context and position. Let us just note at this point a few indicators. 
All three were significantly influenced by the horror of World War Two, the 
questioning and reflection in the post-war aftermath and the constructive optimism of 
the post-war rebuilding. It is necessary to consider whether the emphasis on psychic 
depth is influenced by these, and other historical, horizons. 
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A sense of critical engagement with post-war developments can be read across their 
work. For instance, Klein’s concept of the paranoid-schizoid has been used to 
criticize the nuclear arms race and to criticise and conceptualise, as Ian Parker puts it, 
‘the cultural dynamics that keep this war drive on the move.’93 Furthermore, Klein’s 
work has been considered from an explicitly political perspective as Julia Kristeva 
notes: 
 
Some critics emphasize her theory of the negative and the importance of the 
death drive and of the disruptive forces that call to mind the image of the anti 
establishmentarian and the rebel when they do not descend into the figures of 
the paranoid person or the quietly schizophrenic egotist.94  
 
This indicates Klein’s faith in the liberating powers of the imagination as well as the 
dangers of delusion, obsession and other psychological complexes. Kristeva notes 
that Klein’s work:  
 
…did not focus on the political aspects of the madness which tainted the 
twentieth century. At the same time, even if she shielded herself from the 
horrors that surrounded her, Klein’s analysis of private psychosis, whether in 
children or in adults, helps us to identify the most deep-seated mechanisms that    
- along with economic and ideological influences - paved the way for the 
destruction of psychic space and the annihilation of the life of the mind that 
threatened the modern era.95 
 
 
Sartre becomes politicised from the period of his imprisonment in the Second World 
War and in the post-war period is an active contributor to anti-imperialist and anti- 
capitalist struggles. Opinion is mixed on the identity of Sartre’s politics in the latter 
stages of his career, as he tried to synthesise Marxism and politics. Frederic Jameson 
offers one side of the argument when he argues that Sartre can be considered as part 
of ‘the new left’, which incorporated cultural critique.96  
 
Bergman’s work included some soap commercials when he needed to earn a living at 
the start of the 1950s.97 His sophisticated comedies of this decade are just as worthy 
of analysis as his other work but also reveal his attempt to win an audience.98 Thus, 
Bergman shows that he was broad minded enough to experiment with different 
modes of film-making whilst seeking to get sufficient funding. However, the fact that 
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he did not migrate to Hollywood is an indicator of his orientation outside a more 
consumer focussed film industry. This is notable particularly given his struggle with 
budgets if not the enduring support of the Swedish film industry.99 An aspect of 
Bergman’s politics which Bergman himself discusses is his flirtation with fascism in 
the 1940s as an impressionable teenager staying in Germany. Bergman discusses 
how this episode made him move away from political subjects subsequently; but also 
he discusses how Shame made in 1968 was motivated by continuing thoughts about 
World War Two about the threat of Nazism. This work can also be read as 
suggestive of a critical engagement with contemporary politics. Shame was made 
before the Russian invasion of Czechoslovakia and the intensification of the conflict 
in Vietnam. Bergman makes clear that he would have made the film differently if 
these events had already occurred, which shows, perhaps surprisingly, his 
willingness to respond to, or take account of, political upheaval in this instance.100  
 
The concern with depth and its significance for reflection on society in Klein, 
Bergman and Sartre can be contrasted with the increasing emphasis on surface and 
anonymity which is associated with the expansion of consumer culture and post-
modernism. Arguably Klein, Sartre and Bergman are concerned with the same signs 
of alienation and conformity, which concerned a range of liberal and leftist 
intellectuals. Thus their work can be connected to the critical responses, which 
developed towards the consequences of late capitalism including the critique of mass 
society found in the work of the Frankfurt School.  In the case of Bergman, this does 
not lead to an obvious ideological position. It has been argued by Jörn Donner that 
Bergman’s work is responding to a society, Sweden, that was extremely advanced in 
terms of economic security and thus even more vulnerable to issues concerning the 
‘inner life’.101  In this sense, Bergman’s work confronts a loss of ideology. 
Nevertheless, even if this context prevails across Bergman’s work we also find issues 
of equality, and disempowerment. Some of Bergman’s early works, influenced by 
neo-realism demonstrate a marked concern with the alienation of young working 
class characters from their society. In other works we find expressive and powerful 
treatment of alienation including a striking awareness of injustice and challenges 
faced by his female protagonists. 
 
Meanwhile, the politics of Kleinianism are brought forward when Michael Rustin 
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argues that British psychoanalysis in the post-war period, which included an 
influential Kleinian stream, was defined by a progressive cultural agenda. In his 
essay Lacan, Klein and Politics Rustin argues that this and related sections of British 
psychoanlysis are ‘defined to some degree in opposition to the values of a merely 
materialist or power-seeking society.’102 Another Kleinian theorist, C. Fred Alford 
attempts to bring together Kleinian and Frankfurt School theory. In Jameson’s Post-
modernism, or The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism the theories of structuralism 
and post-structuralism are implicated in the development of depthless culture partly 
because of their failure to attend to history.103 A crucial question, then, which arises 
in relation to a humanist focus on the power of individual imagination is whether this 
is more successful than structuralism in maintaining awareness of historical forces. 
This question can only be dealt with through the focussed analysis of individual 
works, which will follow in subsequent chapters. Despite concentrating on the role of 
imagination I will explore not just the issues that confront Klein, Sartre and Bergman 
within their respective fields, but the relevance or lack of relevance of political and 
social connotations in the work.         
 
The challenge of structuralism and Lacan 
The sense of a humanistic convergence between Klein, Sartre and Bergman is 
reinforced when we look at the contrast offered by the structuralist theory emerging 
in the 1960s. In the late 1950s Sartre was a cult figure, Klein had strong claims to 
being Freud’s successor and Bergman was considered to be at the forefront of 
creativity in world cinema. These reputations did not disappear. However, by the end 
of the 1960s, the constituency of each figure had been diminished, and a critical 
factor in this was the turn against the individual subject conveyed by structuralist 
theory. Structuralist critiques of the auteur theory challenge the way in which the 
work of all these figures had been appreciated. As Merquior notes, the structuralist 
Claude Lévi-Strauss explicitly challenged Sartre’s existentialism.104 Also, as Rustin 
makes clear, British critical theory gravitated towards Lacan rather than Klein and 
the object relations tradition 105
  
 
Lacan’s work was influential across the fields of psychoanalysis, philosophy and 
cultural studies. Of particular relevance to this thesis is that it had a critical influence 
on post-1960s film theory. Susan Hayward argues that the beneficial influence of 
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Lacan on feminist film theory is particularly evident in relation to film noir and 
women’s films because Lacanian and post-Lacanian critics have been able to show 
how women who refuse to ‘mirror’ the desires of the male are perceived as posing a 
threat or disruption to male controlled society. She suggests that Lacan with his 
theory of the unconscious as a language exposes the illusions imposed on images by 
patriarchy.106 In Laura Mulvey’s seminal article on visual pleasure the illusory 
unifying effect of the patriarchal regime is explained specifically using voyeurism 
and fetishism as key structural concepts.107 There is a complex history of film theory 
here, and, clearly, Lacan’s willingness to challenge any conception of individual 
autonomy can inform a critique of individual films. However, my purpose is more 
specific: to indicate how this structuralist perspective conflicts with the intentions 
and ambitions of Klein, Bergman and Sartre’s humanism. 
 
Lacan, in his early formulation of the mirror phase in 1949, suggests that the infant 
overcomes a sense of internal fragmentation and disunity with a specular image of 
him/herself in which unity of the ego is attributed to unity of the body. He writes: 
 
The fact is that the total form of the body by which the subject anticipates in a 
mirage the maturation of his power is given to him only as a Gestalt, that is to 
say, in an exteriority in which this form is certainly more constituent than 
constituted, but in which it appears above all in a contrasting size (un relief de 
stature) that fixes it and in a symmetry that inverts it, in contrast with the 
turbulent movements that the subject feels are animating him. 108
 
 
According to Lacan, then, this mirror image transcends its apparent origin outside the 
subject and offers an imaginary sense of autonomy, which the subject will cling on to 
through the subsequent trials of the Oedipal phase and its inter-relations with others. 
Lacan’s intervention has cultural implications. He pays tribute to the surrealists for 
recognising this illusory sense of unity in images: 
 
I have myself shown in the social dialectic that structures human knowledge as 
paranoiac why human knowledge has greater autonomy than animal 
knowledge in relation to the field of force of desire, but also why human 
knowledge is determined in that ‘little reality’ (ce peu de réalité), which the 
surrealists, in their restless way, saw as its limitation.109
 
 
Lacan opens his 1949 address with his attack on René Descartes’ philosophy of the 
cogito. Here he refers to the Cartesian legacy, and the belief that knowledge’s 
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foundation is self- reflection. Later in the address, Lacan turns against existentialism 
as a philosophy. He recognises that the latter has grasped a sense of negativity which 
ego psychology plays down or excludes: 
 
But unfortunately that philosophy {existentialism}grasps negativity only 
within the limits of a self-sufficiency of consciousness, which, as one of its 
premises, links to the meconnaissances that constitute the ego, the illusion of 
autonomy to which it entrusts itself.110 
 
This explains, according to Lacan, why the freedom that existentialism offers is so 
contradictory, and perversely pessimistic, believing in ‘a freedom that is never more 
authentic than when it is in the walls of a prison’.111 We are still here at an early stage 
in Lacan’s career and later his work became more defined by structuralism as he 
developed the idea that the unconscious is structured like a language. Since semiotics 
was starting to play a part in film theory in the 1960s, the conjunction of 
psychoanalysis and semiotics in Lacan’s work proved an attractive foundation for 
many film theorists, as Geoffrey Nowell Smith notes.112 
  
Klein and Sartre do not give a carte blanche to the autonomous Cartesian human 
subject but they introduce innovative ideas of human agency. For Klein the infant’s 
recognition of the mother and other internalised objects through the depressive phase 
provides a model for greater synthesis of the ego. This is a significant foundation for 
linguistic development and is morally desirable in its projection of a form of 
compassion for the other. For Sartre, freedom is not forever dependent on the 
‘prison’ Lacan refers to in his address, but remains a horizon for analysis. Klein and 
Sartre do not invoke Cartesian reflection but they provide new perspectives on the 
inward gaze, which detaches this psychology from all consuming narcissism. In 
Bergman’s films characters continually look into themselves. A Lacanian perspective 
offers insight into the fragmentation that some Bergman characters experience and a 
critique of the illusions of autonomy which others are beset by, but this perspective 
does not provide an accessible model for recognising patterns of integration and 
individual self-realisation. 
 
Lacan’s ideas are just one example of the structuralist critique of a model of 
individual agency. On the whole, Klein, Sartre and Bergman simply do not engage 
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with the challenge that emerges through structuralist theorists such as Lacan. Their 
continued assumption of a level of individual agency is supported, however, by a 
range of theorists who have challenged the structuralist intervention, precisely on its 
elimination of ideas of the individual. 
 
Marwick’s historical account of structuralism and post-structuralism 
In tracing the intellectual history of the 1960s Marwick charts the rise of 
structuralism and also links this to post-structuralism. Reading through Marwick’s 
summary of the views of key structuralist thinkers we return frequently to the way in 
which ideas of individual autonomy are challenged. This is evident for Marwick 
from Roland Barthes’ essay The Death of an Author, and in Lévi-Strauss’ insistence 
on the work of Ferdinand de Saussure. Marwick summarises Saussure’s argument as 
follows: 
 
Words, he argued, can only have meaning within the entire language system of 
which they are a part; they derive their meaning from their difference from 
other words. This language system, he asserted (there is certainly nothing in the 
way of proof), is external to human beings, arising instead from the power 
structure of society.113
 
 
From work that has been influential on the subject of film studies, as it became 
academically institutionalised in the 1970s, we are aware of Saussure’s semiotics, 
Lévi-Strauss’ insight that anthropology could be analysed as language,114 and the 
work of the other structuralists and post-structuralists, ranging from Michel Foucault 
to Lacan. Marwick’s historical account reminds us that a recurring dominant theme is 
the attack on individual agency. Lévi -Strauss in his book La Pensee Sauvage made 
‘an undisguised attack on Sartre.’115 Lacan decided that  ‘...subconscious desires are 
not those of the individual “subject” but of the (bourgeois) power structure of the 
society to which the subject belongs.’116 Further on, Marwick notes that:  
 
Foucault also joined in the attack on the bourgeois notion that any significance 
attached to the individual human ‘subject’ or historical actor. Only the modern 
‘human sciences’ put the individual ‘human subject’at the centre of things; 
Foucault suggested that this had not always been so, and would not long 
continue to be so.117
 
 
One can argue with Marwick’s generalisations, which seek to extract the common 
 41 
sense meaning from these radical theorists. One might also argue with his point that 
these theorists remain uncritical of Marxism and that this is why they continue to 
emphasise the dominance of bourgeois ideology over the individual. However, 
Marwick’s account is useful in indicating some of the broad differences of this 
intellectual trend that became so prominent in the 1960s from the ideas and practice 
of the figures who I am studying. Marwick sees the structuralist and post-structuralist 
movement as an example of ‘cultural extremism’, in which fairly consensual ideas 
about how individual agency must be placed in context are transformed into new 
absolutes about the weakness and fictional nature of the individual agent. He writes: 
 
They pushed their conclusions to ultimate extremes. Thus the sensible 
observation that all human activities are in some way influenced by the society 
or culture within which they live becomes the dogma that all such activities are 
socially or culturally constructed. The sensible observation that readers, or 
audiences, often bring their own perceptions or imaginings to bear on the ‘text’ 
they read (novels, etc.) or watch (films, etc.) becomes the dogma that texts are 
autonomous, that there is no author. The sensible observation that language is 
very important to the way in which we frame our thoughts, and that most of 
what we know comes, not from direct observation, but from someone else’s 
writing or speech, becomes the dogma that everything is constructed within 
language.118
 
 
Merquior’s critique of structuralism 
The reason for looking now at some points raised in Merquior’s critique of 
structuralism is that he pinpoints the way in which its eclipsing of the role assigned 
to the individual was not a foregone conclusion given the antecedents of 
structuralism. 
 
As Merquior points out, structuralism, despite its own history including roots in the 
work of Saussure, Czech and Russian formalism, was primarily an intellectual 
development in France in the 1960s. Merquior opens his critique of this intellectual 
development by emphasising how it displaced and opposed Sartrean existentialism. 
Structuralism opposed the placing of individual consciousness at the centre of  
theory.119 According to Merquior, existentialism, through Heidegger in particular, 
had romanticised the Cartesian notion of the centrality of consciousness. But 
Heidegger did this in a way that placed consciousness under the sway of Being (as 
Merquior puts it in Heidegger’s work existentialism is ‘nourished’ by ‘quasi-
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religious needs’).120 With Sartre the cogito becomes more centrally identified with 
freedom or the possibility of freedom, but also, as Merquior argues, existentialism 
and Sartre in particular, with his work on Marxism and existentialism, took 
increasing account of history. In contrast, Merquior says the structuralist argument 
against existentialism involved primarily an opposition to history and humanism. 
 
Merquior argues that in the history of the development of structuralism we find not 
only an overlap with the ideas of other philosophies (for instance on the theory of the 
arbitrariness of the sign he finds comparison with diverse philosophies going back to 
Plato); but also instances where a greater emphasis on historical context is included. 
He refers to the success of Jan Mukařovsky in retaining a sense of ‘the 
phenomenological accent on the “intentional” status of the aesthetic object’, whilst 
developing a ‘semiological’ mode of analysis.121 Merquior makes the case that 
Mukařovsky’s recognition of the significance of intentionality in art made him more 
acutely aware of the way the norms governing the artwork are affected by social and 
historical transformation.122 
 
Merquior uses the case of Mukařovsky to reiterate the need of cultural theory to 
recognise the significance of individual intention. My aim here is not to study the 
history of semiology but Merquior’s argument is relevant because Klein, Sartre and 
Bergman go much further in elaborating on the significance of the individual’s 
intentions against the context in which they operate. Klein appears to be closest to a 
form of determinism and Sartre closest to an idealisation of free will, but it is the 
common core preoccupation with imagination that insures their insistence that the 
individual can achieve a degree of transcendence in relation to their circumstances. It 
is worth noting here the point made by Mészáros: he argues that Sartre throughout 
his career was preoccupied with the constraints and limits on freedom.123 This 
preoccupation is also evident in the way Klein tracks the conflicts rooted in the 
psyche and in Bergman’s representations of psychological conflict, but each retains a 
belief in the possibility of liberation through the imagination. 
 
Structuralism and post-structuralism have played a significant role in post-1960s film 
theory. However, the aim of this thesis is not to explore the debates that have ensued 
about the value of these theoretical developments. Instead, I have referred to 
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Marwick and Merquior’s criticisms of structuralism because this allows a stronger 
appreciation of the intellectual convergence of Bergman, Klein and Sartre. The 
central focus of this thesis is on an inter-disciplinary study of selected works by 
Bergman. This involves an exploration of how key concepts from Klein and Sartre 
can be incorporated in an appreciation of the role played by imagination across 
Bergman’s work. This idea of a convergence between Bergman, Klein and Sartre 
involves retaining a significant emphasis on individual agency through the activity of 
the imagination. At the same time each figure represents contextual factors that 
challenge and conflict with any notion of subjectivity as sovereign, and the 
imagination is not represented as a power operating in isolation. All three figures 
develop their ideas within specialised fields drawing on the influence of others. 
 
In Chapter 2 I will argue that Klein’s ideas relate to the influence of Freud, before 
exploring how her work can be applied to Bergman’s films through the example of 
Wild Stawberries. In Chapter 3 I will concentrate on Sartre’s early work, The 
Imaginary and consider how this is significant in relation to some of Sartre’s better- 
known philosophical ideas developed during and after World War Two. I will then 
explore the relevance of these ideas, and existentialism in general, for Bergman’s 
work through the example of The Seventh Seal. In Chapters 4, 5, and 6 I will 
concentrate on three films from distinct parts of Bergman’s career Summer with 
Monika, The Virgin Spring and Hour of the Wolf. In Chapter 4 this will be preceded 
by a brief over-view of three more films from the early part of Bergman’s career. 
The intention of these chapters is to explore how Kleinian and Sartrean ideas can be 
incorporated in close analysis. This involves integrating key points from these 
theorists alongside a methodology specific to film studies including analysis of 
cinematic elements such as camerawork and lighting, and recognition of narrative 
structure and character development. The films chosen have already been extensively 
analysed and discussed but are not as well known as Fanny and Alexander, Wild 
Strawberries and The Seventh Seal. The three films studied briefly at the beginning 
of Chapter 4 Music in Darkness (1948), Port of Call, and Prison have been selected 
because they show how Bergman’s early work involves a mixture of styles, but 
nevertheless relates to key points raised by Klein and Sartre, most importantly the 
significance attached to imagination.  
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The work of these theorists must now be explored more fully. As these ideas are 
applied in later chapters we will also gain a stronger understanding of how they are 
relevant to detailed analysis of film and narrative form. In the process we will see 
how Bergman’s work evolved from his early experiments with style and narrative in 
the 1940s.  
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2     From Freud to Klein, and Wild Strawberries 
 
In this chapter I will concentrate on the specific innovations in psychoanalytic theory 
achieved by Melanie Klein and her followers. I will start by arguing that Sigmund 
Freud’s ideas on narcissism and the death instinct provide a platform for Klein’s 
work. Klein’s significance rests partly on her application of psychoanalysis to 
children evident in her earliest work, but throughout her career we find consistency 
and evolution in the development of her ideas relating to an internal object world for 
children and adults alike. Most of Klein’s writing refers to examples from her 
practice and involves formulation of her key concepts, often in relation to Freud. 
Klein rarely applied her ideas to a wider context, but there are some writings on 
culture including notes for a review of Citizen Kane.1 The account of Freud’s 
influence on Klein’s theoretical development and her main ideas will be followed 
with a brief account of her treatment of creativity in relation to the case of an artist 
recovering from depression, and a short novel about identity transformation which 
Klein analyses later in her career. The relevance of Kleinian thinking for culture rests 
on its dialectical conception of art as a practice that is capable of articulating great 
negativity for both the artist and the viewer through a conception of the imagination 
that is, however, ultimately constructive and benign. This vision of an imaginary 
world operating from birth will be explored further by considering the application of 
Klein’s ideas to film and, in particular, Wild Strawberries, one of Bergman’s most 
psychoanalytic films. The latter offers comparisons to Klein’s preoccupation with the 
death drive, and the representation of a cathartic process, in which the lead character 
models a process of psychic transformation and integration. 
 
Applying Klein’s ideas to art and film undoubtedly raises methodological issues 
because of her immersion in psychoanalytic practice and discourse. The elaboration 
of Kleinian ideas by her contemporaries and theorists dedicated to her ideas is a 
necessary resource for the application of her ideas to culture. Throughout the chapter 
I will call on points made by Kleinians including Joan Riviere, Adrian Stokes and 
Hanna Segal, as well as more recent accounts of the theory. For the first half I will 
focus on how Klein’s ideas build on the work of Freud. In addition to the paranoid-
schizoid position and the depressive position, introduced in the previous chapter, key 
concepts in Klein’s work include those of the inner world, introjection, projection, 
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splitting and envy. 
 
The Kleinian concept of the internal world structured by unconscious impulses is one 
that requires clarification at the outset. As Klein’s fellow analyst Riviere says, for 
many people the idea that an individual internalises other people or objects is 
difficult to accept.2 Riviere explains that this is partly because this inner world 
represents the ‘unknown’ and is thus encountered with apprehension. She also argues 
that we are more conscious of the threat posed by internal figures at the expense of 
recognising good elements that have been introjected.3 It is important to note the 
emphasis developed by Riviere amongst others that this inner world should be 
understood primarily in relation to emotion. There are different approaches within 
Kleinian theory but the re-working and evolution of this theory is placed in a 
historical perspective by noting Lavinia Gomez’s account of it. Discussing the 
heritage of Klein’s work, Gomez discusses how it has been modified so that the 
language of internalised and projected objects and part objects has to some extent 
been subsumed under terms that convey the subject’s ‘psychological functions such 
as seeing and hearing, thinking and experiencing’.4 More important for this chapter is 
the idea that Klein continues to represent an understanding of the psyche that can 
throw into question and challenge preconceptions about the individual, and by 
extension their social world. Jacqueline Rose represents this when she says: ‘In the 
humanities, a post-Lacanian orthodoxy has blocked access to Klein.’5 Later in this 
paragraph Rose adds: ‘Especially in the United States, Klein’s work has been 
rejected on account of its violence and negativity.’6 The appeal of the Kleinian model 
for analysing Bergman’s work rests on its ability to provide a model of integration 
whilst simultaneously maintaining a vision of negativity. In other words the goal for 
both Klein and Bergman is not an unequivocal good object, but instead they value 
awareness and recognition of the way good and bad are intertwined. In Klein’s case 
understanding this vision requires analysis of her response to Freud.  
 
The Freudian inheritance 
The degree to which Kleinian theory emphasises internalised negativity from infancy 
in destructive emotions such as jealousy and envy, and her account of the relation 
between paranoid-schizoid states and on the other depressive mental states involves a 
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significant transformation of the concept of narcissism. The latter is an important 
critical concept which has been used in psychoanalytical theory to represent an 
individual’s failure to engage with reality through a deluding imaginative life based 
on self-indulgent thoughts and desires.7 Klein’s work does not seek to eliminate 
critical reflections on narcissism, but expands on this idea with a focus on active 
transformation through achieving the depressive position and reparative strategies. 
To understand Klein’s interventions at a general level we must return to the influence 
of Freud and other psychoanalysts on her work. 
 
In his 1914 piece, ‘On Narcissism’, Freud believes that narcissism, or self-love, is a 
necessary stage of child development prior to the Oedipus complex and genital 
sexuality. He notes how it has been associated with ‘disorders’ amongst which were 
included homosexuality, but refers to the broader perspective that it is a natural stage 
‘…in the regular course of human sexual development.’8 However, it is necessary to 
pass beyond this stage. For Freud, in these cases the individual’s libido has become 
overly directed towards their ego, blocking their capacity to love.9 Klein follows 
Freud in recognising the need to transcend narcissism but nevertheless it is worth 
noting that this issue produces different perspectives across both Freudian and 
Kleinian thought. For example, adopting a Kleinian approach Sánchez-Prado 
suggests that the Kleinian idea of an inner object, which is loved in conflict with 
social norms can be conceptualised as a form of resistance to imposed ideas on 
sexuality.10 For Freud, reality has to intervene to establish greater reciprocity and 
contingency in relationships. Arguably, Klein’s work advances from this in showing 
how narcissism may be deeply embedded in a set of relationships at the beginning of 
an individual’s existence taking precedence over the state of narcissism described by 
Freud. As a result of this one could say that Kleinian theory goes further than 
Freudian theory in challenging stereotypes about gender and sexuality noted already 
in relation to Freud. Whilst Freud uses the ideas of projection and introjection, he 
still puts a strong emphasis on narcissism as a state in which the individual is 
virtually solipsistic, and thus he fails to recognise the extent of relationships to 
external objects that are involved at the earliest level. In Kleinian theory the self-
absorption of narcissism is not disputed, but it is placed in a more complex set of 
relationships. 
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In Kleinian theory the importance of passing through the paranoid-schizoid position 
and the depressive position, become crucial in transcending narcissism. Freud’s 
notion of primary narcissism, an all-consuming narcissism dominant in the early 
years, was so strongly challenged by Klein’s ideas that this became a key issue in the 
dispute with Anna Freud. As Meira Likierman tells us, Anna Freud was completely 
opposed to Klein’s idea that the baby made discriminations between good and bad 
objects. Likierman writes: 
 
To Anna Freud such advanced differentiating capacities in the infant were 
hardly credible. They also threatened her father’s model of development, which 
postulated instead an initial foetal-like primary narcissism. Sigmund Freud had 
envisaged the young infant as noticing very little of the outside world, its 
existence governed by the pleasure principle, and its primitive mind drifting 
into dream-like, hallucinatory states that hinder the full apprehension of 
worldly frustrations. Only gradually do such frustrations impinge on the 
infantile mind, thus enabling it to begin to accommodate the reality principle, 
and only then are object relations tenable. 
Melanie Klein not only subverted this notion, but, on the basis of her beliefs 
proceeded to hypothesize a rudimentary psychical activity that exists from birth 
and that she termed ‘phantasy’.11 
 
 
In highlighting Klein’s evolution of Freud’s theory we should not underestimate the 
degree to which she honours and builds on his work. In 1920 Freud’s work ‘Beyond 
the Pleasure Principle’ initiated fuller recognition of negativity and self-destruction 
in the unconscious. ‘Beyond the Pleasure Principle’ demonstrates a proximity in 
Freud’s theory to the direction developed subsequently by Klein, and is also striking 
in its reference to child’s play as a source of evidence for psychoanalysis, precisely 
the area that Klein decided to specialise in, and the source of her conviction that 
phantasy is complex from the beginning of infancy. In ‘Beyond the Pleasure 
Principle’ Freud returns to his theory that human motivation must be explained by 
the search for pleasure, and by the repression and censorship of this drive in 
accordance with the reality principle. Freud ponders the impression that unpleasure is 
not just caused by the necessity of compromise. Here, he is partly responding to the 
events of World War One and the question of how to help traumatised soldiers. 
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Freud emphasises the way such soldiers are compelled to repeat in their dreams, the 
traumatised incidents causing their distress. In contrast, before this Freud had argued, 
following the pleasure principle, that dreams provide wish fulfilment. What 
masochistic urges are responsible for the compulsion to repeat painful experiences 
even in the form of fantasy? As Freud puts it: 
 
If the dreams of those with accident-induced neurosis are not to make us start 
doubting the wish-fulfilling tendency of dreams in general, then we might have 
recourse to the explanation that in this disorder the dream-function, like so 
much else, is thrown into disarray and distracted from its proper purposes; or 
we might turn our minds to the mysterious, masochistic tendencies of the ego.12 
 
 
Freud turns to his example of children and play, which derived from his personal 
experience staying as a guest with a family. Freud notices the child’s repeated 
tendency to throw away his toys uttering an exclamation, ‘ “o-o-o-o” ’, that to Freud 
and the mother signifies the word ‘ fort (“gone”)’. Freud also notices in connection 
with this that the child plays a particular game where he throws a reel into his cot but 
then uses the string attached to bring it back. Whilst the throwing out of the reel is 
accompanied by the same sound, ‘ “o-o-o-o” ’, that Freud takes to signify ‘gone’, in 
contrast the return of the reel is accompanied by ‘ a joyful  Da  (“Here!”).’13 Freud 
interprets the game in relation to the child’s response to the periods when his mother 
leaves him. His game of disappearance and make believe, according to Freud, helps 
the child to deal with the anxiety of his mother’s absence. This famous example from 
Freud’s work leads directly into Klein’s extensive work on the symbolic significance 
of children’s play. 
 
We should notice that Freud makes this example deeper and more interesting than at 
first it appears. Freud looks further into psychoanalyticl elements of the child’s 
situation and asks in effect: why does the child include the mother’s departure, when 
this was clearly an unpleasant experience? The game could have just re-enacted the 
wish fulfilment of the mother’s return, but instead, the departure is often a game in 
its own right. Freud speculates about an alternative interpretation whereby repetition 
affords the child control over a painful experience, but then he offers another  
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‘interpretation’: that in fact the throwing away of the toys could be regarded as a 
hostile action designed to provide some revenge against the mother. As Freud says, 
the action might be taken as conveying the statement; ‘ “Alright, go away! I don’t 
need you; I’m sending you away myself!” ’14 Freud continues by comparing the 
situation with a similar pattern found with the same child a year later. The father 
having gone to war, the child would accompany his disposal of the toys with ‘ “Go in 
war!” ’15 In this case Freud considers that the child, being more attached to his 
mother, could enjoy the father’s departure, but this does not obscure the point for 
Freud that children may frequently take up negative or unpleasant experiences in 
their play, and through their play activities seek a form of control over their 
experience. At this point Freud brings in the comparison with adult culture, and in 
particular the way tragedies provide an audience with apparently painful experiences 
to enjoy.16 For Freud, this cannot be explained with reference to just the search for 
pleasure, even if the latter transcends the pain and is the final outcome of the 
spectator’s experience. Such an approach neglects: ‘…the prevalence of tendencies 
beyond the pleasure principle; tendencies, that is, that are arguably more primal than 
the pleasure principle, and quite independent of it.’17 
 
Following his discussion of the fort/da game and his brief discussion of the 
therapeutic process, Freud moves on to focus on the phenomenon of repetition. In the 
patient’s re-experiencing of repressed material he detects the pleasure principle 
because wishes that have been repressed come to the surface.  He also states: 
 
The new and remarkable fact that we now have to report, however, is that the 
compulsion to repeat also brings back experiences from the past that contain no 
potential for pleasure whatever, and which even at the time cannot have 
constituted gratification, not even in respect of drive-impulses that were only 
subsequently repressed.18 
 
 
Freud is on his way here to locating the death drive in the unconscious. He discusses 
after this the cases where individuals appear compelled to repeat unfortunate 
circumstances for themselves, and he returns to the prevalence of repetition in 
children’s play. Although it is possible for the repetition of pain to be compatible 
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with a final gain of pleasure Freud insists that there are many examples where the 
repetition is incompatible with the pleasure principle. Despite the pervasive 
relevance of the pleasure principle, Freud argues that: 
 
Sufficient evidence remains to justify the hypothesis of a compulsion to repeat; 
and this compulsion appears to us to be more primal, more elemental, more 
deeply instinctual than the pleasure principle, which it simply thrusts aside.19 
 
However, this point is qualified as Freud remarks just above this observation: ‘…we 
do need to bear in mind that only on rare occasions will we be able to catch the 
compulsion to repeat operating purely on its own, without the interaction of other 
motive forces.’20 
 
In ‘Beyond the Pleasure Principle’ Freud deliberates on the question of whether 
biological evidence supports the notion of a death instinct. Somewhat tentatively, he 
suggests that beneath the pleasure principle the more primitive urge is to return to a 
state of non-being. This does not mean that humanity is reckless and suicidal. But 
instead there is a deep instinct to maintain circumstances in which one’s death will 
be secured on one’s own terms. For Freud, the death instinct is like the pleasure 
principle regulated by the requirement of equilibrium. How does Freud square this 
idea with evidence of natural instincts geared to self-preservation? He writes: 
 
The theory that there are drives directed at self-preservation, drives that we 
ascribe to all living beings, stands in striking opposition to the hypothesis that 
the entire life of the drives serves to procure death. Considered in this light, the 
theoretical significance of the drives concerned with self-preservation, self-
assertion and dominance diminishes greatly. They are indeed partial ‘drives’, 
charged with the task of safeguarding the organism’s particular path to death 
and barring all possible means of return to the inorganic other than those 
already immanent…21 
 
 
Freud proceeds to consider how his work on sexuality fits into this picture and 
whether it contradicts the ideas being advanced. This leads him to situate sexual 
instincts as opposed to the death instinct and, hence, develop a dualistic theory. 
Commenting on Freud’s introduction of the death instinct (including the suppression 
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of the opposition between ego and sexuality with the speculative opposition between 
life and death), Charles Rycroft indicates that even Freud’s close follower Ernest 
Jones was not able to accept that there was biological evidence for Freud’s theory of 
the death instinct. However, Rycroft notes the influence of the theory on Kleinian 
work. As Rycroft puts it:  
 
the idea still has a certain currency and forms an essential part of Kleinian 
theory, which conceives of aggression as a projection of the individual’s own 
innate self-destructive drive.22 
  
 
Klein’s development of Freudian ideas 
Klein’s adherence to Freud is apparent throughout her work. From the outset she 
uses Freudian ideas about sexuality in the analysis of both children and adults. We 
also find that Klein includes some reflections on the implication of psychoanalytic 
ideas for the understanding of creativity and culture. An early example of Klein’s 
response to both Freud and her interest in culture is evident in her 1923 essay titled 
‘Early Analysis’. Here she picks up Freud’s account of Leonardo da Vinci. She notes 
how Freud’s analysis draws attention to da Vinci’s phantasy of a vulture descending 
on him in his infancy. Klein follows Freud in relating this to da Vinci’s early 
memory of his mother and ‘a condensation of Leonardo’s early infantile sexual 
theories’.23 Klein goes on, inspired by Freud, to emphasise that da Vinci did not 
become fixated on the meaning of his infantile sexual theories about this experience. 
‘In Leonardo's case not only was an identification established between nipple, penis 
and bird's tail, but this identification became merged into an interest in the motion of 
this object, in the bird itself and its flight and the space in which it flew.’24 Thus, 
Klein takes on from Freud the idea that artistic activity can take the fascination of 
sexual fixation and transform this into a creative response to other external 
phenomena. 
 
In the same essay Klein discusses the case of a patient, a 13-year-old boy called 
Felix, who is unconsciously fixated on material developed by his imagination, as an 
infant, of sounds connected to sex. Klein makes it clear that these sounds may have 
been real or imaginary. But when Felix is able to overcome the fixation he discovers 
a passion for music. Klein goes on to note the progression in Felix’s interest from 
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enhanced critical awareness of music to a stage at which he might have risked 
composing music himself. Klein is not overtly idealistic about this and recognises 
that it depends on his talent, but she suggests that there is a process leading to the 
release of this talent which also involves his confidence in assuming the ‘paternal 
role’ of the ‘composer’.25 These examples illustrate Klein’s early interest in Freud’s 
theories of sexual sublimation and its relationship with creativity. 
 
Klein’s continuing adherence to Freud is apparent throughout her work, including 
her essay of 1929, ‘Infantile Anxiety Situations Reflected in a Work of Art and The 
Reparative Impulse’, which was written before she formally developed her key 
concepts of the paranoid-schizoid position and depressive position.26 In this essay 
she refers to Freud’s work on early anxiety situations for the baby. She builds on this 
to convey her conviction that these situations have been revealed by children in her 
analysis, but are also manifest more widely in culture, and represent a fundamental 
dynamic in human nature. Klein illustrates this through her discussion of an opera in 
which a child destroys the objects around him. For Klein, this destruction 
corresponds to a primitive attack on the child’s internal world, where the primary 
objects are the mother’s body, the father’s body and a union of the parents. Klein 
argues that this fundamental destructive anxiety is symbolised by the objects which 
the child attacks, and that as a necessary consequence the child experiences a 
paranoiac fear of reprisal, which is played out in the opera through the coming to life 
of the objects he has attacked. The same danger is posed outside in nature as animals 
and objects threaten him. The child, however, overcomes his anxiety through love 
and concern for a wounded squirrel. For Klein, the child’s empathy and concern for 
nature begins with his transcendence of the violence he has committed initially in 
phantasy against the maternal body, which is now sublimated as various objects and 
animals.27 
 
We can also find here the emergence of Klein’s difference from Freud in relation to 
the concept of super-ego. Freud had developed this concept to account for the child’s 
internalisation of the parents but, primarily, the internalisation of the father as an 
authority figure. For Freud, this is the key to repression and thus a key area for 
analysis of internal conflict. Klein essentially takes this a stage further so that the 
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internalised parents are potentially much more threatening, evoking threats of 
reprisal for infantile phantasies that are present from the beginning of the child’s life 
and precede the Oedipus complex. This primitive archaic form of the super-ego does 
not have the social content associated with Freud’s conception of the fully developed 
super-ego necessary for obedience to social norms. The primitive super-ego theorised 
by Klein carries the threat of annihilating the child completely, thus giving the death 
instinct a primacy over the castration anxiety which Freud placed such emphasis on.  
 
Much later in her career Klein summarised her divergence from Freud as follows: 
 
The threat of annihilation by the death instinct within is, in my view - which 
differs from Freud’s on this point - the primordial anxiety, and it is the ego 
which, in the service of the life instinct - possibly even called into operation by 
the life instinct - deflects to some extent that threat outwards. This fundamental 
defence against the death instinct Freud attributed to the organism, whereas I 
regard this process as the prime activity of the ego.28  
 
Klein distinguishes herself from Freud in her belief that the ego is necessitated at an 
early stage of development by the struggle with the death instinct. For Klein, the ego 
is threatened by the death instinct through bad objects, which are internalised or 
projected, whereas for Freud the death instinct is more like a drive towards oblivion.  
Alford’s comments are instructive on this: 
 
whereas both Freud and Klein set Eros against Thanatos, life against death, for 
Klein there is no nirvana principle, no connection between the hatred and 
aggression of Thanatos and the peace and absence of stimulation that Freud 
writes of in ‘Beyond the Pleasure Principle’.29 
 
Alford notes how Klein’s theory of the death instinct troubled many of her 
supporters; but in the end, according to Alford, Klein differs from Freud because of 
her emphasis on the way negativity is ‘integrated’. As Alford puts it: ‘As the 
individual matures, the destructive elements of the self are split off and regained, 
over and over, until greater integration comes about.’30 
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Klein’s colleague, Riviere, is instructive on the relevance of Freud’s work to the 
Kleinian focus on the death drive. Riviere suggests that Freud recognised a major 
cause of the death instinct in his emphasis on dependency in childhood such that fear 
of losing the love of one’s parents is equated with the possibility of annihilation.31 
Riviere, however, follows Klein in placing the death drive more centrally than Freud: 
 
We cannot escape the conclusion that an intense fear of dying by active 
aggression or passive neglect is a fundamental element in our emotional life, is 
as deeply rooted in our unconscious minds as life itself and is barricaded off 
from conscious experience by every known mechanism of defence.32  
 
For further understanding Riviere refers the reader to work by Klein and Paula 
Heimann, another associate of Klein.   
 
Abraham’s influence on Klein 
Klein was not just influenced by Freud in relation to the death instinct, but by her 
own analyst, Karl Abraham, who had argued that the infant is struck by both 
‘benign’ and ‘destructive’ traits.33 The latter were related by Abraham to the point at 
which the child develops teeth. This triggers a number of sadistic phantasies that go 
beyond biting. Likierman tells us that: 
 
Abraham redescribed the Freudian oral and anal stages as propelled by archaic 
relating mechanisms of preserving or expelling, and this was a significant 
addition to Freud’s view that they were merely propelled by blind, pleasure- 
seeking drives.34 
 
This is a very important source of Klein’s emphasis on the aggression of the infant. 
Likierman argues that it threatened to make Klein’s work convey an idea of human 
nature as flawed from birth (the idea of ‘original sin’). However, Likierman also 
points out that Klein’s adoption of Abraham’s ideas led her to seek to balance this 
picture. Likierman argues that this becomes apparent as Klein’s work progresses: 
 
From 1935 onwards, she was to suggest that benign and destructive tendencies 
are not neatly separated in discrete developmental phases, and that it is 
simplistic to view the infant as proceeding from sadism to goodness. Klein was 
ultimately to conclude that destructive and loving impulses coexist from the 
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beginning, living in continual conflict, and it is through this that a human 
mental life is shaped.35 
 
Likierman comes back to the influence of Abraham on Klein by pointing to the way 
he listened so acutely to his patients. Thus, he picked up on the way mental life was 
structured by emotional relationships, as well as by the pure quest of the instincts. 
So, Abraham is a significant influence on Klein because like Freud he is a forerunner 
of object relations theory, and the understanding that the origins of emotional 
relationships lie in an inner world that emerges as early as the pre-genital phase. 
Freud introduced the ideas of ‘introjection’ and ‘projection’ to account for the 
patient’s inner world and narcissistic disorders. However, according to Likierman: 
 
Freud did not integrate his thinking on these mechanisms into a broader vision, 
nor did he link them to infantile mental development. And while Abraham was 
much more aware of these possibilities, his was also a half-glimpsed version of 
early mental life, and it was left to Klein to integrate all the available thinking 
in a full object relations theory.36 
 
The depressive position, melancholy and mourning 
As we have seen, in her analysis of  Maurice Ravel’s L’Enfant et Les Sortilèges, 
Klein accounted for a sense of emotional pity as a primitive and fundamental 
emotion involved in the infant’s psychic life in her early work. This was a consistent 
idea throughout her work. In her 1940 piece, ‘Mourning and its Relation to Manic 
Depressive States’, she elaborates on the work of reparation achieved by the 
individual, from infant to adult by referencing Freud’s work ‘Mourning and 
Melancholia’.37 In this essay Freud had taken melancholia as a ‘narcissistic disorder’ 
and explained it more fully through contrast and comparison with mourning. Freud 
argues that in both states the individual internalises a loved object: 
 
If we listen patiently to the many and various self-reproaches of the 
melancholic, we will be unable to avoid a sense that the most intense among 
them often have little to do with the patient himself, but may with slight 
modifications be adapted to another person whom the patient loves, has loved 
or is supposed to love.38 
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Freud suggests that a condition in which the conscience obsessively directs 
reproaches against its own person is paralleled by cases of pathological mourning 
where the individual is simply unable to make any progress through grief. However, 
most mourning is a process that allows transformation whereas melancholia is more 
intractable. As Freud points out: 
 
...the causes of melancholia go beyond the clear case of loss through death, and 
include all situations of insult, slight, setback and disappointment through 
which an opposition of love and hate can be introduced to the relationship, or 
an ambivalence already presented can be intensified.39 
 
For Freud, the mourner’s progress beyond debilitating grief is overcome through a 
form of ‘reality’ testing such that the real absence of the lost person is accepted, and 
not denied through the phantasy of the internalised object, but melancholia can be 
more resistant to this reality testing. He acknowledges that it is difficult to 
understand how the mourner overcomes his grief, but argues that this involves 
narcissistic wishes being directed out towards external reality rather than inward 
towards the lost object.40 
 
Klein picks up Freud’s emphasis on reality testing to overcome mourning, but argues 
that this is a process that extends to early infancy. She writes: 
 
My contention is that the child goes through states of mind comparable to the 
mourning of an adult, or rather, that this early mourning is revived whenever 
grief is experienced in later life. The most important of the methods by which 
the child overcomes his states of mourning, is, in my view, the testing of 
reality; this process, however, as Freud stresses, is part of the work of 
mourning.41 
 
Kleinian theorists have noted that for Klein the child’s inquisitiveness and desire to 
know are elevated into an instinct. In her earlier work the destructive possibilities of 
this instinct were recognised alongside its place in normal development but, as 
Klein’s work progresses, further emphasis is given to the contribution of this instinct 
to the individual’s development. Discussing Wilfred Bion’s work after Klein, Rustin 
emphasises how Klein’s ideas about ‘an “epistemophilic instinct” ’ were highly 
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influential for the idea that a caring environment is necessary for the child to develop 
their curiosity and engagement with reality.42 When I apply Klein’s ideas to 
Bergman’s work I will argue that there is a strong parallel in the way that both 
Bergman and Klein stress the need for a balance between the search for greater 
knowledge about external reality, a kind of reality recognition, and its internalisation 
through imagination. 
 
Returning to the study of melancholy and mourning, it should be noted that Klein’s 
account differs in the greater emphasis on how mourning repairs the inner world. 
Thus, the divergence between Klein and Freud has been summarised as follows: 
 
Freud sees the melancholic as burdened internally with an object that cannot be 
relinquished, whereas the mourner manages to let the object go and is thus able 
to form new attachments. Klein’s more complex conception of the inner world 
allows a view of the mourner as able to reinstate the lost loved object 
internally, in a more real and separate form, strengthening rather than depleting 
the ego in its task of forming new attachments…43 
 
For Klein, reality testing allows greater co-existence between the internal and 
external realities of the subject. The individual is seen as restoring an internalised 
lost object but also an inner world that precedes this. Ultimately, the restoration of an 
internal object refers to infantile introjection of the parents. 
 
In normal mourning the individual reintrojects and reinstates, as well as the 
actual lost person, his loved parents who are felt to be his ‘good’ inner objects. 
His inner world, the one which he has built up from his earliest days onwards, 
in his phantasy was destroyed when the actual loss occurred. The rebuilding of 
this inner world characterizes the successful work of mourning.44   
 
Splitting 
Klein’s piece of 1946, ‘Notes on Some Schizoid Mechanisms’, is notable for its 
explanation of the paranoid-schizoid position, already explored in her earlier work, 
including its relationship with the depressive position. From the beginning of life the 
infant’s phantasies according to Klein involve denial of perceptual reality with ideas 
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of omnipotence, idealization and fears of persecution.45 Referring to her earlier work 
Klein states:  
 
I enumerated various typical defences of the early ego, such as the mechanisms 
of splitting the object and the impulses, idealization, denial of inner and outer 
reality and the stifling of emotions.46 
 
Klein uses the concept of splitting to discuss how the infant seeks to expel or deflect 
painful experiences. In the appendix to this article she refers to the significance of 
Freud’s analysis of the Daniel Schreber case, a judge whose memoirs record his 
descent into psychosis. Klein uses the Schreber case as a significant example of a 
patient who exemplifies the process of ‘splitting’. Schreber had become convinced 
that his doctor, Fleschig, had implanted in him the idea of turning into a woman. 
Schreber had, later, become convinced that the doctor was attacking him in different 
guises. The process of splitting continued as Schreber believed a whole army of souls 
was invading his consciousness. Klein writes:  
 
I would suggest, in keeping with the hypothesis outlined in the present chapter, 
that the division of the Flechsig soul into many souls was not only a splitting of 
the object but also a projection of Schreber’s feeling that his ego was 
split.…The anxieties and phantasies about inner destruction and ego-
disintegration bound up with this mechanism {splitting}are projected on to the 
external world and underlie the delusions of its destruction.47                                                                                  
 
The concept of splitting reinforces the understanding of a dialectical dynamic in 
Klein’s thought in which the inner world from the earliest ages is characterised by a 
process involving division and negation, introjection and projection. The transference 
between inner and outer reality is a dynamic, which Klein believes can be 
productively returned to and assessed through the synthesising and reparative 
strategies of the depressive position, and emotional development beyond this 
position. The drive to unity and against fragmentation is notable, but does not detract 
from the recognition of the inevitability, and indeed necessity of splitting in all 
psychological development, as well as its manifestation in the delusions of psychotic 
patients like Schreber.48 
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Destructive instincts 
In her 1955 piece, ‘Envy and Gratitude’, Klein focuses on how these emotional states 
in particular are related to the paranoid-schizoid and depressive positions.49 Here, the 
idea of envy as a destructive emotion is connected to the infantile envy of the breast 
thus qualifying the significance of penis envy as elaborated by Freud.  Klein 
challenges and displaces emphasis on the authority of the father and patriarchal 
symbolism. For Klein: ‘Envy is the angry feeling that another person possesses and 
enjoys something desirable - the envious impulse being to take it away, or spoil it.’50 
Klein relates this to the baby’s experience at the breast. This is summarised by Segal 
in her account of Klein’s work: ‘Since the infant idealizes the breast in phantasy, 
when he is deprived he assumes that the riches he attributes to the breast are enjoyed 
by the breast itself.’51 
 
Jealousy, for Klein, means wanting what someone else possesses. Klein refers to the 
Shorter Oxford Dictionary and Cobb’s Synonyms for her definition of jealousy. 
Paraphrased, the distinction between jealousy and envy that is important for Klein, is 
that the former involves anxiety about the loss of an object, whilst envy desires what 
the other already has, and seeks to destroy the other’s enjoyment of his/her object.52 
Klein uses cultural references to support this definition of specific negative impulses. 
She refers to Othello and comments that William Shakespeare does not always seem 
to differentiate between envy and jealousy.53 Segal helps us to understand the 
distinctions which are important for Klein:  
 
Envy is more primitive than jealousy; it arises in a part-object relation and is 
not related to a triangular situation. Jealousy is a more sophisticated feeling 
belonging to the Oedipal triangle.54 
 
Segal shows how Klein’s ideas here relate to her concept of the paranoid-schizoid 
position, and beyond this Segal also shows how Klein’s work extends Freud’s ideas 
about the authority of the super-ego: 
 
Envy attacks the good object and, by projection and fragmentation, makes it 
bad: therefore it produces a state of confusion between good and bad, which is 
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at the root of many psychotic confusions….The more the good internal object 
is destroyed, the more impoverished the ego feels, and this in turn increases 
envy. The projection of envy onto the object gives rise to an envious super-
ego.55 
 
From Ruth Kjar to ‘On Identification’: Kleinian theory and creativity 
I turn now to look in more detail at the application of Klein’s ideas to culture. We 
have seen how she took an interest in Freud’s account of da Vinci in her essay ‘Early 
Analysis’, and how she related Ravel’s opera to a process of repairing damaged 
objects in her 1929 essay. The idea of art as therapeutic is key in the development of 
Kleinian art theory by her contemporaries such as Ella Sharpe, Marion Milner and 
Riviere; and subsequent theorists including the analyst Segal and the art historian 
Stokes.56 Klein’s 1929 essay also illustrates how depression can be related to the 
creative impulse with discussion of a case where a woman, the painter Ruth Kjar, 
discovered her artistic impulse after being struck with melancholy. The 
transformation of Kjar was recounted, Klein tells us, by her friend Karion Michaelis. 
The change occurred after Kjar had been overcome by sadness coinciding with, and 
apparently caused by, the appearance of an empty space left on her wall after the 
removal of a picture, which had been lent to her. As Klein says: ‘The blank space on 
the wall caused her to forget her beautiful home, her happiness, her friends, 
everything.’57 However, Kjar then discovered her own creative impulse filling the 
space with her own work. It was as if she was suddenly addressing the emptiness 
inside herself, actively repairing her internal world instead of simply purchasing 
another external object. Kajar’s paintings included a 'life-sized figure of a naked 
negress. Apart from one picture of flowers, she had confined herself to portraits’, 
which also included, ‘an old woman bearing the mark of years and 
disillusionments.’58 According to Klein, Kjar had not just decided to address her 
internal world, but this manifested the desire to repair damage inflicted on her 
mother as an infant, a destructive impulse retained by the unconscious.   
   
The Kleinian theory of art involves recognising the intimate relation between 
destructive, fragmenting impulses and the possibility of synthesis and unification 
achieved through depression. This is not to eulogise depression and melancholia but 
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to insist on these as mobile states. Thus, the recovery from depression is connected to 
the recovery from the destructive impulses contained in the paranoid-schizoid phase. 
Segal elaborates that the artist, like the psychoanalytic patient, is engaged in 
confronting their inner pain and anxiety and seeking to repair this inner world.59 This 
path should not be taken too literally as might be suggested by the Kleinian emphasis 
on restoring the internalised parents or at a more primary level the mother’s breast as 
a good internal object. While Kjar’s art had some correspondence at the level of 
content with the figure of her mother, the burden of this approach to aesthetics is to 
recognise how inner feelings of well-being, on the one hand, and conflict (hate, 
destruction and fear) are transferred to internal and external objects. This idea builds 
on Freud’s notion of sublimation, in which the individual must find substitute objects 
for destructive and damaging impulses. Klein pays intense attention to the way 
creativity is necessary for the individual to overcome the damaged inner world. 
 
Klein returns to the analysis of a cultural text in her paper ‘On Identification’,60 
which elaborates her work ‘Notes on Some Schizoid Mechanisms’. ‘On 
Identification’ is an account and an analysis of Julian Green’s contemporary novel, If 
I Were You, translated into English in 1950.61 In this story a young man makes a pact 
with the Devil which gives him the possibility of becoming other people. On the one 
hand, the story may be taken as a terrifying account of unstable identity, and a giddy 
journey of the protagonist into a vampire-like persona. On the other hand, one can 
extract from this story a more positive sense of how the self is formed through 
mediation with other people: a parable which shows how the protagonist learns from 
his nightmarish journey through other selves. Klein is pre-disposed to this kind of 
balanced response. The analysis clearly reveals her reworking of Freudian ideas and 
the application of her key concepts to a narrative text. 
 
Klein derives a balanced reading of the novel partly because she relates it to her 
emphasis on the importance of ‘integration’. At one level the protagonist’s quest is 
futile because it involves a series of substitutions for his real needs. He becomes 
various people, but these transformations do not address the primary source of his 
unhappiness. The primary problem according to Klein is a threat directed at his 
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relationship to an internalised ‘good object’. In joining with the Devil, Fabian takes 
on negative characteristics, which negate and damage his internalised goodness. 
According to Klein, he is launched on this quest because of frustration in his 
relationship with both parents. The Devil represents, then, his most negative and self-
destructive impulses. The impossibility of full integration is an explanation, then, of 
why Fabian eventually dies. But Klein also sees hope in the story. Fabian dies 
happily with reparative feelings towards mother and father, thus achieving a level of 
integration. Klein argues that in the course of the novel Fabian is ‘working through 
the depressive and paranoid-schizoid positions’ and she goes on to say on the same 
page:  
As a result of overcoming the fundamental psychotic anxieties of infancy, the 
intrinsic need for integration comes out in full force. He achieves integration 
concurrently with good object relations and thereby repairs what had gone 
wrong in his life.62 
  
Klein’s account emphasises the relevance of infantile states throughout the narrative. 
For instance, she discusses an episode in the novel, in which the protagonist is 
intoxicated by a woman who serves in a bakery. Klein uses Freudian concepts to 
analyse the situation. She refers, for example, to the way the situation is oedipalised. 
Fabian-Fruges (this is his name at this stage because he has already adapted another 
person’s identity) is consumed by his desire for the woman and cannot bear to watch 
her intimacy with another man, which Klein relates to the concept of the primal 
scene. Alongside these concepts, however, we also have Klein’s characteristic 
emphasis on the privacy of the relationship to the mother. Take, for instance, her 
remarks: 
 
I believe that the whole shop turns in his mind into the feeding mother. He is 
engrossed in looking at a large basket of fresh rolls and stretches his hand out 
towards them when he hears a woman’s voice asking him what he wants.63 
 
Here, again, a significant narrative action is seen to express a fundamental structure 
familiar from Klein’s other writings. She stresses that Fabian’s frustrations, which 
lead him to trampling the bread and his compulsive eating, represent ‘anal-sadistic 
attacks’, and ‘cannibalism’ and ‘oral-sadistic impulses’ directed towards the 
mother’s body.64 Klein places these destructive impulses alongside one another. 
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Thus, as Segal explains, Klein takes up the Freudian chronology of oral, and anal 
stages of development prior to the Oedipus complex, but she moves away from the 
idea of a strict division between these phases.65 Instead of this chronology she 
ultimately places these impulses within the framework afforded by her concepts of 
the paranoid-schizoid and depressive positions. While she makes us aware of the 
Oedipal aspects of Fabian’s meeting with this woman, Klein’s primary emphasis is 
on a deluge of different destructive impulses that can all ultimately be understood as 
manifestations of the paranoid-schizoid position. 
 
Klein situates the Oedipus complex in a fluid way that recognises its manifestation 
alongside the earliest destructive impulses, with the complex emerging more fully 
after the child has passed through the depressive position. Failure to pass through the 
depressive position is likely to result in more severe Oedipal trauma because the 
child is unable to respect the autonomy of the parents on to whom love and hate are 
projected. Klein’s emphasises ‘envy’ and ‘jealousy’ as the dominant passions to be 
recognised in the early stages of the Oedipus complex. She relates Fabian-Fruges’ 
‘passionate jealousy of the man who he believes possesses the baker-woman at 
night’66 to more primitive destructive impulses. Essentially what Klein is describing 
are the protagonist’s self-destructive impulses towards his internalised ‘good object’ 
- the mother’s breast, and following this, the mother herself. Klein recognises how 
the situation develops from this origin and becomes more complex. Her theory 
entails recognising how in the depressive position a sense of guilt about aggression 
can lead to a transformation of bad objects so that these become a source of self-
knowledge.67 Klein’s emphasis on the initial identification with the mother can be re-
worked as a picture of an internal source of well-being in the child that takes many 
forms of imaginative association and transformation. All the qualities which, 
according to Klein, follow from successful early object relations - trust, hope, a sense 
of goodness and well-being can be abstracted from her hypotheses about infantile 
imagination.68 This means that the idea of identity and goodness is predicated on an 
internalised relationship to external desired objects. 
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Klein notes the ambiguity of the ending of the novel: Fabian regains his former self 
who had been asleep in bed for three days before he dies. Klein comments: 
 
Perhaps the author intends us to take the whole story as representing Fabian’s 
phantasies during the illness preceding his death? This would imply that all the 
characters were figures of his inner world and again illustrate that introjection 
and projection were operating in him in closest interaction.69 
 
For Klein, introjection refers to the way aspects of another person are internalised but 
this may involve achieving characteristics that had previously been projected. She 
recognises the to and fro of the personality involved in releasing qualities on to other 
objects, and people, and holding external qualities within. Having described this 
process she emphasises the way Fabian as a character ‘literally leaves his self and 
enters into his victim’.70 Thus, for Klein, the final integration of Fabian’s emotions is 
so significant that the ending can be viewed as revealing that the whole story was 
situated within his psyche, and is, in effect, a parable about the process of splitting 
and integration. 
 
Kleinian theory and Bergman’s Wild Strawberries 
Klein’s praise for Green’s novel focuses on his ability to convey universal 
unconscious psychic processes. However, she does not argue that Fabian and the 
Devil are two sides of the author’s personality. Instead, her understanding of how the 
text is created from the unconscious avoids a transparent psychoanalytical diagnosis 
of the author’s expression, and also leaves open the question of how extensively the 
processes expressed in the story are relevant to the readers. In effect, Klein maintains 
an implicit respect for the autonomy of artists because she does not offer an 
interpretation of the author’s personality. However, she does evaluate this work 
positively because it displays sensitive expression of processes normally locked in 
the unconscious. In this way, value is placed on the artist’s ability to engage with 
their inner world and find the resources for imaginative elaboration of universal 
processes.71 
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Like The Seventh Seal which preceded, Wild Strawberries established Bergman’s 
reputation internationally as a director aspiring to express universal themes of death 
and anxiety in a highly symbolic form, and as a sophisticated exponent of 
melancholy. Whilst The Seventh Seal personifies death, Wild Strawberries begins 
with the elderly protagonist apparently haunted by dreams of death. As we shall see, 
it is not just the presence of death, as a theme, which evokes comparisons with 
Klein’s work but, also, the film can be related to the metapsychology which 
surrounds this concept in the work of Klein and her followers. The dominant theme 
of the film is not, in fact, death, but the troubles of Isak’s life, as whole, with 
particular attention to his failure to find greater emotional and imaginative contact 
with others. The film begins with a monologue of Isak’s thoughts, which he is 
writing in a diary: 
 
Our relations with other people mainly consist of discussing and judging our 
neighbour’s character and behaviour. For me this has led to a voluntary 
withdrawal from virtually all so-called social intercourse.  
 
The anxiety around ideas of death is part of an underlying emotional torrent about 
life that emerges intermittently in the film through access to Isak’s imagination in the 
forms of dreams and memories.  Wild Strawberries relates to Kleinian ideas at a 
structural level as well as the convergence around preoccupation with death and 
inner conflict. Like the story analysed by Klein in ‘On Identification’, Wild 
Strawberries is a narrative about instability of identity. In contrast to Green’s story 
the film has a realist focus on consistency in Isak’s self-understanding, but the use of 
imaginative shifts into his subjective world throws his secure identity into chaos just 
as happened to Fabian through his encounter with his victims. We do not see Isak 
transformed into other people, but we do see how his relationship to others is buried 
in the past and this continues to emerge in unpredictable, startling form. Like Klein’s 
diagnosis of the resolution in Ravel’s opera and like Klein’s account of the reparative 
process in her case studies Isak must face up to his imaginative world. 
 
The structure of the film with its alternation of Isak’s internal world and external 
reality is significant as stream of consciousness cinema and it has been duly noted 
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how Bergman is influenced significantly by Strindberg in this respect.72 This 
structural patterning of the narrative is also known more generally through 
modernism and a wide range of possible comparisons are possible. A silent film, 
which clearly had a big influence on Bergman was Victor Sjöström’s The Phantom 
Carriage.73 The pattern of moving between inner and outer worlds also compares I 
would suggest to the Kleinian emphasis on the interplay between the infant and his 
or her first objects. Bergman appears to intuitively represent some of the processes 
described and analysed by Klein including the significance of phantasy as an 
expression of emotional, internal conflict, and ultimately as a resource for self-
understanding. Bergman, like Klein, recognises, through the character of Isak, a 
deep-rooted negativity, akin to Klein’s all encompassing concept of the death drive 
that takes various forms including the imagining his own death. Furthermore, in his 
preoccupation with subjectivity Bergman could be said to raise the issues that 
surround narcissism. An initial clue to this is present in the fact that the protagonist’s 
initials are those of the director and we should also note that Bergman explained the 
film in relation to himself.74 As Donner puts it, the film involves a ‘journey towards 
the center of the ego’ by Isak Borg.75 In the early nightmare sequence this journey 
within is figured directly as Isak meets his double in a coffin. In keeping with the 
development of ideas about narcissism through Freud and Klein’s work we find that 
the subjective world that confronts Isak in his nightmare is not just represented as 
indulgent departure from reality, but instead, despite the film’s ‘mellowness’, angst 
is a fundamental constituent of the subjective reality.76   
 
Klein focussed on splitting within introjection and projection but we can also see that 
the term ‘splitting’ is appropriate for the division between the inner and outer as 
separate worlds. The whole of Wild Strawberries can be regarded as a process 
imbued with ‘splitting’ signified by the disruption of the ongoing narrative with 
Isak’s imaginings and memories. As Wood points out after Isak’s nightmare: 
 
…actual encounters, further dream, daydream-cum-memory (for Isak 
‘remembers’ scenes at which he wasn’t in fact present) - are like the pieces of a 
jig-saw that Isak, jolted by his own subconscious sense of human failure (the 
dream) to a new vigilance, must learn to put together in order to pass through 
self-awareness to salvation.77  
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It is worth noting here how Riviere in her application of Kleinian theory to literature 
makes the connection between dream and memory, a fusion that defines Isak’s inner 
world: ‘It can be said perhaps that the nearest a normal person, at any rate in Western 
culture, comes to conscious realization of his own inner world is through the process 
of memory.’78 
 
The dreams and memories in Wild Strawberries go against the grain of a narrative 
structure built around Isak’s collection of a special ‘jubilee’ award, which honours 50 
years since his graduation, and the physical journey he makes to collect this award in 
Lund. The content of the subjective sequences convey that the source of conflict is 
deeper than a few bad memories of actual events. Despite the verisimilitude of Isak’s 
memories, expressed through dreams, these recollections are more significant as an 
expression of Isak’s emotions contained within his inner world. As Riviere stresses, 
memories contain, above all, significant emotional experiences.79 Isak’s emotions 
include his desires and his regrets. The subjective sequences which reveal these 
emotions, are echoed by conflicts, and divisions in his conscious world, as he travels 
to Lund. 
 
In the early nightmare sequence Isak dreams of a walk in the city in which he is 
persecuted by an anonymous agency that heralds his death. This sequence conveys a 
frenzy of destruction and ominous signs in the form of objects carrying a mysterious 
threat. These threats evoke Klein’s concept of the paranoid-schizoid because Isak 
feels that he is being assailed by the world itself and this negativity resides inside his 
psyche. In the nightmare a stranger who he meets is revealed as a mannequin that 
falls and bleeds profusely in the street. Isak looks at a clock noticing that it has no 
hands, and then looks at his own watch and notices the same impairment. A carriage 
with no driver is revealed, carrying a coffin and careers before Isak, with a wheel 
spinning off and crashing into a lamppost. The carriage releases the coffin, in which 
is a figure who is revealed to be Isak’s double, dressed in the clothes he will wear for 
the ceremony in Lund.80 The double appears to draw Isak into the coffin. In sum, the 
dream expresses his fear of his own mortality at the age of 78, but also appears to 
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reanimate a deep-rooted anxiety. Bergman, like Klein, focuses on a fear of 
annihilation, which is elemental. As Gado notes, the screech of the carriage wheels 
which carry the coffin sound like a baby’s cry81 which suggests that Bergman is 
drawing on ideas of infantile anxiety. More than this, he is connecting the fear of 
death to Isak’s complete personal history. As Riviere argues: ‘when one fears one’s 
own death, it is all that one will lose, one’s “life” - in both senses - one’s present 
breath of life, and one’s “past life” out of which one’s identity is constituted.’82 It is 
in keeping with this understanding that the film involves Isak turning from his 
immediate fears of death to the way his past has been constituted through relations 
with others. Whilst some of the symbolism of the opening is taken up later in the 
film, the abstraction of the nightmare symbolism also means that Bergman leaves 
space for the audience to find their own connections. 
 
The nightmare sequence has often been praised for its innovative form including 
surrealist imagery, the sound effects, including at one point Isak’s amplified 
heartbeat, and the high contrast of the black and white cinematography, which recalls 
the Gothic expressionism of silent cinema. Kleinian theory has been used in art 
history by Stokes. He argues that: 
 
...negative expressions may figure successfully in art only if there is present as 
well a reparative nucleus: one sign of it, we have said, is a richness or 
excellence attributed to the medium: perhaps not to medium but at any rate to 
art in general. Indeed, it is because there is excellence in art’s succinctness and 
pattern that some trends which are usually inhibited can so freely be displayed: 
this is part of the bringing together, of a coalescence that provides an emblem 
to the difficult organization of the ego. Art is a powerful means for the 
harmless expression of aggressive trends.83 
 
Stokes’ argument relates to existing theories of art including emphasis on the power 
of form to find expression through a specific medium; and also the potential of art for 
sublimating violence. What is most relevant for understanding this nightmare 
sequence is his understanding of these aesthetic ideas in relation to the concepts of 
Kleinian metapsychology. Stokes argues that the artist is involved in repairing lost 
and damaged objects as in the depressive position, but also form must convey more 
elemental, manic processes which for Stokes are connected back to the infant’s first 
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experience of the breast. For Stokes, art must achieve self-containment through 
control of form but also connect beyond this with external reality through less 
controlled expression. Acknowledging the impact of social context and artistic 
tradition, Stokes feels that the most fundamental contact with the external world 
signified by art is a sublimation of the infant’s earliest experience in the paranoid-
schizoid phase. For Stokes, whilst the art work as a whole harmonises and placates 
destructive impulses, in places it should give full expression to destructive impulses. 
The terror and screeching of the wheels in Isak’s nightmare suggest that he 
experiences a manic sense of attack. The unpredictable images and sudden changes 
in angle reveal chaos at the level of form. At the same time the distinctive aesthetic 
properties of this sequence, including its elemental connection to the film medium, 
conveyed through over exposure, provide a sense of mastery and unity. Looking at 
the film as a whole we can see that the returns to Isak’s subjectivity show how 
phantasises that are either gratifying or terrifying animate but also sharpen 
Bergman’s control over the film medium in their stylised departure from the realism 
of the ongoing story.84 
 
Seldon Bach comments on the use of flashbacks, dreams and nightmares in Wild 
Strawberries: 
We are confronting an internal world that has been mirrored and projected and 
the movements we witness on the screen are reflections of the movements of 
internal objects or, as Bergman might say, the movements of the soul.85 
 
Bach is referring here to the way that correspondences are established between the 
content of the dream sequences and other events in the narrative. The film continues 
with the story of Isak’s journey to Lund. In the preparation for this we see his 
dependency on Agda, his housekeeper, and his argumentative dialogue with her. 
There is a sense of humour here in the way Agda mocks Isak whilst caring for him. 
Then Marianne appears, his daughter-in-law who has been staying with Isak and 
travels in the car with him to Lund. As with Agda we see that Isak has an 
argumentative relationship with Marianne who accuses him of egotism and lack of 
feeling. Thus, the dialogue and the development of the narrative build on Isak’s 
initial monologue, and the nightmare sequence, to suggest that his inner self is not 
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immediately as sympathetic as we may suppose from his appearance as a slightly 
frail and lonely old man. We understand that his relationship with others involves 
conflict, but also carries the potential for greater mutuality. 
 
When Isak decides to stop at a house where his family lived in the summer, he 
experiences a daydream in which he returns to his past appearing as an omniscient 
onlooker. The scene begins as Isak returns to the wild strawberry patch outside the 
house. This is the location in which, as Isak remembers, his brother Sigfrid seduced 
his cousin Sara. Isak relives this scene from a voyeuristic perspective unseen by the 
others. The key point of this sequence is that the return to the strawberry patch 
evokes Isak’s jealousy and loss, as Sigfrid displaces Isak in Sara’s affections. It also 
establishes his passivity as an onlooker and this is understood as a displacement of 
his emotions.   
 
From a psychoanalytic perspective the symbol of the wild strawberries has been 
understood in various ways. Bach’s analysis bears the hallmarks of Kleinian theory:  
‘The strawberry patch here represents the maternal breast to which one returns with a 
sense of familiarity and where one feeds, falls asleep and dreams.’86 Bach does not 
focus on this symbol as a sublimation of the sibling rivalry which Isak remembers, 
but rather Bach goes on to argue that the symbolic content of Isak’s phantasies 
involves anxiety about the parental couple and child birth. Bach’s argument is 
supported by the way that the film finishes with Isak’s nostalgic image of his parents. 
This is a tranquil, serene image distant from the abstraction and chaos in the 
nightmare sequence and Isak’s painful memories of his loss of Sara. In the initial 
daydream Isak as a boy and his father are not seen because they are by the riverside 
fishing, and have not heard the call to the breakfast table, whilst in the film’s climax 
the parents magically appear in Isak’s thoughts and salute him. Thus, the attainment 
of a nostalgic grasp of the past is more complete. Whilst Isak’s return to the past 
uncovers painful emotions including jealousy of his brother, the imagery of this 
daydream and the finale are relatively speaking more realistic than the initial 
nightmare, and signify the possibility of greater integration of Isak’s subjective 
world. This fits with the idea that the individual makes progress through recovering 
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painful emotions, and, ultimately through developing a more realistic idea of the 
parents’ presence in the inner world of memory and emotion. It is striking that in this 
film Bergman intuitively envisages resolution in a manner that corresponds with 
Klein’s account of the parents as the key internal figures that must be restored in the 
subjective world. Of course this idea of the parents should not be taken too literally 
and we find that both Klein and Bergman understand that any object may be 
transformed through imagination to become a potent motif in the inner world. 
 
The wild strawberries can be understood as a key symbol in Isak’s sublimation of 
past desires and emotions. Here it is an image that cues the recovery of the past but 
also confrontation with past losses. It is a poignant image of sensuous pleasure but 
also suggests transience. This is consistent with the cultural connotations that, as 
Elizabeth Cowie notes, have been attached to wild strawberries as a motif in Swedish 
culture where they have carried associations of innocence as well as the passing 
pleasures of the Swedish summer.87 Furthermore, as Philip and Kirsti French explain, 
in Swedish culture there is a traditional idea that each child will discover his own 
special area in the form of a ‘wild strawberry patch’.88 As Cowie comments: in Isak’s 
dream the strawberries are ‘spilled’.89 The conjunction of a narcissistic reverie of the 
past and a sense of destructive loss is focussed on through the motif of the fruit.  
Bergman’s interest in this symbolism can be seen further in his other films that make 
the Swedish summer a significant narrative setting, and in his specific use of wild 
strawberries to represent innocence in a dangerous world, as seen in The Seventh 
Seal. Wild Strawberries proceeds to depict some of the causes of Isak’s inner 
anxiety. 
 
The initial daydream progresses as the present day Isak observes the laughter and 
gaiety of others in his family gathering, at the breakfast table, to celebrate his uncle 
Aron’s birthday. His mother is an authoritative presence but fails to control the 
chaos, which ensues after the flirtation between Sara and Sigfrid is revealed. Next 
Isak witnesses, in the hallway, Sara’s reflections on why she is torn between himself 
and Sigfrid. From this we gain an understanding that Isak is too serious compared 
with his brother. However, the diagnosis is not precise because what drives the film 
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here is emotion as much as analysis, and in particular a turn to the past that echoes 
the ideas of melancholy and mourning foregrounded by Klein. Isak himself speaks of 
his memories in relation to these concepts introducing the daydream by saying that 
he feels ‘a trifle melancholy’ and concluding it by saying ‘I was overcome by a 
feeling of emptiness and mournfulness’. These feelings can be judged from Klein’s 
theory as part of Isak’s recovery of his damaged inner world. The possibility of 
development and change within this emotional landscape depends on the interplay 
between his conscious and unconscious worlds. 
 
A striking way in which these worlds overlap is revealed when Isak wakes from his 
daydream to meet a young woman who is the double of his childhood sweetheart 
Sara. Played by the same actress, Bibi Andersson, the second Sara who lives in 
Isak’s childhood house, engages him in a playful, flirtatious conversation and he 
agrees to give her and her two male friends a lift to Lund when he continues the 
journey with Marianne. The second Sara is, then, like the recovery of the lost loved 
object discussed in psychoanalytical accounts of mourning, an imaginative process 
that Klein believes is essential in the transition towards greater integration. The 
mirroring of internal and external world is developed further because Sara’s two 
male companions echo the rivalry of Sigfrid and Isak for their cousin Sara. 
Bergman’s narrative technique develops the skilful interweaving of these 
relationships, but also the dynamic of underlying impulses that dominate Isak’s 
psyche, including his fascination for the childhood sweetheart Sara, and his anxieties 
about achieving reciprocal and fulfilled relationships with others. The conflict of the 
two young men, Anders and Viktor, is presented in ways that are humorous and 
philosophical as they argue about the nature of reality, but these echo a more acute 
sense of conflict in relationships, initially signified by Isak in his remarks about the 
difficulty of relations with others during the opening, and in the revelation of his 
feelings of rivalry with his brother Sigfrid.  
 
The physical journey on which the narrative is based is a structure which 
encompasses Isak’s acquisition of knowledge and insight. However, it is not 
exclusively Isak who gains in understanding but also other characters including 
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Marianne. Both characters harbour melancholy secrets, which are brought out into 
the open through the course of the film. The sense of melancholy is juxtaposed to a 
playful gaiety represented by Sara and her two male companions. Bergman does not 
present his material as a drama of origins concerned with who is responsible for the 
problems that afflict Isak. Instead, humanistically the film conveys that a tragic 
current, which can be compared to Klein’s death drive, is dispersed through a range 
of relationships and phenomena. Tragic destruction is signified as impersonal, 
accidental force when Isak’s car collides with another, but the negativity, which the 
film focuses on, is located inside the characters. Everyone survives, and it is made 
clear that the crash does not after all signify the malign power of chance and 
accident. Instead, the incident creates a momentary sense of an impersonal 
destructive force and foreboding before transferring this sense of negativity into the 
representation of the couple whose car crashed into Isak’s. The couple with whom 
Isak collided are the Almans. Following the accident, Isak gives them a lift because 
of the damage to their car. This provides the opportunity for Bergman to show that 
this couple represent a different kind of annihilation, tied to self-destruction in their 
competitive failing marriage, with a strong emphasis on the heartless egotism of the 
husband. The competitive element is striking and was a feature of human nature that 
Klein related to destructive infantile emotions.90 Eventually Marianne insists that 
they leave because they present a bad example to the young fellow passengers. The 
Almans depart, confessing their shame. Even here the negativity is balanced by a 
reparative element. As Gado notes, the Almans provide a comparison with other 
failing relationships depicted later in the film.91 Marianne’s relationship with Evald 
and Isak’s relationship with his wife are, thus, tied in with the theme of a 
psychological strife under the surface of this civilized society. 
 
When Isak stops at a garage in an area where he worked as a young doctor, the 
garage attendant is overjoyed to see him and shows great respect for the work he did 
in that area. The garage attendant, played in an unusual cameo role by von Sydow, 
suggests to his wife that they should name their baby after Isak. This digression in 
the plot looks ahead to the empathy involved in the film’s resolution, drawing on the 
caring side of Isak’s work to show that he is not always as egotistical as Marianne 
has alleged. It is also a cue for Isak to look confused realising that this was a point in 
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his life where he achieved more in his contribution to other people, a point well 
illustrated by Sjöström’s masterful, understated, but expressive representation of 
momentary bewilderment. However, even here the negative pole of the film’s 
emotional dialectic is lurking in the background. As Gado points out, we learn later 
that at this time Isak’s wife was having an affair.92 
 
The emotional substratum of the film appears to move towards equilibrium in the 
ensuing scene. Having stopped their journey for a meal Isak sympathises with 
Anders in his argument with Victor about God. Over the meal Isak recites a poem 
about a loving divine presence and the others join him in this well known verse.93 
Certainly this can be viewed as part of Isak’s journey to a more integrated state of 
mind, capable of reparation and empathy towards others, and probably expresses, in 
some sense, Bergman’s intimacy with religious belief. However, the scene is not a 
resolution. Its impact is qualified by its place within the overall structure of the film 
and the abstract imaginative quality of the poem’s lines addressed to an unknown 
friend. According to Harvey Greenberg, Isak is not here expressing religious 
conviction, as Sara suggests, but ‘a painful conversion’.94 Isak tells the others that he 
must visit his mother who is nearby and Marianne asks to join him.  
  
When Isak and Marianne arrive at his mother’s house there are ominous dark skies. 
During this scene there are repeated medium close-ups of Marianne observing the 
inter-action between mother and son. These register that Marianne understands that 
Isak’s emotional coldness derives from his mother, and that this also explains the 
alienation of her husband Evald, Isak’s son. In this way Marianne’s observation of 
Isak and his mother contributes to her emotional understanding of her own husband’s 
inner world and by implication her own. It is important for the viability of Kleinian 
analysis to recognise the emphasis on reciprocity between increased knowledge of 
the external world through observation, for instance, and integration of the 
individual’s inner world. This scene is a further example of the way the progress of 
the narrative corresponds to an increased sense of realism allied to greater integration 
of inner and outer worlds. This occurs progressively through the film as Isak in 
particular becomes more self-aware about his past disappointments and their 
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emotional implications. In this case the move to integration occurs as Marianne’s 
understanding is extended through perception. However, it is important to recognise 
that Marianne’s perception is just one moment in a process, and at this stage her 
thoughts are not conveyed to the audience. In this way, Marianne’s subjectivity gains 
a stronger foothold in the narrative alongside the focus on Isak’s consciousness. 
 
The scene has been criticised for the negative representation of Isak’s mother.95  
However, a recognition of the attention to Marianne’s subjectivity undermines the 
idea that this is a completely male centred narrative. Bergman, like Klein, strives for 
a  ‘universal’ level. While the possibility of achieving universalism is obviously open 
to question, it has to be acknowledged that in this scene there is a clear attempt to 
signify complexity, interiority and a more general, shared plane of experience. 
Marianne is projecting her own concerns, however insightful and justified. We 
should understand that she, like Isak, is a character in a state of flux. This sense of 
uncertainty is maintained to the end of the film, as Marianne and Evald’s relationship 
is unresolved at the climax. Returning to the representation of Isak’s mother, it can 
be observed that although her character conveys coldness, the narrative momentum 
does not present this as a revelation of the single cause of Isak’s personality. Instead 
there is still an element of mystery maintained in this scene as the mother shows Isak 
her father’s watch, which has no hands. This is a haunting reminder of Isak’s 
nightmare and thus connects with a broader sense of alienation. The mother has a 
chilling presence and an arrogant appearance, but in the brevity of the scene, and the 
symbolism of the clock, we are given the impression that both, she and Isak, are 
lonely characters, and that the lack of emotional warmth in their lives is bound up 
with a wider context. 
 
According to Klein, the development of greater integration is not a linear process 
with a clear-cut end. The paranoid-schizoid and depressive positions reappear 
throughout the individual’s life although with less ferocity if the depressive position 
has been successfully experienced. All the characters in Wild Strawberries and not 
just Isak’s mother in particular, who only appears in cameo, live in the shadow of an 
emotional deficit, even if their world appears to be one of bourgeois civility. 
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Underneath even the closest family relationships there is turmoil, ultimately 
encapsulated in a force that is antithetical to life. This is what lies behind Marianne’s 
perception of Isak’s meeting with his mother. As already stated, Bergman is not so 
focussed on establishing a single origin for the malaise that affects Isak, but rather 
suggests that in a way, these problems are integral to life, including a sense of loss 
that can be accentuated through loneliness and/or ageing and frustration in a 
marriage. 
 
Shortly after the visit to his mother’s house, Isak’s third flight into subjectivity is 
developed through another daydream, which provides the most complex presentation 
of his inner anxieties and is charged with a range of painful psychological issues. 
Falling asleep as Marianne is driving, Isak dreams again that he is at the wild 
strawberry patch where, as a 78 year old he meets the Sara of his childhood. This is 
no reverie. The narcissistic submersion of painful realties is dramatized and exposed 
as she holds up a mirror and asks him to confront the truth as she declares that she 
loves his brother. The reality of his distance from this past, and the isolation caused 
by her, are captured through imaginative condensation of material, already 
introduced, which highlights his identity as an elderly professor, as well as anxieties 
from his youth. Thematically we can see how the film deconstructs his power as a 
man with a distinguished career. The sequence goes on to combine loosely associated 
episodes foregrounding Isak’s pain and humiliation. 
 
We see Sara nursing her sister’s baby beneath a dark, melancholy night sky. When 
Isak follows and looks on at the empty cot, the theme of his loss is expressed through 
the imagery. He proceeds to look on from outside the house at Sara and Sigfrid who 
are in evening dress. She has taken Sigbritt’s baby safely inside and plays the piano 
before embracing Sigfrid. Isak looks on and turns the pain of this perception inwards 
as he pierces his hand on a nail in the wall. Next, the sequence extends to the subject 
of his career as bizarrely he is ushered into the building by Alman, the failed husband 
of the car crash. Now, Alman is an authoritative patriarchal figure testing Isak on his 
proficiency as a doctor with the young characters, Sara, Anders and Viktor, among 
the audience. When Isak is asked to treat a female patient, he pronounces her dead 
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but then she is revealed to be a double of Berit, Alman’s wife, who throws back her 
head in manic laughter. Mr Alman gives the verdict that Isak is not only 
incompetent, but lacks the human qualities to be a doctor. He then leads Isak to a 
space in the woods lit like a stage by the moonlight in which they witness a scene 
where Isak’s wife Karin meets her lover. Isak sees how the lover overpowers his wife 
but also how she throws her head back in laughter, like Berit did on the operating 
table. Karin then declares that if Isak is informed of the incident he will be full of 
forgiveness, but adds that this is meaningless for her because he lacks human 
warmth. As Alman says, this scene is a direct replay of a situation witnessed by Isak 
in 1917, which he retains as a clear, distinct memory.   
  
Isak’s anxieties in this sequence connect with the other episodes. In this sequence the 
material develops the focus on Isak’s self-destructive impulses evident in the earlier 
scenes. However, in his melancholy reflection there is a sense of a confused move 
towards greater self-awareness. The accusations against him delivered by Alman are 
self-evidently the product of an over punitive and unjust authority. Following Klein’s 
account of the need to recognise and then transform a punitive super-ego, we can 
allow that there is perhaps a sense of cathartic release, a working through of the 
depressive position, in the flickering awareness that Isak’s persecution is excessive. 
The verdict from Mr Alman that Isak is ‘guilty of guilt’ refers to a world in which 
conflict lurks underneath appearances, but it also conveys absurdity. Isak’s anxieties 
have become less rooted, transferring associations between his conscious awareness 
of the faults of others and the idea of self-inflicted chastisement from his inner world. 
This fluidity of meaning is partly captured by the Kleinian conception of a dialectical 
emotional development as opposed to the representation of isolated and realistic 
behavioural issues such as Isak’s professional practise. The latter concern is sidelined 
by an aesthetic, which instead focuses on the recovery of submerged emotion. Isak’s 
sense of shame is more real than any of the events he sees in this internal world. The 
revelation of his responsibility for his wife’s infidelity pushes the self-recrimination 
to a new extreme, but also consolidates the idea that Isak’s problems partially lie 
within his own psyche and that he has responsibility for facing them. Certainly, this 
sequence reinforces the horror of Isak’s nightmare at the beginning of the film, but it 
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also moves towards a more explicit and realistic understanding of the negativity that 
haunts Isak. However, the most significant shift occurs in the scene that follows. 
 
Isak awakes to see Marianne who has stopped the car and is smoking. She tells Isak 
of her problems with Evald and this is conveyed with a flashback. The theme of 
death returns in this scene as Evald responds to Marianne’s news about her 
pregnancy by saying that he wants nothing to do with bringing up a child. He states 
that for him the purpose of life is death. Isak is troubled by this, and listens anxiously 
as Marianne explains the situation and how she will not give in to Evald’s wish that 
she abandon the baby. Here is a key point in the film’s thematic development as the 
possibility of new birth is counter posed to the various intimations of death and 
emotional coldness. However, the most important development is that Isak displays 
empathy for Marianne’s predicament. This is a turn away from his desire to cut off 
emotional relationships and a turn outwards from his concern with lingering hurts 
and recriminations. At the end of this scene as Sara, Anders and Victor present Isak 
with flowers, the light fades and Isak turns into a spotlight, a theatrical moment in 
which the realistic aesthetic of Isak’s conscious life is overtaken by the stylisation 
associated with his dream world. In this way the film involves a stylistic and 
dramatic expression of the sense that Isak’s inner and outer worlds are converging. 
This sets up the ending in which Isak’s formal triumph at the award ceremony is 
juxtaposed with the achievement of warmer and more intimate relationships with 
Agda, Marianne, and Evald. This is expressed also by the way the young people 
serenade Isak before he goes to bed. The internal transformation is registered by Isak. 
His internal monologue explains that he has learnt from the day just at the moment 
we see him collect his award. Admittedly this transformation maintains some 
ambiguity. Isak, for instance, only suggests that he can perceive causality in the 
day’s events without elaborating in depth on his emotions. Evald does not commit to 
Marianne’s baby even though the couple seem to be close. Agda refuses Isak’s 
request that they talk to each other less formally. However, this lack of resolution can 
be seen as part of a commitment to realism against contrived resolution and Isak’s 
final dream, which he explains as his way of going to sleep, conveys, as I have said, 
a tranquil image of his parents and a significant change from his nightmare of death. 
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Critical responses to Wild Strawberries     
This chapter has represented the relevance of Kleinian ideas to Wild Strawberries. At 
the same time it is necessary to engage with the critical idea that this focus on an 
inner world is in some respects a limitation. Various critics have considered the issue 
of whether Wild Strawberries is sufficiently negative in relation to its content. There 
is not the space here to survey the range of critical responses, but I wish to note 
several points that have implications for the Kleinian theory advanced in this chapter. 
Even Wood, who provides a very insightful and appreciative commentary on the 
film, conveys a degree of criticism in relation to Bergman’s subsequent achievement 
with Persona. 
 
In retrospect it {Wild Strawberries} looks on one level almost too complete, 
too self-contained in its jig-saw structure, to stand as an adequate response to 
the stresses of the contemporary world. Though far removed from Art for Art’s 
Sake, it is perhaps more satisfying as a Work of Art than as a record of fully 
lived experience.96  
 
Wood questions whether, ‘Bergman was working from the whole of himself?’97 
Gado argues on the other hand that the film can be understood as a quest by Bergman 
for reconciliation with his father. He suggests that the ending shows the way that 
Bergman is split between commitment to the truth of his own experience of 
alienation from his father - rendered through Evald’s continued detachment from 
Isak - and an attempt to flee from this into an imaginary resolution.98  
 
Maria Bergom-Larsson provides a reading, which is ambivalent on the basis of the 
film’s psychoanalytical content. She notes that the film has been called ‘a 
psychoanalysis’, referring to Donner’s interview with Bergman, and notes in the film  
the ‘…tone is far more conciliatory…’ towards the father than for instance the anger 
against the father figure expressed in Bergman’s first script Frenzy.99 Her overriding 
argument about Bergman’s treatment of patriarchy is, however, that he is unable to 
free himself from patriarchal structures including ‘his image of God’ ‘except in a few 
isolated cases, when we encounter a critique which is often perspicuous but 
completely atomistic, never structured.’100 Despite this Bergom- Larsson 
acknowledges that in Wild Strawberries ‘the analysis’ of the father is ‘more 
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penetrating and psychologically profound’ (than in the earlier aggression against 
patriarchy in films such as Frenzy.)101 Johns Blackwell also shows ambivalence 
about the film in relation to the representation of gender. She praises one scene in 
particular, that in which Isak’s wife is seen to reveal that her infidelity was caused by 
his lack of love for her. Only at this point, according to Johns Blackwell, does the 
film fully question a patriarchal representation of gender. For Johns Blackwell, 
women are forced throughout the film to fit into a male conception of them. ‘Almost 
all the women in the film cohere into maternality: even Agda the housekeeper 
nurtures her employer.’ 102 She goes on to argue that:  
 
The female body is almost exclusively a site of potential or frustrated maternal 
plenitude for the male. That in Wild Strawberries the legacy of coldness and 
death, elsewhere in Bergman attributed to the father, is associated with the 
mother is a case of a projection of the failings of the father onto the mother in 
order to save the father so that the son might be reconciled with him.103 
 
Finally in relation to critical responses we should consider Bergman himself who has 
explained the film in different ways at different times. In Images he corrects this and 
reinforces the sense of melancholy narcissism, stating that the initials not only refer 
to himself, but also the words Isak and Borg connote ‘ice’ and ‘a fortress’ 
respectively. Bergman looks back quite critically at his psychological motivation for 
the film: 
 
The driving force in Wild Strawberries is, therefore, a desperate attempt to 
justify myself to mythologically oversized parents who have turned away, an 
attempt that was doomed to failure. It wasn’t until many years later that my 
mother and father were transformed into human beings of normal proportions, 
and the infantile hatred was dissolved and disappeared.104 
 
These criticisms just noted challenge the Kleinian reading I have developed in this 
chapter. Wood suggests that we must turn to Persona because too much integration 
in the artwork blocks off engagement with social issues. Gado denies the efficacy of 
the catharsis in Wild Strawberries due to underlying antagonism against the father. 
Both Bergom-Larsson and Johns Blackwell put more emphasis on the film’s 
sublimation of patriarchal authority than the idea of a creative sublimation of the 
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death instinct. Bergman himself suggests that the film is constrained by its lack of 
realism in relation to the representation of his parents. 
 
These are significant points to take into consideration. On the other hand, we can still 
reaffirm the achievements of Wild Strawberries. We have seen how the film 
compares to complex development of ideas about narcissism in all its manifestations 
both positive and negative in Kleinian thought. The integration that is so central to 
the film’s aesthetic achievement is not total. The metapsychology that is conveyed 
through imaginative sequences engages with a range of conflicts that apply beyond 
Isak Borg, making him in effect a kind of everyman figure. Although clearly 
constructed from the perspective of a male character, much of the film represents his 
subjectivity in crisis. Furthermore, other perspectives are developed through the 
assertive actions of female characters including Marianne, Agda, and Isak’s wife. 
The Kleinian argument suggests that criticism as well as the work itself must 
recognise the power of both genders in the construction of the imagination. 
 
Bergman clearly sought to continue developing new ideas about film-making after 
Wild Strawberries and moved further away from the ideas of religion that he had 
accepted from his familial upbringing. However, as the Kleinian analysis suggests 
already in Wild Strawberries the reflection on his parents is subjected to sublimation 
and re-working, to such an extent that the image of tranquillity at the end is an 
isolated symbol and not the representative of a dominant theme. Thus the Kleinian 
approach should be complemented by recognition of the degree of openness in the 
text. Bergman himself seems to hanker after such freedom of interpretation 
suggesting that beyond the self-analysis is a creative response to the figure of 
Sjöström, a personal representation of a man who represents a significant cultural 
and filmic influence on Bergman.   
 
Donner moves towards a more socially engaged version of the humanistic 
understanding of Wild Strawberries, putting across the idea that in Bergman’s work 
we see the transition to a more individualised society and the internal and spiritual 
issues that arise: 
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Swedish literature from the 1940s on accentuates the spiritual transformation 
{away from a more religious society} by leaving behind all the collective 
philosophies to which the authors of the 1930s still were attracted. As an artist, 
B{ergman} becomes extraordinarily representative of the change, a victim of 
the time, and simultaneously its interpreter.105 
 
In this engagement with the psychology of individualism and its difficulties Bergman 
finds common ground with the Kleinian focus on the way the inner self emerges 
through a history that is social and emotional. Wild Strawberries explores and 
exposes the fear of death and ties this into a wide range of relationships: from 
infancy to old age; familial, professional and between strangers. We have also seen 
how the issues of loneliness and humiliation are countered through a focus on more 
empathic and emotional understanding. I have drawn attention to the contribution to 
Kleinian theory of distinctive elements including the Kleinian theory of art put 
forward by Stokes, which resists the idea of too much integration. 
 
The debate about integration and about the gendered politics of the film remains 
nuanced and open to further argument. It is wrong to reduce all Bergman’s work to 
one theoretical framework, given his range of influences. Kleinian theory itself does 
not necessarily have this ambition, developed as it has largely been within 
psychoanalysis and only intermittently applied to culture. What about other 
influences and philosophies of imagination? Alford makes an interesting argument 
from within Kleinian theory, suggesting that we can use the achievement of 
integration within an artwork for comparison with the phenomenon of resolution in 
our own society, but this clearly depends on the spectator gaining a sense of freedom 
as they respond to and judge the text.106 As we turn to Sartre for another model we 
will find points of convergence with Kleinian concepts, but also a different emphasis 
on the individual’s engagement with society. Just as it has been psychoanalysed, 
Wild Strawberries has been interpreted with existentialist thought to the fore. Steene, 
for instance, comments that: 
 
Every time Isak steps out of the car, he in a sense steps into a world that 
challenges him to commitment. All of his experiences during the trip from 
Stockholm to Lund dramatize the existential view which is the film’s 
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philosophical core: that life is not a matter of merely being a spectator or 
submitting it to cold analysis.107  
 
There is overlap here with Kleinian analysis in the idea of expressing a departure 
from cold analysis as encapsulated in Isak’s repressed emotional life. This is also 
dramatised most effectively in Bergman’s other breakthrough film of the period - 
The Seventh Seal with its focus on the existential predicament of a knight in a hellish 
world. The following chapter will consider the evolution of Sartre’s ideas on 
imagination and the power he attributes to emotion before considering how these 
ideas can be applied to Bergman’s The Seventh Seal. 
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3     Sartre’s theory of imagination and The Seventh Seal 
 
Sartrean and Kleinian theories both provide an account of human nature which 
foregrounds internal division and negation. It is helpful here to recall how Sartre’s 
best known work of philosophy, Being and Nothingness, employs the concepts of  
the ‘for-itself’ and the ‘in-itself’’ to distinguish two modes of being. As a starting 
point we can see that the ‘for-itself’ refers to consciousness and the ‘in-itself’ refers 
to matter. However, Sartre’s thesis is more complex than this. For example, 
consciousness may assume an idea of itself as being thing-like, of fixed and 
determinate nature. Sartre challenges this as a form of false consciousness, an 
evasion of freedom and a denial of the truth contained in the very concept of the ‘for-
itself’. However, this does not mean that consciousness can deny its inherent 
relationship with the ‘in-itself’. We cannot deny material factors including the self’s 
relation to the body. For Sartre in Being and Nothingness we must understand the 
internal relationship between the ‘for-itself’ and the ‘in-itself’. Thus, negation is 
placed at the heart of being and the Sartrean model like Kleinian theory believes that 
knowledge requires engagement with an ineradicable division within human nature.1 
 
There seems, nevertheless, to be an immediate gulf between Sartrean and Kleinian 
theories on account of Sartre’s opposition in A Sketch for the Theory of Emotions and 
Being and Nothingness to the Freudian concept of the unconscious. Sartre insists in 
Being and Nothingness on the power of the individual’s self-consciousness. He 
writes: 
 
If we reject the language and materialistic mythology of psychoanalysis, we  
perceive that the censor in order to apply its activity with discernment must 
know what it is repressing.2 
 
This belief in the power of consciousness is articulated through Sartre’s criticism of a 
state of mind, which he calls ‘bad faith’. I will return to this well-known concept 
later in this chapter. Critics believe that Sartre concentrates on free will at the 
expense of recognising social influences, which can impact on the subject without his 
or her awareness. His individualism has been viewed as extremely problematic for 
gaining a sense of social context. Rustin, for instance, argues from a Kleinian 
perspective that Sartre fails to appreciate the full significance of the individual’s 
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place in society. Rustin argues that Lacanian theory and Sartrean philosophy share a 
view of the individual as isolated while Kleinian psychoanalysis shows the 
individual’s immersion in a social reality from infancy.3 
 
Sartre is indeed preoccupied with an individualistic perspective, and, for this very 
reason, his work represents an alternative perspective on Bergman’s films. Bergman 
is concerned with the mysteries of the psyche, but he is equally focussed on 
conveying the alienation of individuals in society. Wild Strawberries relates to this 
because it focuses on the consciousness of Isak, but connects his inner world to 
social experiences. Also, we saw that Wild Strawberries uses the idea of death as a 
cue for reflections on life. Sartre engages with this issue in Being and Nothingess 
through his dialogue with Heidegger’s ideas about death. The language in the book 
suggests that Sartre accords it at least the same centrality as Freud and Klein stating: 
‘… death haunts me at the very heart of my projects as their inevitable reverse side.’4 
However, Sartre does not believe that we find in the concept of death the truth of our 
existence, but rather that death demarcates a boundary. This is made clear as the 
above quotation continues:  
 
But precisely because this ‘reverse’ is to be assumed not as my possibility but 
as the possiblity that there are for me no longer any possibilities, it does not 
penetrate me. The freedom which is my freedom remains total and infinite. 
Death is not an obstacle to my projects; it is only a destiny of these projects 
elsewhere. And this is not because death does not limit my freedom but 
because freedom never encounters this limit.5 
 
 
This philosophical reflection relates to Bergman’s representation of individuals who 
establish their own ‘projects’ in the shadow of death. The significance of death as a 
theme in Bergman’s work is reinforced when we recognise that his international 
reputation was really boosted by The Seventh Seal, made one year prior to Wild 
Strawberries, in which death is personified. In this film a medieval knight who has 
returned from The Crusades with his squire finds a brutal society. The knight is 
preoccupied with the apparent absence of God and is haunted by the figure of Death, 
but strives to combat this threat psychologically and through action. This subject 
matter and its treatment led Andrew Sarris to declare that The Seventh Seal ‘is 
perhaps the first genuinely existential film’. 6  
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In this chapter I will explore the relationship between Sartrean theory and Bergman’s 
work by focussing on Sartre’s early philosophical book on the imagination: The 
Imaginary. This has received less attention than Being and Nothingness, but arguably 
it paves the way for key ideas in the latter. Sartre’s approach to imagination is better 
known through his own creative work including, notably, Nausea and his work as a 
cultural theorist and critic, including What is Literature. Both of these works afford 
points of comparison and contrast with his early philosophical study of the 
imagination. Sartre’s work on the imagination actually begins with a short early work 
The Imagination : a Psychological Critique published in 1936, but this is followed 
by The Imaginary (also called The Psychology of Imagination), first drafted in 1937 
but published in 1940. Peter Caws points out that:  
 
It was in the second and unpublished part of Imagination (i.e. precisely the 
first draft of The Psychology of Imagination) that Sartre, according to Simone 
de Beauvoir, ‘crystallized the first key concepts of his philosophy: the 
conscious mind as tabula rasa, and its capacity for annihilation 
(néantisation).’7 
 
 
In his early work on the imagination, but also his other early work on emotion and on 
the ego, Sartre challenges the idea of an inner world as conceived by a range of 
philosophers and psychologists. This is the beginning of Sartre’s distinctive approach 
to the human condition. The particular interest of The Imaginary lies in the way that, 
using a phenomenological method, he distinguishes imagination as a distinctive 
attitude of consciousness. I will consider how his theory is developed through a 
range of examples, which rely on his own self-reflection and how he is engaged in a 
debate with other philosophers and psychologists. By focussing on imagination 
Sartre’s theory compares with the Kleinian emphasis on phantasy. Both theories 
recognise the power of imagination in contrast to rationality and the causal power of 
external influences. However, as noted a moment ago, there is a significant gulf. 
Sartre’s rejection of the unconscious, through insistence on the reality of 
individualised consciousness, may be interpreted as a failure to fully acknowledge 
social reality. While accepting some legitimacy behind this argument I will explore 
the alternative view that Sartre’s theory of imagination recognises the place of 
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consciousness within social existence, albeit filtered through an individualistic 
perspective. Following a study of The Imaginary I will consider why commentators 
on Sartre’s work have thought that his early reflections on the imagination are useful 
for a theory of art and culture. I will explore how in his other work we can find 
examples which complement and help to develop his work on imagination. This 
broader sense of Sartre’s philosophy of imagination is useful when turning to 
cinema, Bergman’s work and the case of The Seventh Seal, in particular. And it is 
useful in retaining a sense of the interaction between art and society.     
 
The Imaginary 
As Dermot Moran points out, the first section of Sartre’s The Imaginary is called 
‘The Certain’ because Descartes is an important influence.8 Like Descartes in his 
Mediatations, Sartre puts his faith in reflection and self-awareness. Sartre believes 
that these are important sources of knowledge that must be defended against 
positivistic forms of science. Like Descartes he begins with that which he thinks he 
can be certain of. Nevertheless, Sartre is well aware of the problems with Descartes’ 
philosophy. As an alternative to Descartes’ philosophical conclusion, in which pure 
consciousness and God provided the foundations of knowledge, Sartre draws on the 
work of the phenomenologist Husserl, and yet Sartre also argues that it necessary to 
move beyond Husserl. 
 
The imaginary phenomena that Sartre refers to are often images in the usual sense of 
the word but also include other kinds of phenomena: he discusses phenomena that 
appear before consciousness including fictional ideas, ideas about people who exist 
but are absent, hallucinations, dream imagery and external images like paintings and 
photographs. Sartre also includes reference to some examples of aural imagination 
and it is clear that he wishes ultimately to relate his observations to art in general. His 
initial agenda involves commitment to the insights of Franz Brentano and Husserl, 
both of whom understood consciousness as defined by intentionality. Following these 
thinkers Sartre argues that all examples of consciousness involve consciousness of 
something and thus consciousness is defined by its intention towards something other 
than itself. Sartre aims to show that imagination is like other examples of 
consciousness in that it also is defined through its intention towards something other 
than itself.9 One of the key subjects for attack in The Imaginary, and in Sartre’s 
 98 
preceding work, Imagination : a Psychological Critique (1936), is what he calls ‘the 
illusion of immanence’.10 This phrase is used by Sartre to refer to a mistake that he 
locates in a range of theories. He argues that these theories make the common 
mistake of suggesting that the object of an image is, in some way, reproduced within 
the image. We can see how an idealist philosopher such as Bishop Berkeley may be 
guilty of such an approach, because for him existence is dependent on perception. As 
Beata Stawarska puts it: ‘Sartre targets Berkeley’s idealism for having reduced 
transcendent objects to their mode of appearance, and so reduced the objective world 
to subjective impressions.’11 However, it is less clear how this applies to empiricist 
philosophers such as David Hume who is also a target of Sartre’s criticism. 
 
Hume, in fact, gave imagination a very prominent role, as Gerhard Streminger has 
demonstrated with reference to Hume’s key works. Streminger shows how Hume 
held imagination responsible for mistaken metaphysical ideasm, but also gave it an 
extremely positive role in unifying disparate elements in experience. Streminger 
provides a range of examples, which illustrate Hume’s paradoxical treatment of the 
imagination. Streminger informs us that: ‘While in the first book of the Treatise… 
the ideas of imagination cannot yet attain the vivacity of memories and experiences, 
in his later writings Hume already regards it as “certain we may feel sickness and 
pain from the mere force of imagination…” ’12 One of Hume’s most famous 
examples is that of ‘the golden mountain’. According to Hume whatever we can 
imagine could exist at some point in time, and thus the golden mountain is possible, 
but we cannot imagine ‘ “a mountain without a valley, and therefore regard it as 
impossible.” ’ 13 This illustrates how Hume allows a creative role for imagination in 
its ability to combine different ideas and envisage different possibilities, but Hume’s 
example of the mountain without a valley also suggests a constraint on imagination, 
because, for Hume, we cannot imagine what is impossible. An objection can made 
here: who determines what is possible and impossible? 
 
In order to understand Hume’s account of imagination, and Sartre’s criticism of it, 
we must return to Hume’s theory of the mind, in which he divides consciousness 
between impressions and ideas. The former are acquired directly through perception 
and consequently more vivid than memories, ideas about objects or people that are 
absent or fictitious, and ideas like that of the golden mountain. However, for Hume 
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all ideas are derivative of impressions and ultimately causally dependent on the 
channel of perception. Thus, imagination creates an image like that of the golden 
mountain by synthesising discrete impressions from experience.14 In The Imaginary 
Sartre challenges Hume’s equation of the mental image with an idea derived from 
experience. For Sartre, this fails to acknowledge the distinctive mode of 
consciousness involved when we imagine something. He uses a reduction ad 
absurdum argument to suggest that for Hume an idea of an object imagined involves 
speaking as if the object were reproduced inside the idea. Sartre notes Hume’s 
argument that it ‘ “is impossible to form an idea of an object that is possest of 
quantity and quality, and yet is possest of no precise degree of either...” ’15 Sartre 
takes this to be an unnecessary prescription that the image should resemble a real 
object. Using the example of a chair he says it would be absurd to think that 
perception involved the chair being inside consciousness. He continues: 
 
Now I close my eyes and I produce the image of the chair that I have just 
perceived. The chair, now being given as imaged, can no more enter into 
consciousness than previously. An image of a chair is not and cannot be a  
chair.16 
    
 
Sartre continues by saying that the assumption that images are merely weak copies of 
the objects to which they refer is contained within a wide body of opinion: 
 
Psychologists and philosophers have mainly adopted this point of view. It is 
also that of common sense. When I say that ‘I have an image’ of Pierre, it is 
thought that I presently have a certain portrait of Pierre in consciousness. The 
object of my current consciousness is precisely this portrait, and Pierre, the 
man of flesh and blood, is reached only very indirectly, in an ‘extrinsic’ 
manner, only by the fact that he is what the portrait represents.17 
 
According to Sartre theories of the imagination which suggest that mental images are 
portrait-like objects conflict with our understanding of the nature of consciousness: 
 
Without doubt, the illusion of immanence was always left implicit. Otherwise it 
would have been understood that it was impossible to slip these material 
portraits into a conscious synthetic structure without destroying the structure, 
cutting the contacts, stopping the current, breaking the continuity. 
Consciousness would cease to be transparent to itself; everywhere its unity 
would be broken by the inassimilable, opaque screens.18    
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Sartre argues that many philosophers and psychologists, including such figures as 
Hume, are in effect speaking of images in the mind as being copies of objects. This is 
because they suggest that the image is a secondary version of the object, and 
therefore has qualities that are derived from the object, albeit in a weakened form. 
Sartre argues in effect that the mistaken theories tend to objectify images. The image 
itself is spoken of as a thing rather than being the means through which we are made 
aware of things in external reality, or indeed made aware of things which are 
fictional. In his commentary on Sartre’s work Anthony Manser characterises the 
philosophy of imagination criticised by Sartre: 
 
The conventional view of the imagination might be crudely represented in the 
following way: there arise in the mind ‘mental pictures’ which are in many 
ways like actual perceptions of external objects. These pictures are of two 
sorts, those of the reproductive imagination, exact copies of things seen in the 
past, and those of the free imagination or fancy, combinations of fragments 
from the reproductive imagination into new shapes.19 
 
 
Even when imagination conjures up an image that does not correspond to an object 
of perception such as the golden mountain, impressions are given a formative role by 
Hume who argues that the imagination freely rearranges and transfigures elements 
from perceptual experience. Sartre, in contrast, sees the example of images that 
depart from perceptual experience as a clear indication that the imaginary is a distinct 
realm. In this, he draws on the influence of Husserl. As Stawarska indicates, Sartre 
turned to Husserl’s example of a flute playing centaur in The Psychology of 
Imagination.20 Sartre insists that we must follow Husserl’s argument that this image 
is the result of the creative intentionality of the imagination and thus detached from 
the influence of the empirical world and its impact on perception. The import of 
Sartre’s argument can be expressed as follows: in trying to tie imagination to 
empirical data, in a strict pattern of cause and effect, philosophers like Hume have 
put the issue of origins before a phenomenology of experience, and have thus failed 
to recognise the autonomy of imagination.   
  
In endorsing Sartre’s criticisms of the conventional views on imagination Manser 
comments: 
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The philosophers appear to have talked as if there were a central notion of 
mental picturing which had little or nothing to do with other things called 
imaginative.21 
 
Having started from the basis that imagination is a distinct form of consciousness, 
Sartre moves on to look more closely at the way in which it compares and contrasts 
with perception. Thus, the third section of the first chapter is concerned with what 
Sartre calls ‘quasi-observation’. 22 He discusses examples where he observes objects 
in imagination. At first, Sartre’s argument appears to be very close to that of Hume 
who suggested that ideas are weakened impressions. Sartre claims that observation of 
images has an ‘essential poverty’ in comparison to the impressions that make up 
perception.23 For Sartre, the mental image is limited but this is not because it is a 
secondary form of perception or because it has been derived from perception.  
Instead, Sartre argues that these limitations are inherent to imagination itself and are 
apparent when we reflect on the nature of images: 
 
Our attitude in relation to the object of the image could be called ‘quasi-
observation’.We are, indeed, placed in the attitude of observation, but it is an 
observation that does not teach anything. If I give myself in image the page of 
a book, I am in the attitude of the reader, I look at the printed lines. But I do not 
read. And, at bottom, I am not even looking, because I already know what is 
written.24. 
 
While he is trying to construct a sense of what imagination involves, Sartre is also 
simultaneously deconstructing the illusions left by other theories.  In this sense, 
Sartre pre-empts those theories which insist that we must recognise the illusory 
nature of the image. Sartre conveys the limitations of imagination, but this does not 
lead him to say that imagination has nothing to say about the world. 
 
As already noted, Hume’s theory suggests that we recognise the image by the 
inferiority and weakness it has in contrast to perception. Sartre goes further than 
Hume then in asserting the limitations of imagination and says that we have a strong 
awareness of the imagined object as something different from the perceived object. 
Sartre states this more fully as follows: 
 
Every consciousness posits its object, but each in its own way. Perception, for 
example, posits its objects as existing. The image also includes an act of belief 
or a positional act. The act can take four and only four forms: it can posit the 
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object as nonexistent, or as absent, or as existing elsewhere; it can also 
‘neutralize’ itself, which is to say not posit its object as existent.25 
 
Here, Sartre refers to our awareness that the mental image may apply to something 
that has been invented. Hume’s golden mountain might fit this category. Or the 
mental image may refer to our idea of a person or object that is missing from a 
location. Sartre uses the example of the everyman Pierre and talks about his tangible 
sense of Pierre's absence when, for instance, he is not sure whether a figure walking 
towards him is Pierre or not. Or the mental image may refer to our image of someone 
or an object, which we picture in a different locale from ourselves. The final form 
that Sartre attributes to the image concerns a level of self-awareness in which we are 
aware of imaginative capacity before an object materialises. In this case we have a 
spontaneous sense of the negation of perceptual content. Sartre is poetic on this point 
and suggests the possibility that, in this form, consciousness intuitively connects with 
past experiences whilst maintaining a creative, spontaneous intentionality towards 
the present and future: 
 
The consciousness appears to itself as creative, but without positing as object 
this creative character. It is thanks to this vague and fugitive quality that the 
image consciousness is not given as a piece of wood that floats on the sea, but 
as a wave among the waves. It feels itself to be consciousness through and 
through and homogenous with the other consciousnesses that have preceded it 
and with which it is synthetically united. 26 
 
 
Thus, Sartre’s work conflicts with theories that seek an exclusively factual or 
empirical basis for knowledge. He recognises different levels of consciousness 
describing the form of consciousness above as ‘nonthetic’ consciousness of itself. 27 
This means that he is talking about an internal, ‘implicit’, pre-reflective sense of 
one’s own consciousness which is distinct from self-consciousness in the sense of 
reflecting on our own thoughts.28 Sartre believes that the spontaneous nature of this 
form of consciousness is conveyed through a metaphor of movement, ‘waves’. In 
sum, although he recognises the limitations of imagination Sartre also conveys its 
independent qualities. 
   
‘Image, portrait, caricature’                                                                                
Sartre considers three different examples of imaginative consciousness, a mental 
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image, a photographic portrait, and a caricature in relation to the example of a friend 
‘Pierre’. Sartre argues that these three forms of imagination have in common the 
attempt to make present a subject who is absent. In making the subject present they 
substitute the sensation of presence that would be provided by perception. Sartre 
suggests that psychology would normally distinguish the mental image as more 
subjective than the portrait. He accepts that the image will lack the detail of the 
photograph, but the latter will lack the expressive qualities of the subject captured in 
the caricature. He says:  ‘...something that was lacking in the photograph, life, 
expression, is clearly manifest in the drawing: I “regain” Pierre.’29 
 
Sartre points out that many theorists would regard the mental image as a different 
type of phenomenon from the photograph and the caricature.  However, Sartre’s 
phenomenological method involves searching for points in common between 
different states of consciousness. All three ways of imagining their subject share 
certain characteristics. In each example consciousness is involved in the intention of 
creating the imaginary object. Clearly, the intentionality may vary or even be difficult 
to uncover, but Sartre insists that consciousness must play a critical role in creating 
the meaning of the absent Pierre, even when he is presented as photograph or 
caricature. We must create this meaning from the ensemble of sense data. 
 
If someone suddenly shows me a photo of Pierre, the case is functionally the 
same as when an image appears in my consciousness suddenly and without 
being willed. However this photograph, if it is simply perceived, appears to me 
as a paper rectangle of a special quality and colour, with shades and clear spots 
distributed in a certain way. If I perceive that photograph as ‘photo of man 
standing on steps’, the mental phenomenon is necessarily already of a different 
structure: a different intention animates it. And if that photo appears to me as 
the photo ‘of Pierre’, if, in some way, I see Pierre behind it, it is necessary that 
the piece of card is animated with some help from me, giving it a meaning it 
did not yet have. 30 
 
In discussing the portrait Sartre is very careful to indicate how the image as object in 
the external world can be taken by consciousness in different ways. We may simply 
perceive the portrait without investing imaginatively. Sartre provides us with a sense 
of the way the material aspect of the image as object has to be transcended for 
imaginary consciousness to take over. 
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Another example used by Sartre is that of a different caricature, in the form of a 
female performer, Franconay, impersonating a well-known jazz singer and performer 
Maurice Chevalier.  Sartre talks about how the consciousness of the spectator may 
oscillate between perceiving obvious discrepancies between the image of the 
performer and that which is imagined: 
 
The imitator is small, stout, brunette; a woman, she imitates a man. The result 
is that the imitation is approximate. The object that Franconay produces by 
means of her body is a feeble form, which can always be interpreted in two 
distinct ways: I am always free to see Maurice Chevalier as imaged, or a small 
woman pulling faces.31 
 
 
Sartre points again to the duality between seeing the performer as herself and as the 
character she portrays, but he goes further in recognising a complexity in the build up 
to the imaging consciousness. He talks of the way consciousness must synthesise the 
materials presented: 
 
To decipher the signs is to produce the concept ‘Chevalier’. At the same time I 
judge: ‘She is imitating Chevalier’. With this judgement the structure of 
consciousness is transformed. The theme now is Chevalier. By its central 
intention, the consciousness is imaging, it acts to realize my knowledge in the 
intuitive matter that is furnished for me.32 
 
 
This suggests how cognition and imagination work together. The spectator may grasp 
the point of the impersonation before acquiring the image, which the performance 
elicits. Whilst perception and imagination are different attitudes the latter may 
involve a transformation of concepts into a sensible form. However, Sartre also 
recognises how emotion may play a part in the imagining of Chevalier. Since the 
latter is well-known Sartre perceived him before Franconay’s performance and this 
was accompanied by a certain ‘affective reaction’ (perhaps enjoyment of his 
performance). This emotional response may be brought back to life in the imagined 
Chevalier: 
 
... the affective sense of the face of Chevalier will appear on the face of 
Franconay. It is this that realizes the synthetic union of the different signs, it is 
this that animates their fixed dryness, that gives them life and a certain depth.33 
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This allows Sartre to recognize more fully the ‘expressive’ nature of imagination.34 
At the same time Sartre talks about the ‘spontaneity’ of imagination, and also about 
situations where the spectator is in a hybrid state and the object of consciousness is 
‘neither fully perception nor fully image’.35 
 
The analogon 
It can be objected that Sartre’s account leaves us mystified as to what actually resides 
in consciousness when we imagine. For Sartre, imagination is a form of 
consciousness that may share qualities with other forms of consciousness, but at the 
same time maintains its own distinctive nature.  In this sense, Sartre’s account of the 
imagination engages with the epistemology and the nature of consciousness, but lays 
stress on the creativity of artistic ideas of consciousness. However, there is still the 
problem of determining whether Sartre is denying any form of representation within 
consciousness.36 Here we need to consider the concept of the ‘analogon’. 
 
Sartre uses the term ‘analogon’ to describe the way imagination grasps something 
that is not a derivative from reality, but instead a set of details which allow 
imagination to constitute its object. The analogon is the prop or medium for this 
activity. As such it may be used to refer to the image as external object or as 
immaterial psychic content. Sartre states: 
 
I will say in consequence that the image is an act that aims in its corporeality at 
an absent or nonexistent object, through a physical or psychic content that is 
given not as itself but in the capacity of ‘analogical representative’ of the object 
aimed at.37 
 
 
 
This explanation replaces an idea of passive representation with a more active sense 
of the mind’s capacity for imaginative creation. In his commentary on Sartre’s theory 
of history, Thomas Flynn explains this concept of the analogical representative as 
follows: 
 
Perhaps the most distinctive feature of Sartre’s theory (in The Imaginary) and 
one that figures in his understanding of history is his concept of the ‘analogical 
representative’ or analogon in imaging consciousness. This may be a physical 
thing, like a carving or the printed letters on a page, or physiological changes, 
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like the eye movements that serve as content for hypnagogic images. The 
analogon is synthesised with cognitive, emotive and often, kinaesthetic 
elements to yield the intended object. The carving for example, is simply a 
piece of polished wood until it is ‘derealized’ into the analogue for the aesthetic 
object.38 
 
Flynn conveys how the concept of the analagon differs from the assumptions of 
Hume and others about the imagination as representational of the world. The 
difference comes back to Sartre’s insistence on imagination as a distinctive creative 
process, one that cannot be pinned down or captured in the notion of images as 
object-like entities. The psychic content of the analagon may vary from hypnagogic 
images to paintings, so that Sartre’s main method of elucidation is through diverse 
examples and recognition of how the imagination works in a relational way, driven 
by intention. 
 
Sartre uses the concept of the analogon to represent how consciousness is different 
when involved in imagining. Imagination will reach beyond its own content, taking 
perhaps simple perceptual details and imbuing these with a deeper meaning. In the 
case of images that are external objects imagination invests the material of the object 
with its own subjectivity. In the case of immaterial mental images, imagination also 
reaches beyond the surface content. In all cases imagination strives towards a 
signified subject. Thus Sartre does not romanticise reading as act consumed by 
imaginative production. Instead, he notes how the reader may move between taking 
words as signs and entering into mental images. In all cases the intention behind the 
creation of the analogon signifies a radically different orientation from that involved 
in perception or cognition. External objects may become the props for the 
imagination at any time. In these instances, we can recognize, says Sartre, that:     
 
The two worlds, the imaginary and the real, are constituted by the same 
objects; only the grouping and the interpretation of these objects varies. What 
defines the imaginary world, as with the real universe, is an attitude of 
consciousness.39 
 
 
Therefore, Sartre approaches the imaginary as an elemental state. In this book he 
does not discuss imagined fictional worlds, but is concerned with the moment at 
which consciousness summons an imaginary object. As already indicated he is keen 
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to outline the limitations of this act: how it cannot compete with the world’s 
complexity. It is as if one imagined object followed by another is like a jerky film in 
which continuity does not completely work. For Sartre, transformation of imagined 
objects and people is a precarious business in which consciousness intervenes and 
may not be able to realise its full intentions.40 
 
Discontinuity and emotional projection in the imaginary 
An example which Sartre provides to illustrate the fragmented, discontinuous nature 
of the imagination comes in his reposte to Johann Wolfgang von Goethe’s claim that 
he could ‘produce a flower as a bud, make it grow, blossom, open, close, shed its 
petals, etc.’ 41 Sartre replies to this claim: 
 
Without doubt, one can indeed make a top hat appear, and also the figure of 
Pierre. Perhaps one sees them simultaneously, perhaps one can even see 
Pierre’s face below the top hat. But what one can never see as imaged is the 
effect of a top hat on Pierre’s face...42 
 
For Sartre, the actions of the imagination have to be complemented by reflection to 
achieve unity, and he backs this up by referring to the way a painter will step back 
form his work to observe it from a different perspective. 
 
Further on, Sartre takes up another example, which concerns desire. Mental images 
of food may respond to the desire to eat and reinforce this desire. Sartre argues that 
we should not make the mistake, which he attributes to the illusion of immanence, to 
believe that the hunger stems from the images of food. These images resulted from 
the hunger. Hunger brought the imaginary food into the mind. The consequent 
images are a medium for this desire. They are determined subjectively and should not 
be regarded as even a secondary cause of the hunger. Also, we should note that there 
are secondary, emotional, responses to the imaginary. In these responses affective 
schemata come to the fore simply as a result of a second hand account of a particular 
event. This is evident in another example, which Sartre gives: when someone 
responds to hearing of a terrible event by exclaiming their distress but the emotion is 
unconvincing. Again Sartre’s emphasis is on an example where subjectivity 
dominates the response of the individual and constitutes how they take up a 
particular imaginary scenario.43 
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Sartre accepts that the imaginary can have a transformative effect on the emotional 
element that constituted it:  
 
One could not therefore deny that my hunger, my sexual desire, my disgust 
underwent a significant modification while passing through the imaging state. 
They were concentrated, made more precise, and their intensity increased. 44 
 
 
Sartre’s account of the way emotion works in imagination is closely tied to his view 
of the way emotion works in perception. He argues, in relation to the latter, that we 
may project feelings on to an object through perception. He then suggests that we 
may have the impression of these feelings being caused by the object, so the emotion 
appears to be confirmed by the external source. This exchange between emotional 
projection and the object of perception can become an elaborate pattern of exchange 
back and forth: ‘each affective quality is so deeply incorporated in the object that it is 
impossible to distinguish between what is felt and what is perceived.’45 With the 
imaginary object, however, emotion is projected on to something which is 
fundamentally empty so that, according to Sartre, the irreal object can become 
simply the reflection of the subject’s feeling: ‘Feeling therefore feeds on its own 
reflection.’46 
 
Thus, Sartre’s account of the imaginary ultimately recognises how external 
phenomena influence the content of imaginary experiences. Yet he does not seek to 
invoke a definitive set of causes or sustain a surreal idea of the imaginary as a 
completely spontaneous mode of consciousness. Instead, he focuses on the 
phenomena and experience which reveal emotion intersecting with imaginary 
content. Sartre also approaches the issue of how we may be gripped by an imaginary 
experience despite its unreality and suggests that psychological knowledge can 
inform our understanding of extreme states of delusion where the imaginary takes 
over. I will return to this point shortly in the chapter in considering Stawarska’s 
commentary on The Imaginary. 
 
The conclusion of the Imaginary 
In the conclusion Sartre reiterates his central point. Referring again to his mental 
 109 
images of Pierre in a different location he states that: ‘This fundamental absence, this 
essential nothingness of the imaged object, suffices to differentiate it from the objects 
of perception.’47 Sartre also spells out his opposition to a deterministic form of 
psychology: ‘For consciousness to be able to imagine, it must be able to escape from 
the world by its very nature, it must be able to stand back from the world by its own 
efforts. In a word, it must be free.’48 He spells out the philosophical consequences of 
his arguments so far and starts to apply this work to questions raised in aesthetics 
(although he insists that the latter requires a book of its own). For Sartre imagination 
is a continuous possibility. He suggests that imagination is a ‘surpassing’ of the ‘real’ 
and compares his thinking here with Heidegger’s use of the concept of      
‘surpassing’ 49 Thus, imagination does not enter into nothingness, but must reduce 
the real to a temporary nothingness in order to bring forward the content that was 
previously absent. Returning to an example discussed earlier, he argues that our 
imagination becomes active in the face of a portrait when we use the material and 
formal aspects of the portrait to reach the subject who is not there. This means that if 
some aspect of present empirical reality changes, such as a change of light in the 
room where I look at the portrait, this has no impact on the nature of the imaginary 
object. The latter is determined by my consciousness of the formal intentions that I 
read as the work.50 
 
Thus, Sartre argues that in his enjoyment of a particular symphony the imaginary 
object remains the same despite different performances. For example, he might judge 
a poor performance of the symphony as a less successful ‘analogon’ (to use Sartre’s 
term) of how he imagines the symphony. 
 
Does one not clearly see that the performance of the Seventh Symphony is its 
analogon. It can be manifested only through analogons that are dated and that 
unfurl in our time. But in order to grasp it on these analogons, it is necessary to 
operate the imaging reduction, which is to say, apprehend precisely the real 
sounds as analogons. It is therefore given as a perpetual elsewhere, a perpetual 
absence. We must not picture it (as does Spandrell in Huxley’s Point Counter 
Point  - as do so many Platonists) such that it exists in another world, in an 
intelligible heaven.51 
 
For Sartre, our imagined symphony is more than the symphony performed in the 
present, but the former is wedded to the latter. One could say the present symphony 
cues us for the imaginary. The value of art is undisputed. It gives expression to the 
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freedom of consciousness. 
  
Commentary on Sartre’s philosophy of imagination 
In evaluating Sartre’s argument Mary Warnock makes the point that we may feel he 
has simply dressed up what we know from common sense: 
 
it might be objected, there is nothing very surprising in the conclusion that 
imagination differs from perception in that the objects of the latter are real 
while those of the former are not. 52 
 
However Warnock defends the originality of Sartre’s work:  
 
Imagination has been redefined.  All the definitions which made it a kind of 
thinking, or a kind of peering at mental entities called images, have been 
rejected. It has been redefined as the mode of consciousness of an object, 
…which entails the bringing into fleeting existence of an appearance which 
fades at once to nothingness. And this is significant for Sartre, just because he 
has already more than half formed the concept of human nature which is 
expounded in Being and Nothingness, and which turns essentially on the 
possibility of projecting what is not the case….Man’s ability to imagine things, 
which, of course, was never in doubt, is now shown to be connected, in its 
essence, with his ability to choose. 53  
  
 
Flynn indicates Sartre’s innovation in giving imagination a stronger role than 
envisaged by Husserl, so the emphasis on intentionality becomes wedded to a  
recognition of the distinctive roles of imagination: 
 
…the image is not a ‘thing,’ not even a mental thing, but a form of 
consciousness, a way of being present to the world. This way is called 
‘intentionality’ by Husserl and his followers in the phenomenological 
movement. Sartre never questioned the claim that consciousness is 
characteristically other-referring, that it ‘intends’ an object in its every act. 
Where he augmented the Husserlian thesis was his account of the way 
consciousness ‘intends’ its objects imaginatively (as distinct from perceptively 
or emotively).54 
 
 
This clarifies how Sartre goes beyond Husserl and is suggestive of the sense in which 
imagination can dominate consciousness in its deepest work. 
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However, there is also considerable doubt in commentaries on The Imaginary about 
whether Sartre convincingly develops Husserl’s ideas. Stawarska focuses on the 
concept of the analogon as an essential element that requires revision if Sartre’s 
account of imagination is to succeed. Stawarska argues that Sartre was decisively 
influenced by Husserl. This is manifest in Sartre’s discussion of the flute playing 
centaur, and Albrecht Durer’s engraving of  ‘The Knight, Death and the Devil’, both 
images discussed previously by Husserl.55 As Stawarska points out, Husserl used the 
latter as an example of the way an object can be ‘apprehended’ through ‘normal 
perception’ or ‘aesthetic contemplation’.56 As Stawaska explains, Sartre believes that  
Durer’s picture ‘can be aligned with an act of pure fantasy’ such as imagining a flute 
playing centaur, in that both acts consist of intentionally animating some content, 
which may be mental or physical.57 We have seen how Sartre uses other examples to 
make this point. 
 
Stawarska is persuaded that this ‘unitary’ theory of imagination (images and external 
pictures together in a unified theory) is problematic.58 He describes it as a picture 
theory of imagination and describes how Husserl decided that he could not maintain 
this perspective. The problem occurs in equating the mental representation with the 
physical object of the picture. As Stawaska puts it: 
 
In fantasy it is impossible to distinguish a picture thing from the picture-subject 
it represents, and so it is difficult see how the internal function can serve the 
symbolic function at all. 59 
 
This doubt is extended later as Stawarska contends that there is a crucial difference 
between our image of a person or thing which is absent and our image of something 
like a mythical creature which we know has no real existence. As Stawarska puts it:  
 
A centaur cannot be absent (nor present) since it does not belong to the class of 
things posited as existent. This being so, the centaur (and any other fictional 
being) can no longer be argued to function as a referent of a picture 
representing something absent, and consciousness imagining a centaur cannot 
be mapped onto the consciousness of a picture representing an external referent 
or an ‘original’.60 
 
 
Stawarska argues, in effect, that Sartre’s account of the imaginary has serious 
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problems in taking account of fiction because it relies on a picture theory of 
imagination; and this theory retains the dependence of the imaginary on a referent 
which can be grasped through perception. We can agree with this criticism, to an 
extent, because it is notable how perceptual experience through memory was not 
eclipsed by the examples of the image of the absent Pierre and the caricature of 
Chevalier. These examples may lead us to suspect that Sartre has not escaped the 
idea that imagination is ultimately derivative in relation to perception. Nevertheless 
Stawarska believes that Sartre’s account can support the idea of the imagination as an 
autonomous activity distinct from perception, but the basis for this is developed 
through the section where Sartre discusses the pathology of imagination. 
 
In this section Sartre aims to show how we can discriminate between different types 
of imaginary experience, which include dreaming and hallucinations. Stawarska 
emphasises how Sartre draws on Pierre Janet to conceptualise these forms of 
imagining as obsessive, in which awareness of reality is lost. Janet focussed on 
patients where obsession involved a ‘dimishment of the reality function’.61 Thus, 
Stawarska elicits from Sartre’s text that imagination depends on an attitude of belief, 
in which I believe temporarily in the existence of the imagined world, whilst 
knowing that it is imaginary. Dreaming and hallucination differ from reading fiction 
in that they fail to expose the unreality of the imagined scenario. Obsession becomes 
a pathological instance of the imaginary. This account fits with Sartre’s theory as 
already outlined, which included a sense of the imagination’s limitations as well as 
its capacity. It ties Sartre’s phenomenological analysis in with aesthetics where the 
suspension of disbelief is a key idea that parallels Sartre’s emphasis on a knowing 
engagement with the unreal. 
 
One of the problems Stawarska’s intervention exposes is that of converting Sartre’s 
insights into an aesthetic theory. To analyse the imagination of texts and narratives 
we need to go beyond the idea these are the product of a distinct mode of 
consciousness. In his work on the pathology of imagination Sartre shows himself to 
be aware of this problem. When Sartre discusses how hallucinations and dreaming 
may be distinguished from perception he recognises how in pathological imagination 
there is a disintegration of subjectivity. Discussing hallucination as something 
comparable to obsession, Sartre writes:  
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The hallucination therefore bears a resemblance to the obsession up to a certain 
point: in both consciousness is attracted by the idea that it can produce a certain 
object. Only, in the case of the hallucinator, a very important modification has 
surfaced: disintegration.62 
 
 
Extrapolating from this we might say that Sartre allows that the imagination in art 
can produce something of the power that we find in a hallucination, but it will be 
distinguished because through the conventions of art, including suspension of 
disbelief, the artist and the reader find meaning in the work and, thus overcome the 
possibility of disintegration inherent in the work of imagination. Sartre’s discussion 
of dreaming becomes an important element in his move towards a theory which can 
accommodate narrative. He accepts that the dream presents a different type of 
example because of story form  ‘Due to the fact that the dream makes us suddenly 
enter into a temporal world, every dream is given to us as a story.’63 Speaking of the 
‘spatio-temporal universe’ of the dream, Sartre states:  
 
To tell the truth, it is not even imaged, in the sense in which consciousness 
imagines when it presentifies something through an analogon. It is, as 
imaginary world, the correlate of a belief, the dreamer believes that the scene 
unfurls in a world; that is to say, the world is the object of empty intentions that 
are directed on it starting from the central image.64 
 
Here, Sartre acknowledges that, while the analogon (in the form of a mental image) 
may be the cue for an imaginary world, the latter elaborates from the initial imagined 
content. We should also remember here, that Sartre discusses the process of reading 
as one in which words on the page are the analogon for the production of an 
imaginary universe:  
 
Reading is a kind of fascination, and when I read a detective story I believe in 
what I read. But this does not signify in the least that I cease to hold the 
detective’s adventures to be imaginary. Simply, an entire world appears to me 
as imaged through the lines of the book (I have already shown that words serve 
as an analogon) and this world encloses my consciousness, I cannot disengage, 
I am fascinated by it.65 
 
 
Here Sartre acknowledges that the reader’s involvement in an imaginary world calls 
on more than the imaginary attitude. The relevance of Janet’s theory of obsession as 
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explained by Stawarska is that it shows what happens when the imaginary takes over 
from other mental operations.  
 
Sartre is interested in exploring the boundary between pathological forms of 
imagination and those controlled by the suspension of disbelief. This is apparent for 
instance through his novel Nausea, in which the narrator Roquentin becomes 
preoccupied with the way his perception can be transformed through subjectivity. 
We can conclude, therefore, that when Sartre wrote The Imaginary he did not 
successfully clarify how such ambiguity bears on a theory of art. It is also unclear 
whether he trusts in the imaginary to produce a deeper awareness of social reality. 
Mészáros points to the tension in Sartre’s early work, indicating how Sartre tries to 
maintain the idea of imagination as inherently related to freedom and as at the same 
time a mode of consciousness that is situated ‘in the midst of the world’: 
 
On the one hand he wants to assert the complete freedom and its vital negating 
function. On the other hand, he is very much concerned with showing that 
consciousness...cannot possibly construct another world than exactly the one in 
which we happen to live. Of course, this is a most uneasy solution that 
constantly oscillates between the extreme poles of total indeterminacy, and its 
diametrical opposite: the massive contingency, facticity, ‘absurdity’ and 
absolute giveness of the ‘things in the world’, with all their iron 
determinations.66  
 
 
While we can agree with Mészáros, it can also be noted here how fiction offers a 
solution to the problem identified in Sartre’s work. If the power of imagination is 
delegated to characters, the author can reveal the tension between their capacity for 
freedom and the constraints of their surrounding world. Further to this, the author 
himself /or herself can seek to situate his or her perspective in the imaginary world in 
a way that parallels the contingency of the characters. This demonstrates the artifice 
of fiction, but extends the idea of the imaginary as a unique mode of consciousness 
to include representation of the interaction between consciousness and the world. 
Although Mészáros does not discuss this argument, he acknowledges that Sartre’s 
commitment to the tension between freedom and determinism allowed his fiction and 
drama to present, in imaginary form, acute contradictions from his own social 
context. Mészáros also sees in Sartre’s early work a commitment and tension that is 
apparent in his subsequent philosophy.67 
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A comparable understanding of Sartre is also apparent in some other contributions, 
which relate The Imaginary to his later work. Writing generally about the 
philosophical legacy of existentialism, Peter Rickman claims that the two key 
legacies of this movement are: 1) its emphasis on the relevance of philosophy to 
daily life and; 2) the emphasis on ‘the uniqueness of individuals’.68 Using Sartre as 
an example, alongside Kierkegaard, Rickman maintains these two reasons explain 
the close relationship between existentialism and literature which provides the 
resources for exploration of both these concerns: ‘Over and above offering formal 
criteria and frameworks for reflection we can conjure up individualised models, or 
types of life, and the imaginative exploration of their implications.’69 
 
Rickman’s argument reinforces the significance of the imaginary in a broad sense for 
existentialism. Returning more specifically to Sartre’s theory of imagination, we find 
that that an element that has been highly valued is that of ‘negation’ or ‘nihilation’. 
The power of imagination, to render reality as ‘nothingness’, has been regarded as 
the key to his philosophy of freedom. As Flynn puts it  
 
…that ‘othering’ feature of the imaging act gives the imaginer a certain power 
to suspend the actual in the possible as an exercise of freedom and to ‘hollow’, 
as Foucault might say, the plenum of the ‘in-itself’ with lack.70  
 
Flynn duly recognises how Sartre’s philosophy can be used to challenge a restrictive 
notion of art based on resemblance, distinguishing Francesco Guardi’s paintings of 
Venice from those of Giovanni Canaletto because the former provide a sense of 
Venice that transcends perceptual experience.71 Flynn also argues that the idea of the 
imaginary plays a part in Sartre’s ‘Existentialism is a Humanism’ noting how the text 
has been criticised for its introduction of the Kantian philosophy of a universal 
morality. Flynn then suggests that Sartre’s version of this argument is carried by his 
‘appeal to ‘‘the image’’ of the kind of person we think we should be when we make a 
moral choice.’72 Thus, Flynn argues that Sartre’s turn towards greater social 
commitment is accompanied by his philosophy of the imaginary quoting 
‘Existentialism is a Humanism’ as follows: ‘ “I create a certain image of the man I 
choose; choosing myself I choose man.” ’73 Flynn duly acknowledges that Sartre 
recognises a dialectical relationship between imagination and perception, but notes 
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the continuing efficacy afforded the imagination in Sartre’s literary biographies. 
Sartre, in these works, showed how Flaubert, Jean Genet and Charles Baudelaire 
rebel against oppressive circumstances through their use of imagination.74      
 
The relevance of Sartre’s philosophy of imagination to his other work 
The examples from Flynn indicate how Sartre’s account of psychological processes 
behind imagination is complemented by his other work. There is only the space here 
to consider a few further points from Sartre’s oeuvre but this remains necessary as a 
context for applying his theory of imagination to cinema and Bergman. In The 
Transcendence of the Ego Sartre argued against the idea that the ego is a fixed 
object-like entity.75 This led him to challenge even Husserl whose theory included 
the concept a transcendent ego. For Sartre, phenomenology had to recognise how the 
ego is continually recreated from the flow of an impersonal consciousness. Similarly 
in  Sketch for a Theory of the Emotions, Sartre criticises psychologists who talk of 
emotions as purely physical manifestations, and questions the idea of emotions as 
fixed states.76 For Sartre, emotions are bound up with consciousness and as such 
reveal the intentions of the subjects in relation to reality. This view is repeated in 
Being and Nothingness when Sartre states: 
 
…the empirical psychologist, while defining man by his desires, remains the 
victim of the illusion of substance. He views desire as being in man by virtue 
of  being ‘contained’ by his consciousness, and he believes that the meaning of 
the desire is inherent in the desire itself. Thus he avoids everything which 
could evoke the idea of transcendence.77 
 
 
Sartre’s determination to resist fixed programmatic accounts of the self, imagination 
and emotions has been interpreted by some as a forerunner of post-structuralism. We 
saw that he notes the way imaginary experiences resist continuity in a complex form, 
and how hallucinations were differentiated from perceptions because they signalled 
the disintegration of subjectivity.78 However, Sartre is keen to maintain the reality of 
the individual as an integrated unit. His vision of the fragility of individual identity is 
developed extensively in Being and Nothingness, but elements of this work suggest 
that total dismantling of subjectivity is not the aim. As noted earlier internal negation 
is at the heart of Sartre’s philosophy in Being and Nothingness so that subjectivity is 
inherently liable to division, but still can be understood as a coherent unit.79 
 117 
   
The intricate balance between a deconstructive approach and one that maintains a 
sense of the individual as a coherent unit is present in Sartre’s, well-known, 
discussion of bad faith in Being and Nothingness. Sartre’s examples of bad faith 
include the example of a woman who leaves her hand intertwined with that of a 
flirtatious man, despite her indecision about responding to his seductions. She 
engages the man’s potential to speak in a high-minded form of love. As Sartre puts it: 
 
She draws her companion up to the most lofty regions of sentimental 
speculation.…And during this time the divorce of the body from the soul is 
accomplished; the hand rests inert between the warm hands of her companion -
neither consenting nor resisting - a thing.80 
 
 
This example shows how bad faith involves refusing the possibility of choice such 
that the body, or in this case a part of the body, appears to signify a final decision 
which has not actually been made. In this sense the hand becomes object-like 
because it fails to represent the uncertainty and continuing evolution of the woman’s 
consciousness in relation to her suitor. Another famous example concerns the waiter 
who Sartre describes in evocative terms. According to Sartre, the waiter fails to 
express his freedom as consciousness ‘for-itself’: ‘He applies himself to chaining his 
movements as if they were mechanisms… he gives himself the quickness and pitiless 
rapidity of things.’81 The waiter seeks to give his role the substance that Sartre 
reserves for being ‘in-itself’. As we know, for Sartre consciousness can never 
coincide with being ‘in-itself’ and thus, as Sartre observes, the waiter’s movements, 
Sartre recognises the intentionality, the striving for definition: ‘He is playing, he is 
amusing himself. But what is he playing? We need not watch long before we can 
explain it: he is playing at being a waiter in a café.’82 
 
Sartre’s examples read like intensely imagined, literary or cinematic, episodes. We 
may see the woman’s hand in close-up, and we may imagine the waiter as a clearly 
defined character of the subplot. At the philosophical level, Sartre goes beyond the 
particular. He wants to show how these individual moments signify insights into the 
human situation in general. We are meant to recognise the possibility that humans in 
any situation may conceal their freedom through objectification of the body. As 
Sartre’s account of the relations between self and other indicates, this objectification 
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can be projected on to someone else. In any situation a person may seek to limit their 
freedom through fastidious playing of a particular role or dogmatic adherence to a 
fixed identity. Sartre compares the waiter’s situation to that of a child who plays a 
game. For Sartre, the waiter ‘plays with his body in order to realize it’; he also 
compares the waiter’s situation to that of many different jobs in which the public are 
served ranging from the grocer to the soldier.83         
 
As Gary Cox highlights, Sartre is not simply discussing self-deception but rather 
understanding how an individual may constrain his or her freedom through self- 
definition.84 The example is complicated, as Cox points out, because the waiter could 
conceivably be understood as transcending bad faith. This is because he knowingly 
plays his role. For Sartre, bad faith can be overcome but only when we attain 
awareness of the tension between our freedom to choose and the resistance provided 
by the external world. Sartre also focuses on how this tension emerges in potentially 
intersubjective situations. Looking at the waiter Sartre becomes aware that he can 
only become like the waiter if he recognises the waiter’s imaginary representation of 
himself. Describing the waiter’s performance Sartre says: ‘It is a “representation” for 
others and for myself, which means that I can be he only in representation.’85 Thus, 
the waiter becomes an analogue animated by Sartre’s intention to imagine himself as 
a waiter: 
 
I can be he only in the neutralised mode, as the actor is Hamlet, by 
mechanically making the typical gestures of my state and by aiming at myself 
as an imaginary café waiter through those gestures taken as an ‘analogue.’86 
 
Sartre draws on his earlier work on the imagination, using the concept of the 
analogue/analogon and figuring in imagination as a mode of consciousness essential 
to both the waiter and the empathic onlooker. Sartre regards understanding of the 
other as a process potentially imbued with dramatic role-play, a process defined by 
movement and creation. This contrasts with an account of the relationship between 
self and other which relies on fixed roles or identities, but Sartre’s account is also at 
odds with a nihilistic sense of complete disintegration in meaningful human 
relations. 
 
Sartre gives centre stage to a vision of emotion caught up in the flux of 
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consciousness. In Being and Nothingness Sartre gives a special place to anguish as a 
response to the realisation of the freedom of the ‘for-itself’. He argues that his ideas 
are in accordance with the work of Kierkegaard and Heidegger, and the idea of 
anguish at which he arrives through these thinkers is distinguished from fear. In 
anguish, we turn towards the self. Anguish accompanies the recognition that either in 
the future or in the past we hold responsibility for our decisions.87 The centrality 
given to this can be compared to the Kleinian focus on moderating the anxiety of the 
paranoid-schizoid phase through mourning and melancholy in the depressive phase. 
Anguish in this sense has constructive potential. Christine Daigle argues 
convincingly that Sartre’s representation of anguish involves understanding this 
emotion in opposition to bad faith. If bad faith is a denial of one’s own freedom, 
anguish represents an advance because it involves recognition of this freedom.88 
Daigle indicates that Sartre’s account of the relationship between bad faith and 
anguish reveals a movement towards an ethical philosophy of authenticity.89 Sartre 
recognises that emotions and consciousness are interdependent and inseparable from 
human relations.      
 
Sartre’s analysis of the relations between self and other is complemented by the 
development of a more dialectical conception of imagination, which is resistant to 
metaphysics, in his post-war work. In Sartre’s post-war treatise What is Literature?, 
based on his articles in Les Temps Modernes, he envisages literature as a relationship 
between writer and reader. In this, he rejects the Kantian idea of art as ‘finality 
without end’90 in favour of the more circumscribed notion of literature as a 
relationship between two creators: the reader and writer. In the Kantian philosophy 
the reader has the freedom to play through their experience of the artist’s creativity, 
but in Sartre’s revision of this, the reader has a responsibility to recreate the 
imaginative world suggested through the art work. He writes: 
 
...the Kantian expression ‘finality without end’ seems to me quite inappropriate 
for designating the work of art. In fact, it implies that the aesthetic object 
presents only the appearance of a finality and is limited to soliciting the free 
and ordered play of the imagination. It forgets that the imagination of the 
spectator has not only a regulating function, but a constitutive one. It does not 
play; it is called upon to recompose the beautiful object beyond the traces left 
by the artist. The imagination cannot revel ‘in-itself’ any more than can the 
other functions of the mind; it is always on the outside, always engaged in an 
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enterprise.91 
 
 
Sartre’s conception of the reciprocal relationship between artist and reader is 
supplemented by his emphasis in What is Literature? on the need for a historically 
informed self-awareness of the artist’s identity. Sartre provides an overview of 
historical developments in French literature.92 There is not the space here to examine 
this account apart from three points that overlap with the concerns of Bergman and 
Klein. Firstly, Sartre argues that his generation has been deeply marked by the 
horrors of Fascism and the concentration camps. He writes: ‘Satan, Maritain once 
said, is pure. Pure, that is, without mixture and without remission. We have learned 
to know this horrible, this irreducible purity.’ 93 Sartre goes on to talk about torture 
but the key point theoretically is that Sartre recognises how the horrors of the Second 
World War challenge the idea of a recuperative, redemptive dialectic. Like the 
recognition of the death drive by Klein and the underlying sense of negativity in Wild 
Strawberries and The Seventh Seal, a malignant force is identified by Sartre as a part 
of human nature. However, secondly, he stresses that the agenda for his generation 
involves reflecting on the contingency and uncertainty of their situation:  
 
In short, if we wished to give an account of our age, we had to make the 
technique of the novel shift from Newtonian mechanics to generalized 
relativity; we had to people our books with minds that were half lucid and half 
overcast, some of which we might consider with more sympathy than others, 
but none of which would have a privileged point of view either upon the event 
or upon itself.94  
 
Thus, Sartre is inspired by the idea of locating meaning in the midst of the world. 
This also applies to Klein’s immersion in the relationship between the individual and 
external reality through the medium of phantasy. Thirdly, Sartre retains a belief in 
progress, which depends on a creative negativity that transcends the destructive 
forces in the human situation: 
 
In so far as literature is negative it will challenge the alienation of work; in so 
far as it is a creation and an act of surpassing, it will present man as creative 
action. It will go along with him in his effort to pass beyond his present 
alienation towards a better situation.95 
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What is Literaure? like ‘Existentialism is a Humanism’ expresses Sartre’s 
constructive optimism after World War Two, but both works also draw productively 
on his pre-war philosophising about the imagination and contingency.   
 
Sartre and Cinema 
Little has been written explicitly and at length about Sartre’s ideas in relation to the 
cinema.  An initial scepticism about the relevance of Sartre’s ideas to film studies is 
suggested by two specific comments. The first is from Giles Deleuze, who notes how 
Sartre’s book on The Imaginary does not include an account of films:  
 
As for Husserl, as far as we know, he never mentions the cinema at all (it is 
noteworthy that Sartre too, much later, in making an inventory and analysis of 
all kinds of images in The Imagination, does not cite the cinematographic 
image).96 
 
The second sceptical point about Sartre’s relevance to film, that I wish to highlight, is 
made by Eric Rohmer: 
 
Bazin introduced a new metaphysical dimension (we can use the word, as he 
did so himself, though at the same time he was careful not to play the 
philosopher) or if one prefers, a phenomenological approach. Sartre’s influence 
was, as he said, a decisive factor in his career. We can admire the disciple’s 
subsequent independence from his teacher.97 
 
 
The quotation from Rohmer acknowledges, at least, that there is a line of influence 
from Sartre to film theory through the work of André Bazin. This is a development 
discussed by Dudley Andrew in his book on Bazin.  Andrew explicitly emphasises 
the role of the ideas in The Imaginary: 
 
…the book that changed Bazin’s whole cast of mind, a book that he bought 
immediately and underlined heavily, was the 1940 study called The Psychology 
of the Imagination. This book provided the final foundation block for Bazin’s 
theory of film.98 
 
 
As Andrew spells out, the basis for the influence of this book on Bazin was Sartre’s 
account of the special place of art, as an autonomous activity of the imagination. For 
Rohmer, concern with cinematic specificity is the advance signified by Bazin and 
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neo-realism. However, Sartre is not prepared to essentialise the nature of cinema, 
something, which Rohmer and Bazin appear to do in different ways. Taking Bazin as 
an example, we can see that the unique qualities of cinema are given special status 
over other forms of imagination. For example, at certain points in his essay, ‘Theatre 
and Cinema - Part Two’, he conveys the idea that the theatre audience and the film 
spectator are radically different because of the different forms involved:  
 
Illusion in the cinema is not based as it is in the theater on convention tacitly 
accepted by the general public; rather, contrariwise, it is based on the 
inalienable realism of that which is shown. All trick work must be perfect in all 
material respects on the screen. The ‘invisible man’ must wear pyjamas and 
smoke a cigarette.99 
 
Here, Bazin appears to make assumptions about both the theatre audience and the 
conventions adopted by film-makers, arguing that cinematic illusion has a more 
inherent connection with reality. At other points, however, Bazin openly 
acknowledges the limitations of realism and enthuses about the way theatre and film 
can be creatively combined.100 
 
Dudley Andrew casts some light on the question of how Bazin deviated from Sartre. 
He states: 
 
Sartre’s ideas pose a great problem for the photographic arts because, in his 
view, all image-making must be the intentional act of consciousness, whereas 
photographs can be snapped automatically.101 
 
And two pages later Andrew adds: ‘Sartre had said that beauty is an attribute only of 
the imagination and not of the world, but the naturalist in Bazin could not accept 
this.’102 
 
We have seen enough of the tensions in Sartre’s theory and the apparent 
contradictions in Bazin’s work to see that Andrew’s summary is not complete. For 
Sartre, imagination involves engagement with the world, while Bazin thinks that 
cinema has a special ability to communicate the world’s beauty. The idea that Bazin 
corrects Sartre’s subjectivism seems to mask the philosophical limitations of Bazin’s 
work. This is most apparent when Bazin insists on the inherent relationship between 
cinema as a medium and realism. Consider, for instance, Bazin’s belief in the special 
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properties of cinema in the following quotation from The Ontology of the 
Photographic Image: 
 
The objective nature of photography confers on it a quality of credibility absent 
from all other forms of picture making. In spite of any objections our critical 
spirit may offer, we are forced to accept as real the existence of the object 
reproduced, actually re-presented, set before us, in time and space. 
Photography enjoys a certain advantage in virtue of this transference of reality 
from the thing to its reproduction.103 
 
  
Admittedly there is a marked comparison between Bazin and Sartre in the idea of 
film as a material process that allows imaginative engagement with external reality. 
The medium provides access to a transcendent apprehension of the real. However, 
we saw that various issues are raised by Sartre’s concept of the analogon - most 
significantly that it threatened to turn the object of imagination into an object directly 
caused by external reality and dependent on perception. Bazin appears to make 
cinema this kind of object. Sartre, on the other hand, accentuates the otherness of 
imagination. 
 
Through his emphasis on negativity Sartre signals the tension between reality and 
imagination. For Sartre, imagination is a different mode of consciousness, which 
suggests that it is more compatible with anti-realism, magic realism or an overtly 
subjective expressionist aesthetic. Nevertheless, we do not have to go this far in 
marking a divergence from Bazin. We have seen the situation is not simple because 
in Sartre’s philosophy imagination is not sovereign, but plays a role along with 
perception, emotion and cognition. Ultimately, the imaginary is situated within a 
social context. Whilst art is valued as a prime instance of imaginative work, we also 
find the imagination playing a part in daily life. The significance attributed to 
imagination and the abstraction accorded to it through the concept of the analogon 
does not pave the way for a celebration of art for art’s sake, Sartre’s insistence on 
imagination as an integral and distinct attitude of consciousness means that 
ambiguity is a necessary quality of consciousness, and not the preserve of one art 
form or indeed an elite artist with special gifts. Bergman, we might say, has this 
status, but the parallels between the foregrounding of imagination in Bergman’s 
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work and Sartre’s passionately democratic philosophy of imagination are revealed by 
looking at The Seventh Seal, the film which really established Bergman’s reputation 
as an allegorical film-maker. 
 
The Seventh Seal 
A number of critics find in The Seventh Seal a range of ideas that they consider 
existential. Sarris, for instance, relates the film to the fashionable interest of the 
1950s in the ‘the anguished self-consciousness of Kierkegard and Nietzsche’.104 
Sarris suggests that: Bergman’s depiction of a church painter and his representations 
of death  
 
typifies Bergman’s concern with the role of art in transcending the existential 
limits of life.105  
 
The idea that Bergman is influenced by existentialism is also expressed in Birgitta 
Steene’s analysis. Steene’s piece is aptly titled ‘The Seventh Seal : An Existential 
Vision’106 She notes that the film opens by depicting the isolation of the knight and 
Jöns, his squire, and the way the direction incorporates religious references: starting 
with a sound track of a church choir, the opening scene also includes a voice reading 
‘a brief passage from the Revelation of St John the Divine’, but the knight ‘fails to 
understand its message’.107 So, the film draws on Bergman’s knowledge and interest 
in Christian scripture, but also, as Steene shows, at various levels the film subjects 
the certainties of Christian faith to imaginative uncertainty. This is apparent in the 
style of the film which resembles ‘a medieval allegory’.108 As Steene points out 
Bergman subverts this form through the emphasis on ‘doubt’ and the absence of  ‘an 
orderly universe’, whilst the redeeming power of God is replaced by a sense of God 
as ‘enigma’.109 She argues that:  
 
the knight and his squire complement each other, and depict the sceptic 
personality facing a world where God is silent: one in futile introspection, the 
other in gallant action. They do not offer an alternative. All the film seems to 
say is that some people can live without illusions and still function as useful 
social beings, while others succumb to their need to believe and lose 
themselves in a search for God.110  
 
Steene adds: 
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Yet, both the knight and Jöns are conceived as moral agents, and in this 
ambivalence Bergman establishes his affinity with existentialist philosophy and 
its tenet that we must live as though we had free will.111 
 
 
Other critics have considered whether or not Bergman transcends the bleakness of 
Sartre’s existentialism. Robert Lauder, for example, explicitly accounts for 
Bergman’s 1968 film Shame using Sartre’s ideas, but argues that the The Seventh 
Seal, despite its similarities with Shame, offers an alternative because it includes a 
sense of hope through the representation of the family of travelling artists as a 
symbol of the Holy Family, and the significance of the knight’s relationship to this 
family.112 Lauder is not alone in pondering Bergman’s relationship to Sartrean 
philosophy from a position which perceives the latter as overly pessimistic, if not as 
nihilistic. Jesse Kalin, for instance, entertains the idea that Bergman’s work can be 
compared to Sartre, and then goes on to argue that there is a decisive difference. 
Kalin insists that there are differences, at least of degree, in the way the two authors 
approach freedom and morality: 
 
First, certainly in The Flies, Sartre describes, and advocates, a conversion - to 
truth, to responsibility, to authenticity. But in existentialist texts it is never clear 
that this is more than a formal commitment to freedom as such, more than 
acting in the terrible awareness of the utter groundlessness (arbitrariness, 
absurdity) of one’s situation and choice.…For Bergman, there is good and evil 
in the world, in its (our) very nature. One’s second chance is not just (or really) 
for an ‘authentic’ life but for a better one, in which one becomes a better 
person.113 
 
 
Kalin’s argument provides an interesting platform for contrast and comparison of 
Bergman and Sartre in terms of ethics, but in relation to The Seventh Seal I will focus 
on whether there is a comparison with Sartre’s ideas of imagination. We must start 
with Bergman’s reflections on the film in Images: My Life in Film. The title of this 
book immediately suggests a point of comparison. Bergman reveals in relation to a 
range of his films how particular mental images inspired him. With The Seventh Seal 
he remembers how the film was based on a one-act play Wood Painting, which he 
wrote as a teacher for drama students before he became a film-maker. Bergman says 
that this play was based on ‘visual memories from my childhood.’114 He recalls how 
 126 
as a child he was captivated by images in his father’s country church, a point that 
Steene emphasised. Quoting his earlier autobiography he says ‘Like all churchgoers 
have at times, I let my mind wander as I contemplated the altarpieces, triptychs, 
crucifixes, stained-glass windows and murals.’115 These images led him to the 
images of The Seventh Seal including the knight playing chess with Death. Bergman 
goes on to mention music that inspired the film, Carl Orff’s Carmina Burana, itself  
‘inspired by medieval songs written by minstrels …, during the years of the plague 
and the bloody wars...’116 We should also note Bergman’s comments on the 
presentation of Death. Bergman describes the decision to represent Death as an 
unusual hybrid, a risky move, which succeeded: ‘Bengt Ekerot and I agreed that 
Death should have the features of a white clown. An amalgamation of a clown mask 
and skull.’117 In particular this was a victory for the idea of eliciting imaginative 
vision from the audience. But perhaps, as with Sartre’s example of the caricature and 
the portrait, part of the fascination lies in the ambiguity of the image, the fact that the 
imaginative apprehension teeters on the edge of a more mundane perception. It is not 
just interest in ambiguity which suggests a comparison between the two authors. 
Looking at the initial scenes of the film we find key ideas from Sartre’s study of the 
imagination are applicable. There is a sense that images have an independent power 
but also a play on the representation of the unseen and absent is central to the film’s 
creative development. 
 
The Seventh Seal represents a range of characters, but centres on a knight and his 
squire returning to Sweden after the Crusades. The initial shots reveal how Bergman 
foregrounds imagery and symbolism before establishing the narrative. Momentous 
music begins, whilst the screen is still black, before orchestrating the dramatic 
appearance of the sunlight as a distinct compositional element. The first shot depicts 
a startling patch of sunlight amidst the cloudy skyscape, whilst the second shows a 
bird of prey hovering, a suggestion of death below. This mise-en-scene hints at 
symbolic meaning to be revealed later while an anonymous male voice reads from 
Revelations. 
 
Drawing on the Sartrean study of imagination we can say that the film invites the 
audience to enter an imaginary world in which their perception is merely the 
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preliminary process before arriving at a fully imaginative attitude of consciousness. 
The film already suggests that a meaning will be attributed to this engagement with 
something beyond perception through the authority of a religious textual citation. 
However, as the narrative begins with the introduction of the knight Antonius Block 
and Jöns, his squire, the ambiguity of the relationship between the real world and the 
imaginary is maintained. The characters themselves experience and demonstrate this 
dichotomy giving the audience an omniscient perspective on the relationship 
between the imaginary and reality in the diegetic world. The interest in the 
subjectivity of both characters is prepared by their first appearance sleeping on a 
beach. Without representing their dreams, a dreamlike atmosphere is set up by the 
representation of their drowsiness. The idea that the knight has access to an 
imaginative dimension is suggested, because when Death suddenly appears before 
him on the beach as a figure in a black cape, this is registered as a private experience. 
The squire is still asleep. In the initial conversation with Death, the knight testifies to 
the strength of his mind over his body, refusing to submit to the idea that he must 
immediately accept his own demise. The idea of an ambiguous overlap of different 
realities is presented through the image of a chess set beside the knight, which later 
in the scene is superimposed over the image of the sea in the background. This 
condenses the narrative idea of the knight’s contest with Death - they will play chess 
to determine whether the knight can avoid his own death - but at a more 
philosophical level this image emphasises the juxtaposition of the knight’s subjective 
world (it is a private contest) and the external world shared with the squire and the 
other characters which, in this case, is represented by nature (the sea). The knight’s 
subjective visions are not, however, the only manifestation of an imaginary 
dimension. In the following scene, as he rides with Jöns, the latter stops to approach 
a hooded figure only to be confronted with a skull. They are riding through a land 
plagued by death, but in reporting his meeting with the skull Jöns adopts a 
metaphorical perspective telling the knight that the gentleman was most eloquent in 
his speech despite his silence. This draws attention again to the imagery of death. 
Throughout the film it is clear that Jöns represents a materialistic perspective in 
contrast to the knight’s preoccupation with the enigma of God’s silence, but right 
here at the beginning of the story, we recognise that Bergman references the squire’s 
imagination as well as that of the knight. For Jöns, the skull means that he can 
imagine a gruesome death and has a sense of the horror in the society to which they 
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are returning. 
 
Next we are introduced to the troupe of performers asleep in their caravan in a 
tranquil sunlit setting. When Jof, father and juggler, awakes he enjoys alone his 
vision of the Virgin Mary playing with her child. Jof’s seduction by this vision is 
conveyed as he rubs his eyes in disbelief and then wakes his wife Mia to report what 
he has seen. Here, the dialogue reveals her scepticism, but also her reaction that some 
of his ‘visions’ are about good and some about evil, and some are more real than 
others. At this point we are reminded of the symbolism introduced earlier as a 
collaborator of Jof and Mia, the actor Skat places the mask of a skull on his face to 
recite lines from a forthcoming production. This image of the skull echoes the image 
of the ‘well spoken’ skeleton who the squire addressed. The imaginative linking of 
the two narrative strands is extended visually when the knight and squire ride by in 
the background. Jof and Mia are transfixed by the beauty of their baby, Mikael. Jof 
has a vision that he will achieve a juggling trick which defies reality by keeping a 
ball suspended in the air. We are also given the impression that Jof’s imaginative 
vision extends to his wife as the return of heavenly music from his vision 
accompanies Jof's turn towards her at the end of the scene. 
 
In the next scene the squire talks to the church artist who paints The Dance of Death 
on the walls of a church. The images are realistic, according to the artist, who talks in 
detail about how the plague has led to horrific physical developments but the squire 
imagines these horrors. Meanwhile, the knight meets Death again this time disguised 
as a priest. The dialogue provided by the knight’s confession to this imposter reveals 
the knight’s fear about God’s absence; however, again this is represented through the 
themes of a gulf between imagination and reality. The former is represented 
negatively as the knight states ‘How I live in a ghost world enclosed in my dreams 
and imaginings.’ He is tormented by his inability to remove his image of God whilst 
suspecting that the latter is an object, ‘an idol’ made from his own ‘fear’. The 
knight’s self-reproaches reveal the relevance of Sartre’s insights into the role of 
emotion in imagination as a compensation for reality’s failings. However, the 
knight’s introspection brings to the fore anguish. The knight has a heroic quality 
because he is facing at a psychological level the negativity that pervades his society. 
Sartre’s idea of imagination as a cue for freedom is evoked as the knight musters 
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himself again for his confrontation with Death. Looking at his hand the knight 
relishes that he is still alive, a physical being fully engaged in a challenging 
confrontation with death, a project in which he finally hopes to achieve a 
‘meaningful action’ in the face of nothingness: ‘This is my hand. I can move it. My 
blood gushes in it. The sun is high in the sky. And I...I Antonius Block am playing 
chess with Death.’   
 
Imagination is thus explicitly represented through the characters of the knight and 
Jof, but also through other characters including Jöns, and through the focus on 
particular images and sounds from a third person perspective. Although it can be 
argued that the visions of the knight and Jof are intended to represent metaphysical 
insights, it is clear that Bergman does not wish to suggest that the subjective world of 
the knight and Jof can transcend the reality of the world they are surrounded by: a 
society of the Middle Ages dominated by plague, violence and persecution. The 
over-riding theme of the knight’s visions of death is the absence of God, while Jof is 
portrayed partly as a naïve dreamer. Both the knight and Jof are aware that the 
imagined scenarios that emerge for them encompass a dialectic of presence and 
absence. The figure of Death who the knight meets is initially present only to him, 
unseen and unheard by the other characters. Jof is transfixed by the beauty of his 
vision of the Virgin Mary and child but is mocked by the others when he speaks of 
this. In both cases, the subjective visions involve a negation of the world, as the 
knight and Jof perceive it. The knight searches for an alternative to the apocalyptic 
world, that surrounds him, through his struggle with the figure of Death. Although 
Jof’s vision echoes the bliss of his family life, the vision is removed and represents 
an escape from the actual dangers he faces. Like Sartre, Bergman is keen to reassert 
the contingency and absurdity of the world that challenges his imaginative 
protagonists and other characters, including women burnt as witches and the 
persecution of Jof because of his role as a creative performer. The brutal reality 
reveals the limitations of his character’s imaginative lives. However, the theme of 
imagination is extended because the brutality of the society appears to be dictated by 
a malevolent imaginary, in which demonisation, sadism and masochism prevail. The 
third person narration, used to represent the diegetic world as a whole, is itself an 
imaginative force, one that suggests an authorial vision. 
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Initially there appears to be no narrative link in terms of action between the visions 
of the knight and Jof. This means that the imaginary itself is foregrounded and not 
subsumed by the narrative pattern. It also calls for a thematic response from the 
audience focussed on the meaning of the imaginary episodes. However, a narrative 
synthesis of the different plot lines emerges. The knight meets the family in an idyllic 
scene where he is offered wild strawberries and milk. The knight is forced to leave to 
take up his private challenge, playing chess away from the others, but realises that 
Death also threatens the family. Bergman plays with the convergence of the different 
lines. Later in the film, Jof thinks he sees the knight and Death playing, and realises 
that they must flee despite Mia’s disbelief. Following this point, when there is a 
virtual convergence of the visions of Jof and the knight, the latter performs his heroic 
act of knocking over the chess pieces, which diverts Death from the disappearance of 
the family. This narrative action focuses on the importance of intentionality (the 
knight’s decision) and action (the knight’s heroics are doubled by the actions of the 
squire in rescuing a girl). The society is in the grip of a physical disease, but also a 
spiritual malaise which can be interpreted as ‘bad faith’ in an extreme form, 
including superstition, mechanical brutality, and self-inflicted pain on the body as 
shown by a group of flagellants. In contrast, the knight and his squire offer a limited 
form of transcendence, even though they cannot finally escape the clutches of death. 
Their limited success is not achieved through rationality, but through imagination 
and action. 
 
The film’s other plot lines are skilfully integrated with the story of the knight’s 
journey home including the subplot involving Lisa, Plog and Skat. Despite the horror 
of Skat’s denoument a humorous element pervades the antics of these characters. 
When Death kills Skat by sawing down the tree in which he is hiding, there is a 
strange mixture of horror and absurdity. The film’s range significantly incorporates 
humour, which extends to the casting of Nils Poppe, a famous Swedish comedian as 
Jof.118 The suggestion of absurdity also corresponds to Sartre’s philosophy since 
recognition of nothingness and the contingency of life may produce a sense of 
absurdity as well as one of anguish. The humorous element in Bergman’s cinema is 
not always recognised and is a suitable subject in its own right, but here it reinforces 
the sense of his overlap with Sartrean thinking. In fact Bergman more than Sartre 
 131 
expresses absurdity at different points in his work but, nevertheless, like Sartre he 
remains committed to a more complete and holistic exploration of issues arising from 
our awareness of life’s contingency.  
    
The conclusion appears at first to represent a transcendence of social reality through 
imagination in an entirely negative sense. The figure of Death is now rendered 
triumphant. The representation of a boundary between the material world and the 
knight’s subjective vision collapses as Death takes over the life of the knight and his 
entourage. Nevertheless, the ending of the film is more nuanced and ambiguous than 
this. We should remember here how Sartre insists on the range and diversity of 
imagination, and how he emphasises breaks between the imaginary and other modes 
of consciousness. At the end of The Seventh Seal we are confronted by not just the 
triumph of Death but an insistence on a plurality of individual perspectives. When 
the knight’s entourage meet Death his appearance cues a sense of different 
imaginations at work. The squire answers the door but does not see the visitor, either 
because the squire is so focused on the material world or because Death is hiding (in 
keeping with his character as the gatekeeper to absolute nothingness, but also one 
might say in keeping with his fondness for games). His arrival inside the building is 
anticipated through sound and an intense point-of-view of the empty corridor from 
the perspective of the peasant girl rescued by Jöns from the thief, Raval, (a villain 
who had also tormented Jof). The girl’s gaze is dominant in this scene looking 
intently up towards Death. Then each character introduces themselves with formality 
as if now they have accepted their loss of freedom, before the girl articulates the 
simple truth: ‘Now it is finished’. There is a match cut from the peasant girl’s face, 
looking up at Death, to Mia, completely innocent of this outcome. We are given the 
sense of two complete independent states of consciousness whilst retaining the 
suggestion of an imaginative linking of the two women. Now Jof looks to the horizon 
and sees the knight’s entourage dance with Death on the hill-top. 
 
The image of Death and his followers dancing reinforces the idea that the film’s truth 
lies within the image, which Bergman initially discovered on the walls of his father’s 
church. Jof ’s vision departs from the third person narration of the previous scene 
because he sees Skat instead of the peasant girl.119 While the ending does not involve 
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the radical disjuncture between perception and imaginary evoked by Sartre’s account 
of various examples in The Imaginary such as the portrait, and the mental image of 
an absent person, it does suggest a disjuncture between different subjectivities. The 
polyphonic qualities of the film noted by Donner can be compared with Sartre’s 
insistence on a multiplicity of dream worlds rendered at its most extreme by 
pathological imagination. The difference between Jof 's vision and information given 
in the preceding scene is one of detail and this slender discrepancy allows space for 
the spectator’s imagination to join the polyphony. 
 
In the ambiguity and incoherence of the finale we can see that that the film itself is a 
product of imagination for the viewer, an analogon, which the viewer must transform 
into their own vision. This possibility has been encouraged by the representation of 
an oscillation between reality and the characters’ visions throughout the film. The 
audience is encouraged to move between different levels of reality and ultimately to 
face, head on, the vision of the director. In this way a sense of reality is reasserted 
against the power of the imaginary world. The ambiguities of the ending - encourage 
an active response - and leave open the possibility for the viewer to extract their own 
meaning. Bergman, like Sartre, respects the autonomy of an imaginative exchange 
between artist and audience. 
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4    From three early Bergman films to an analysis of Summer with Monika 
 
The last two chapters have made it clear that Klein and Sartre work with concepts 
specific to their respective disciplines. Nevertheless, points of convergence are 
apparent in the application of these ideas to Bergman’s films. Both theories focus on 
the imagination as an aspect of human nature that must be understood in its own 
right. At the same time, both theories observe and emphasise a relational process in 
which the imagination is related to other aspects of human experience. We have seen 
how emotional elements are given a primary role by Klein but also in Sartre’s 
thinking. 
 
Both theorists provide an account of imagination that is elemental: in Klein’s case 
through her theory of infantile imagination; and in Sartre’s case through his 
phenomenology of imaginary experience. However, it has been striking that the 
application of both theories to Bergman’s films involves a strong awareness of the 
value of integration. In Klein’s case this is based on her theory of the depressive 
position and reparation, whilst in Sartre’s case we have seen, drawing on Stawarska, 
that he recognises the need to distinguish aesthetic experience from pathological 
imagination. Both theories seek to develop a complex account of subjectivity, but 
one that values the idea of coherence at the level of individual experience and this 
applies to their evaluation of art works. At the same time, we saw that both theories 
insist on the significance of the interaction between the imagination of the individual 
and external reality so that a tension between these elements remains. This is 
particularly apparent in Klein’s account of the epistemophilic instinct, in which 
knowledge about external reality is recognised as a powerful force driving the 
development of the individual, and in Sartre’s insistence that the ‘for-itself’ and the 
‘in-itself’ are two distinct modes of being. These distinctions carry over into 
recognition in both Kleinian and Sartrean theory such that imagination is ultimately 
understood as related, if not reduced, to a social context. In Wild Strawberries we 
saw how the introspective world of an elderly doctor is connected to a wider picture 
of relationship conflicts, isolation and angst under the surface of an affluent 
bourgeois society. In The Seventh Seal we saw the representation of a society in 
which fanatical religious beliefs are accompanied by extreme violence including 
persecution of women and a marked intolerance of creativity and art.    
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Close examination of the Kleinian and Sartean theories also reveals key points of 
divergence. Klein’s account of the imagination involves the concept of internal 
objects in the psyche, whilst Sartre distances his theory from any theory that suggests 
external objects are replicated inside consciousness. Furthermore, as noted already, 
Sartre attacks the idea of the unconscious. The possibility remains that Bergman 
intuitively draws on ideas relevant to both perspectives. Different works in the 
Bergman oeuvre catch the eye as particularly relevant to the theories in question. For 
example, Bergman’s film of 1951 Summer Interlude is strongly expressive of a 
cathartic process based on mourning in which a young ballet dancer remembers the 
tragic death of her boyfriend. In this film, the flashbacks, highlighted by Godard as a 
key form of expression for Bergman, are used to explore the presence of the past in 
her subjective world as well as narrative development. Another film, The Magician, 
made in 1958, appears to be more relevant to Sartre’s ideas. This work explores the 
situation of a showman Albert Vogler whose magic show is subjected to 
interrogation by a sceptical scientist and the authority of the local aristocrat and 
police commissioner. Set in the nineteenth century the film shows how Albert and 
his troupe trick their audience. This film acknowledges that the magician is a skilful 
manipulator of the imagination of his spectators, but it also critiques the cynical 
establishment including the scientist’s devotion to instrumental rationality. In the 
awareness of artifice The Magician interrogates appearances in a manner akin to 
Sartre’s exploration of the imaginary and bad faith,and includes Albert’s self-doubts 
as subject matter. Without going into further details of Summer Interlude and The 
Magician, it can be seen that some works in Bergman’s career show an affinity with 
psychoanalytic themes, while others are closer to an existentialist preoccupation with 
the way the individual creates meaning and how this is understood in a social 
context. 
 
However, my intention is to apply Kleinian and Sartrean ideas together in relation to 
Bergman’s work. The fundamental differences between the theories are reduced 
when we consider that Klein’s theory of internal reality remains quite distinct from 
the theory of internal representation that Sartre was critiquing. Due to Klein’s use of 
the unconscious as a key concept, the individual’s internal world is understood as a 
mobile and intangible space characterised by fluctuating emotions. The presence of 
internal objects is only understood through the dynamic of therapy and the dynamic 
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of interaction with others and not as fixed reproduction of empirical realities. We can 
also note that Sartre shifts his ground somewhat to allow for the influence of 
determination beyond the grasp of individual awareness and various elements in 
Sartrean thought can be interpreted as compatible with Freudian thinking.1 
 
In other words, both Sartreans and Kleinians place emphasis on a process of 
transformation in which the imagination is centre-stage, but must be understood in 
relation to its situation. I am not suggesting that the theories are synthesised and 
reduced into one because they each retain their own particular sensitivities and 
concepts, but they can be explored in combination to reveal the range of individual 
Bergman films. In doing this we should recognise that both theories aspire to situate 
the analysis of art in the wider context of their account of human nature. In this way 
they avoid reducing art to a discussion of the artist’s mastery of techniques specific 
to his or her medium. Imagination is understood as more than the individual’s talent 
in a specialised field. At the same time, it has to be acknowledged that neither theory 
incorporates or engages with the specific concepts of film. These include key 
concepts ranging from mise-en-scene to camerawork and the organisation of time 
and space in the narrative. 
 
Just as Klein and Sartre are influenced by specialists in their respective fields 
Bergman draws on and reworks different cinematic, dramatic and literary influences. 
Much has been written about Bergman’s work in relation to these influences.2 My 
readings of selected films will complement existing work, but will aim to provide an 
original contribution by incorporating and integrating ideas from Klein and Sartre. I 
will not apply these across Bergman’s work as a whole but to selected films using 
close analysis. The films selected provide a cross section of Bergman’s work but 
cannot provide a fully comprehensive account. To understand this more fully it is 
worth at this point noting Steene’s overview and categorisation of Bergman’s films. 
 
The films that I will consider in this chapter, Music In Darkness, Port of Call, Prison 
and Summer with Monika are all placed by Steene in a category entitled ‘Films from 
the Forties and early Fifties. Focus: The Young Couple’. 3 The film I will explore in 
Chapter 5, The Virgin Spring is placed by Steene in the category ‘Religious or 
Existential Quest Films of the Fifties and Early Sixties, often with Male Protagonists’ 
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with several other films that include Wild Strawberries and The Seventh Seal. Hour 
of the Wolf, which will be analysed in Chapter 6, is placed by Steene in the category 
of films ‘Exploring the Role of the Artist/and or Directorial Persona’. Steene has 
three remaining categories ‘Early Family or Marriage Films, often with Women as 
Central Characters’; ‘The Haunting Past: Memories and Nightmares’; ‘The Family 
Saga’. Clearly, Steene includes a significant appraisal of Bergman’s historical 
development in these categories but they do not all correspond to historical periods. 
Furthermore, there are thematic comparisons between films in the different 
categories. We have already seen how Wild Strawberries is concerned with the 
haunting past even though it is also a film revolving around an existential quest. In 
sum, the reason I mention Steene’s categories is to make it clear that, while the films 
I analyse are not representative of Bergman’s career as a whole, they do represent an 
intriguing cross section of thematic and historical development in Bergman’s work, 
and have specific qualities in common with other works in this oeuvre. 
 
The role of imagination in three early Bergman films  
Whilst better known, and later, Bergman films such as The Seventh Seal, Wild 
Strawberries and Persona have been given the status of complex works resonant 
with psychoanalytic and philosophical meaning there has been less discussion of his 
early films in this fashion. However, turning to three of Bergman’s early films we 
can see that before he achieved significant critical success Bergman was making 
films in which imagination is given a structural and thematic role, through sequences 
that disrupt the spatial and temporal linearity of narrative, and through an evaluative 
emphasis on the power and redemptive qualities of imagination for his characters. 
 
Music in Darkness 
Music in Darkness made in 1948 was Bergman’s fourth film as a director.4 As Steene 
points out the title in Swedish has ‘alliteration and cadence’ which evokes the 
significance of music in the film more poetically than the English translation, and 
particularly the early American translation of the title, which only focused on the 
lead character’s blindness (Night is My Future).5 The film shows immediately 
Bergman’s interest in including a sequence that steps outside the verisimilitude of the 
narrative in order to represent a character’s internal state. After a terrible accident on 
an army training ground, resulting in blindness to Bengt (played by Malmsten), the 
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film’s protagonist, a dream sequence depicts his inner world. Bergman reworked the 
novel by Dagmar Edqvist to shift the emphasis on to character psychology.6 Steene 
informs us that Bergman’s emphasis on the psychological issues facing Bengt 
contrasted with the novel’s concentration on the theme of romance transcending the 
division between the middle class hero Bengt and the servant Ingrid (played by Mai 
Zetterling).7 
 
Although Bengt moves on from his initial trauma to pursue his fortune as a pianist 
the thematic treatment of his struggles with his disability can be read as evoking a 
more general fragility in human nature and the impossibility of retaining a masterful 
egocentric dominance. The theme of vulnerability is also pursued in Ingrid’s struggle 
against class boundaries. The surrealism of the dream sequence, early in the film, is 
most effective because of the skilful way it is related to the rest of the narrative 
bringing to mind the Kleinian purpose of integrating elements of the unconscious 
through social interaction. Sartre’s preoccupation with the contingency of the ego is 
also relevant here because the instability of the self is conveyed through Bengt’s 
struggles following his accident, in which a greater sense of agency is only achieved 
after significant internal and external transformations, including many depressing 
setbacks caused by the intolerance in society.8 Bengt’s recognition of Ingrid 
transcends perception. This is matched by a scene where Ingrid’s intuitive awareness 
of the fact that Bengt is in a state of danger is the motivation for their final 
reconciliation. This appears to be a magical resolution, but it maintains the focus on 
imaginative awareness in the characters that was introduced so traumatically in the 
dream sequence representing Bengt’s blindness. 
     
Music in Darkness has subsequently been dismissed by a range of commercial 
mainstream critics as lacking seriousness.9 However, it illustrates not only 
Bergman’s early interest in representing character subjectivity, but also when placed 
alongside his next film Port of Call, we can see how much he experimented with a 
range of styles from melodrama to documentary style realism. 
 
Port of Call  
Port of Call made in 1948 was directed from a script almost completely written by 
Olle Lansberg10 and differs from many other Bergman works, including Music in 
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Darkness, in its inclusion of some documentary-style representation of the shipping 
industry and the culture of its workers in the Swedish town of Gothenburg.11 The 
film begins with a montage-like sequence of visual perspectives on the industrial 
setting devoid of dramatis persona, and then focuses on the central protagonist, in 
this setting. He is Gosta, a sailor who has returned to the harbour from his travels. 
The emphasis on character and context is interrupted by the violent and sudden 
suicide attempt of a young woman jumping into the harbour to drown herself who 
Gosta saves. The film goes on to explore mental instability in the woman, Berit, but 
extends this to encompass different aspects of society and characters, including 
Gosta himself who is overtaken by self-hate and depression towards the end of the 
story, and the shocking story of a friend of Berit’s who has an abortion. The opening 
reveals the intention to deal with a range of social issues from life in the docks to 
suicide, using a form of realism. At the same time, there is a clear focus on 
subjectivity as manifested through the self-destructive nature of Berit’s suicide 
attempt. 
 
Gosta’s rescue of Berit is a heroic moral action. Through the film Gosta retains this 
status but this is complicated by his attraction to the woman he has saved. Bergman 
explains this psychological complexity partly as a result of Lansberg’s screenplay 
with its sophisticated representation of the character’s emotions.12 Flashbacks are 
used to deepen our knowledge of Berit as she recalls her troubled past as a child 
hearing the arguments of her parents. When she feels compelled to tell Gosta 
honestly about her past, another flashback is used to convey her turbulent history 
with her authoritarian mother who arranges for her to be sent to the penitentiary, as 
well as her search for an escape from the family home with a succession of two 
boyfriends. 
 
Instead of being just an analysis of the way parental conflict impacts on a child’s 
consciousness the film condenses this material to suggest that internalisation of 
conflict and division can eat away at a person to the point where the violence is 
directed inwards. Klein’s emphasis on the effects of a punishing superego parallels 
the way Berit struggles with her authoritarian mother and the authority figure of the 
social worker. Klein’s theory also applies to Gosta. When he learns the truth of 
Berit’s history he cannot consume his anger about her relations with other men. His 
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equilibrium is disrupted and his relationship to Berit as a good object in his psyche is 
apparently destroyed through envy. Against this psychological turmoil the industrial 
setting provides a context, which contains both stabilising elements, a reality outside 
the strife of the family, and elements that reinforce and elaborate the existing 
conflicts including the violent competition between men for the attentions of Berit. 
 
There is an uplifting ending in the manner of Hollywood, but this is not because the 
characters have conquered all that threatens them. Instead, there is a very strong 
sense of reconciliation with a transient notion of the present and an acceptance of 
having to live with the past and difficult issues, which will continue. Critically the 
union of the couple is only made possible after Berit’s crisis around a decision in 
which she must give information to the authorities about an illegal abortionist who 
operated on her friend. Berit is reluctant to divulge the information because she sees 
no good intentions in the authorities who interrogate her, but this is just one more 
fixed state, like her self-destruction that she has to rise above to find a degree of 
personal freedom. Berit foreshadows a whole range of female characters in 
Bergman’s work who strive for autonomy at a psychological level. 
 
Prison 
Bergman’s next film as a director, Prison is an early example of his attraction to a 
more philosophical style. The story brings together three plot lines. In the first a 
retired teacher, Paul, visits his ex-pupil Martin who is directing a film. Paul has 
recently been released from an asylum and reveals his ideas for a film in which the 
devil controls reality. Paul specifies that this requires no extraordinary catastrophes 
to take place since life itself is hell. In the second plot line, Martin’s friend, Thomas, 
a journalist, explains his idea for an article based on his meeting with a 17-year-old 
prostitute Birgitta Carolina. The third line of action concerns this young woman and 
her exploitation by a pimp, Peter who is also her fiancée, and his sister. They force 
Birgitta Carolina to let them get rid of her baby. The second and third plot lines come 
together after a further morbid twist when Thomas tries to persuade his girlfriend 
Sofi to enter a suicide pact. Not knowing that she knocked him out, he mistakenly 
believes they were successful and wanders the street like a lost soul, meeting the 
equally bereft Birgitta Carolina. Both characters are in a state of mourning and 
melancholy. A shift to an overtly imaginative register represents their night together 
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in an attic-like space, with a mise-en-scene that conveys Bergman’s fascination with 
childhood imagination, including a toy cinematograph. The imaginative register 
develops further with Birgitta Carolina’s dream as she re-experiences male violence 
and the death of her baby in surreal and symbolic form. In this way, the film appears 
to confirm the gloomy premise provided by the retired teacher at the beginning of the 
film.   
 
Commenting on the way the film uses realism in the story of the young prostitute but 
also develops a style that is ‘abstractly representative and at times purely    
allegorical’, 13 Koskinen draws attention to the influence of the Swedish literary 
culture in the 1940s, and quotes Donner to identify the preoccupation of this culture 
with writers such as Albert Camus, Franz Kafka and Sartre. Koskinen goes on to say 
that this interest in what Donner calls ‘a Sisyphus, a K, a suffering Mankind’ became 
an integral part of Bergman’s work and is also evident in his later works such as The 
Seventh Seal. 14 
 
Young believes that critics discussed the film’s existentialism but failed to recognise 
the film’s weaknesses. ‘French Existentialism was in the air; more than one 
interpreter found it irresistible to quote, from Sartre’s No Exit, “Hell is other people”. 
More than one has continued to find it irresistible. Yet, obviously Bergman had not 
credibly proven that Hell was other people.’15 Young’s comment downplays the 
efforts of both Bergman and Sartre to engage the audience in critical reflections on 
their society through allegorical elements. However, as Young notes and as Bergman 
makes clear, his original title for the film was A True Story.16 Bergman explains that 
it was intended as an ironic treatment of a particular kind of story in newspapers but 
he was required to change the title by his producer to the fashionable sounding one of 
Prison: 
 
Prison came to be seen, through no fault of its own, as a film typifying the 
1940s. This had to do not only with the title but with the fact that because 
Tomas, played by Birger Malmsten, is a journalist and author, he is presumed 
to be active in the literary circles of that decade.17 
 
 
This film can be related to the cultural current of pessimistic existentialism in 
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Swedish society at the time. It can also be accused of self-indulgence with 
Bergman’s self-reflexive commentary occurring early in the film and the way the 
middle class male journalist is reunited with his girlfriend at the end. However, these 
responses are challenged by the way Bergman seeks to elicit an active questioning 
response from the audience. When he discusses Prison, in his book Images, Bergman 
refers to Birgitta Carolina as ‘a soul’ and the intimacy of camerawork and 
perspective suggests that the film seeks a spiritual dimension through the narrative of 
her suffering.18 A theological message is never explicitly developed because it seems 
clear that Bergman places more emphasis on challenging the audience. In interview 
he explains that the film was made intuitively to convey his sense of a deep-rooted 
and ‘incomprehensible’ problem of evil rather than a metaphysical notion of the 
devil.19 
 
Bergman’s existentialism and foray into the inner world of his characters in Prison 
reveals his ambition to take on metaphysical themes. However, the film also 
demonstates his interest in combining imaginative representation of character 
subjectivity and a more ‘realistic’ grasp of external social elements, which are shown 
to be the cause of alienation and disempowerment. This combination of interests 
continues when we turn to the film he made in 1953, Summer with Monika. 
 
The application of Kleinian and Sartrean ideas to Summer with Monika 
 In Bergman’s early films he frequently uses the formation of a couple as a basis for 
exploring subjectivity. Bergman’s later films would intensify the focus on the inner 
world. Bergman was not consciously influenced by Klein, but his interest in 
psychoanalysis is manifest in a focus on latent emotional forces of desire and 
destruction. Klein, as we have seen, provides a powerful account of how the infant 
internalises objects, which it regards as hostile. Anxiety is produced by this sense of 
the enemy within and the baby desperately looks for good objects to replace this 
negativity. This vivid account can provide a comparative text for any narrative, 
which focuses on the struggle between an individual or individuals and a corrupting 
or hostile environment. For our purposes, the key feature from Klein that should be 
adopted is that of internalisation. Whilst psychoanalytic theory has focused on the 
formation of the couple in film narrative, Klein’s theory with its focus on the death 
drive provides a complementary emphasis on the way characters are threatened by 
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external forces that they seek to escape from through the processes of projective 
identification and splitting. In this analysis of Summer with Monika I will consider 
how the film conveys the alienation of the protagonists, how they project on to each 
other, and split off from the social environment. 
 
In common with the Kleinian perspective, Sartre focuses on the inner life but 
conceptualises internal struggle as a conscious battle for authentic knowledge against 
bad faith. As Jonathan Webber reminds us, bad faith means a battle to maintain a 
sense of self that is unfixed, not objectified.20 This kind of transcendence can only be 
fully achieved in the Kleinian schemata when the individual passes through the 
depressive position and consequently recognises the ambivalence of the other. There 
is a strong parallel here between Sartrean and Kleinian thinking in the way that 
progress is achieved through recognition of the other’s autonomy. For Sartre, part of 
the struggle against bad faith involves recognition by consciousness that it is part of 
society.21 Thus, the struggle for authenticity is against objectification in all its forms, 
and not confined to the individual’s internal transformation. In Summer with Monika 
the struggle against bad faith can be seen in the way the principal protagonists resist 
the roles that are expected of them in society. This becomes even more provocative 
when finally Monika resists her role as mother and wife, an issue which I will 
discuss. It should be noted that Sartre, in common with other existential writers 
believes the struggle can only be fully captured from a first person standpoint.22 
There is always an asymmetry between the self’s authenticity/bad faith and the 
other/external reality. Before applying these ideas to the text we should consider 
whether they involve a conception completely at odds with the views of Bergman 
himself. 
 
Bergman has said about Summer with Monika: ‘I have never made a less complicated 
film.’23 Bergman is referring here to the spirit of freedom in which it was shot. Also 
of relevance is his emphasis on the ‘genius’ of Harriet Andersson and the moment in 
the film when she looks directly at the lens.24 Bergman attributes the originality of 
this moment to Andersson. Although Bergman is not correct in saying that this was 
the first moment in cinema where this was done, we can understand his tribute to his 
actress.25 This also relates to his skill as a director. In this shot Bergman provides an 
intense focus on subjectivity and conveys the asymmetry between first and third 
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person accounts, an effect that I will return to in the analysis. 
 
This story, with its culmination in Monika’s betrayal of Harry has been regarded by 
some critics as simple and conventional, spiced up by the erotic performance of 
Harriet Andersson, as well as the dynamics between Bergman and this actress.26 
Gado puts forward the argument that the narrative is ‘slight’.27 However, this ignores 
some of the complexity that can be found in the evolution of the relationships. We 
will see that throughout the film a strategy of symbolic representation is developed 
alongside a ‘realistic’ style. From the Kleinian perspective this is critical. Reparation 
cannot be achieved without creation of a symbolic reality, and Kleinians have 
evaluated artwork by considering how intensively this process is achieved. A symbol 
which is clichéd, or predictable, may completely fail to address the intensity of 
emotion which from the Kleinian perspective is at stake in artistic creation.28 
 
Although the film has a refreshing directness, its quality does depend on a complex 
development of artistic expression. The analysis will consider the cueing of an 
imaginative response from the audience and a thematic insistence on the imagination 
of the key protagonists. Both of these elements allow a distinctive focus on emotion 
to evolve. For Sartre, art’s capacity to explore emotion is important because 
imagination is the key to unlocking consciousness from bad faith - the belief that 
freedom does not exist.  We will see how Monika and Harry choose to defy a world 
in which they feel their spirits are deadened - a world of bad faith. At the same time, 
it is clear that in this work the rebellion is not just viewed as the subjective response 
of Monika and Harry, but in fact the neo-realist aesthetic of openness continually 
reminds us that this drama unfolds in a relatively complex social setting so that 
issues of gender, class, age, and hierarchy are foregrounded at different points. 
  
We have seen in the previous chapter how the concept of intentionality lies behind 
Sartre’s phenomenological method and theory of imagination. Although Sartre does 
not provide a model for textual analysis the clear implication is that analysis of art 
must look for the author’s intentions. This is borne out by the subsequent influence 
of Sartre’s work on film criticism on the Cahiers group including André Bazin. 
Summer with Monika was elevated by these critics, precisely because they felt it was 
an authored work.29 Elsewhere in the world,the film was mainly known for the 
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performance of Andersson as Gado points out.30 However, it is the Cahiers group 
and their practice of reading the author’s intentionality into expressive film form 
which led to the development of Bergman’s reputation internationally. 
 
For Sartre, the key counterpart to his emphasis on intentionality in the work of the 
artist is his recognition of the role of subjectivity in the reception of the work. This 
was seen, for example, in Sartre’s account of the portrait discussed in my previous 
chapter. As Flynn reminds us, for Sartre, art is valued as an exchange between 
different consciousnesses that are free: 
 
The artwork, for Sartre, has always carried a special power: that of 
communicating among freedoms without alienation or objectification.… In his 
The Psychology of Imagination, he speaks of the portrait “inviting” the viewer 
to realize its possibilities by regarding it aesthetically.31 
 
In the case of Summer with Monika a comparable philosophy is accompanied by 
elements which suggest a critical response to society. This is partly explained by the 
source material (a novel), but also the way Bergman is inspired by film-makers 
including neo-realism and specifically Roberto Rossellini. Jacques Aumont makes 
this comparison although he suggests that across Bergman’s work as a whole we find 
a whole range of film styles. For Aumont, it is important that Bergman uses these 
styles in an autonomous way (he does not elevate one over the other).32 The point 
behind the Rossellini comparison rests on the use of a realistic style that, nonetheless, 
aims to cultivate the free, imaginative role of the viewer. Rossellini famously 
achieved this with the use of gaps in the narrative as in the theft of the soldier’s shoes 
in Paisa (1946). Discussing Summer with Monika, Aumont notes the value placed on 
exterior location and the use of long take, a conjunction that Bazin understood as a 
basis for an active response from the viewer.33 We will see that Sartre’s belief in the 
value of reader response, like that of Rossellini and the neo-realists is implicitly 
endorsed by the ambiguity and indeterminacy of meaning at various points in 
Summer with Monika.  
 
The dual emphasis on the free imagination of the viewer and the artist means that 
Sartre’s work can be regarded as distinct from those analyses which pinpoint a fixed 
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and determinate vision in the work of an artist. Sartre, in effect, provides the basis of 
an alternative to structuralist and Lacanian analysis both of which can be criticised 
for eliminating intentionality in the work. The phenomenological method involves 
tracing authorial intention in the work without pinning this to a fixed vision.34 
Throughout the film this method with its focus on how a viewer’s response is 
actively elicited by the film-makers allows us to see instances where it is necessary 
to go beyond what is directly given in the film material and instead posit something 
that is more actively imagined.   
   
Analysis of the film: the opening 
In the first shots, the absence of voice over and dialogue elevate the documentary 
images of the Stockholm waterside from factual background to something more 
meaningful. Following Sartre’s philosophy of imagination the images can be said to 
await the meaning provided by the audience. At this stage we may not be sure about 
the significance of these images. For a Swedish audience perhaps they are 
recognisable, while for other audiences these shots introduce the location. The 
opening sections demonstrate an awareness of social context. With a documentary 
style, the first sequence involves a montage of dissolves representing some of the 
Stockholm waterside, in the early morning, including industrial elements. We see a 
warehouse and cranes, while working boats are moored in the harbour. Other 
elements in the landscape are also visible: a church spire to the left of one shot, and 
faintly in the background of another a solitary barque moves across the harbour. The 
underlying purpose is poetic: expanses of water that will be significant later as the 
protagonists escape the mainland; light playing across the water in juxtaposition with 
the solid, but distant coastline; silence, only interrupted, after several shots, when we 
hear an industrial boat off-screen. This opening demonstrates how the film brings a 
romantic sensibility to representation of a local, contemporary landscape. In the 
tradition of romantic poetry it suggests that the landscape is an emotional resource, a 
potential counterpart to character subjectivity. However, we should not take this 
point too far. For Bergman, like Sartre, all material can be animated by imagination, 
so that nature is not given an exclusive role in their work.35 
 
The development of enigma through lack of dialogue is maintained with the 
representation of Harry. Since information about him is restricted at this stage we 
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have to intuitively sense his character, another example of Sartre’s notion that the 
imagination is brought into play when the viewer projects on to the given material. 
Following the opening montage of the waterfront, the credits sequence continues 
with a series of dissolves. Now we are made aware of character and time being 
represented, as the individual shots show different stages of Harry’s journey across 
the city on bicycle. He is surrounded by traffic with the noises engulfing character 
and audience. Thus, the film establishes the basis of an existential style in which the 
gap between the subjectivity of the character and the external world is signified. 
Evoking character subjectivity and realistic landscape rather than focussing on more 
plot-entred material paves the way for the later dislocation between the character and 
his external world. This will be because Harry will look for an alternative to the 
reality of his social existence through his emotional identification with Monika, and 
their escape to the island. 
 
In a film, which is in some respects a gentle story of young lovers, it is unsurprising 
that the world around the characters is presented as, at this stage, relatively benign. 
The next space is introduced with quiet observation of social inter-action peripheral 
to the mainline of the story. A man closes the door to a shop and exchanges greetings 
(through removing of their hats) with another man who walks into the space of a 
courtyard, following a carriage, which carries a strange assortment of bric-a-brac. 
This world of the itinerant trader and his cart is one of business and polite custom. 
The sound of bells is eclipsed by an accordion. Why does the film include these 
elements? Sartre’s emphasis on the role of imagination provides a perspective. 
Again, there is the possibility of different interpretations dependent on the context of 
the audience. What is certain, however, is that the style suspends a fixed immediate 
connotation and also moves towards greater representation of a social world. At the 
same time, this social world is partly being set up as a stage in which the subjectivity 
of the main protagonists will take over. We can only really understand the initial 
investment in the background when looking back on the story’s thematic 
development, in particular the separation of the couple from society. At this stage, 
the detail functions to delay and contextualise their appearance but it carries a 
slightly whimsical, dreamy momentum alongside the sociological observation. The 
incorporation of poetic licence in observation of the everyday brings to mind again 
Rosellini’s works of Italian neo-realism as well as other developments in European 
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art cinema such as French poetic realism.36 The fact that equilibrium is expressed 
through the background details is significant for the level of formal integration 
achieved at the end of the film - a critical point from the Kleinian viewpoint which 
places so much emphasis on reparation achieved through integration. From the 
beginning, Bergman trusts in an aesthetic notion of synthesis, which provides a 
counterpoint to (rather than an escape from) irresolvable social conflicts. 
 
Everything seen thus far is pushed towards the background as Monika appears for the 
first time. A man who is seen leaving his shop walks past the mirror and adjusts his 
hat, leaving Monika shown in medium shot in the mirror with head slightly bowed. 
Thus, her appearance is indirect and mediated by context and the mirror. The social 
background and Monika’s appearance are orchestrated with great attention to a 
partial meaning that must be completed in the imagination of the viewer. Although 
the absence of dialogue is crucial, the use of gaps in the text can be found also in the 
way space is organised between shots. The impact of Monika’s first appearance is 
intensified because the arrangement of space is disorienting in the lead up to her first 
appearance. We do not know where we are in relation to the previous shot when she 
appears. The lack of visual and aural clues intensifies the mystery of her appearance 
amidst the social context. At this point, we may become more aware that the film is 
not just a realistic account because the symbolisation is more overt, with the use of 
mirror as frame. We can see here the Kleinian insistence on the way symbolism is 
central to the making of art. For Kleinians, art is inherently symbolic and thus must 
create at this level through the given material, even if this material is realistic or 
naturalistic.37 The Sartrean fascination with an autonomous imaginary level open to 
the viewer’s interpretation is also vividly represented here. Using Sartre’s categories, 
we can say that the mirror image evokes Monika’s imagination of herself rather than 
being just an object of perception. It is as if her image is independent of reality and 
conveys her dreams. In turn the viewer projects on to this image, conscious already 
that it is an image for Monika and not simply a perceptual experience. There is 
ambiguity around Monika’s personality which is immediately evoked by this 
introduction with its emphasis on imaginary levels which transcend perceptual data - 
Monika’s imagination of herself and the viewer’s response to this. 
 
Monika turns away from the camera and walks with the group of men into a cafe, 
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with the last man, previously seen at the beginning of this section, bowing and lifting 
his cap to allow her in first. The whole effect is that of a theatrical exit, and this 
provides a further contrast to the everyday normality of the opening sequences. We 
also have to note that the deployment of a single take here, including action in depth, 
creates a rhyme with the final shot of the film in which Harry is seen looking into a 
mirror as a group of man disappear through a cafe door in the background. This final 
shot is preceded by Harry’s visual memory of Monika on the island. Thus, the 
rhyming of two shots - Monika’s look in the mirror, and Harry’s look in the mirror - 
dispersed across the film, concentrate the expression of meaning on the figure of 
Monika. She is present but imagined in the mirror in the first one, absent but 
imagined in memory in the latter. All of this might be interpreted as support for the 
view that Bergman is playing with a representation of the woman from a male 
perspective as an unknowable other. However, this misses the complexity of 
Monika’s character, including the directness that evolves through her actions and 
later through her notorious look towards the camera. The potential of Monika as a 
source of meaning for the rest of the text can be gauged by the range of connotations 
produced in her initial appearance in the film. Monika’s point-of-view of her own 
image in the mirror brings us closer to her character. This initial appearance also 
presents gender differences (we see the man in the background adjust his hat before 
she raises her lipstick and then decides not to use it), through the contrasting content 
in different pockets of the mise-en-scene. The visual information in this sequence 
also conveys generational differences. The elderly gentleman who ushers Monika 
into the cafe contrasts with the more middle-aged characters who we see tyrannise 
Harry with their concerns over work efficiency. 
 
The dream world of the couple 
The text cues the viewer to imagine beyond what is shown and this includes a strong 
sense of the social background, but we need to consider some of the central elements 
of the story. Sartrean and Kleinian ideas illuminate the relationship between Harry 
and Monika and their subsequent story.  The film cultivates a sense of the 
subjectivity of the main characters. The initial meeting between Monika and Harry is 
marked by spontaneity. Their intentions are driven by emotions and imagination. The 
initially cryptic spatial organisation in this section of the film is minimised because 
continuity is re-established as Harry reappears. The spatial disorientation that had 
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prevailed is contrasted with the elements which now provide continuity, including 
Monika’s presence in the cafe, to convey the idea of romantic destiny as Harry and 
Monika meet. The camerawork progresses from an omniscient viewpoint in which 
we see Monika sitting with her back to Harry while he is in medium close-up. The 
key dialogue, which follows, requires that both characters are in medium close-up. 
The initial set up also provides continuity through the symbolic quality of the 
characters’ physical positioning. Monika’s back to the frame continues the sense of 
her appearance in the mirror, initially latent and withheld. Harry’s appearance in the 
cafe is static contrasting with his movements travelling across town, but continuing 
the idea of his solitary existence. Thus, a build-up of associations at the visual level 
creates anticipation of the moment when these characters speak to each other. This 
enhances the sense that they only focus on each other, a phenomenon that relates to 
the Kleinian concept of projective identification whereby the world is coloured by 
one’s subjective phantasies to the exclusion of other detail. 
 
After introducing herself with, ‘Got a match? I can't find mine’, Monika’s lines carry 
the most potent meaning in this meeting. She is suddenly outrageously utopian: 
‘Spring has come. Let’s clear off and travel and see the world.’ Monika shows little 
respect for work and shares her dissatisfaction with the conditions: ‘This winter I 
thought my arse would freeze off.’ Finally as the camera gets closest she asks: ‘Have 
you seen Song of Love with Garbo?’ Key elements from Bergman’s previous work 
are here, including, foremost, the idea of the isolated lovers and their desire to escape 
drudgery. It is as if we are moving into a self-sufficient world structured by their 
imagination, with Monika taking the lead. The more conventional idea is here too: in 
Sweden the Spring is so important because the Winter is so cold. Also, emerging 
strongly we have the idea of a different reality signified by film, a discourse that will 
continue through the rest of Summer with Monika. The complexity of this imaginary 
world is a central preoccupation that can only be understood through some scrutiny 
of the way filmic elements are arranged across the film as a whole, as we saw with 
the rhyming mirror shots. All the filmic elements including spatial organisation and 
dialogue build a pattern where some individual elements can be appreciated more 
deeply through their symbolic relation to other moments in the film. Whilst the 
linking of different elements creates harmony, the continuous possibility of gaps and 
fractures conveys how precarious coherence is in this imaginary realm. This is why 
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the film conveys more than one imaginary level: referring to the world of cinema, 
and mixing realism with a sensibility that reaches beyond the observation of the 
physical world. Kleinian and Sartrean insights into imagination provide a conceptual 
parallel with the representation here because both of these theorists emphasise how 
imagination leads representation and, in doing this, negativity is a fundamental 
element. Shifting between realism and theatrical mise-en-scene creates imaginary 
coherence in the idea of romantic destiny, but it also leaves open the sense that 
annihilation of the romance is possible. As Klein’s work shows, finding the good 
object does not insure well-being because it sets up binary opposition with all that is 
rejected, and intensifies the threat of this other reality. At the same time, as Sartre 
shows us, intentions carry responsibility and in the reconciliation of two subjects in 
love, the balance between them can be easily disrupted.38 As Monika and Harry meet 
there is already an indication that Monika’s actions will determine what will happen 
to the couple. 
 
While Monika’s dominance is related to her willingness to imagine an alternative to 
their drab daily existence Bergman also focuses on Harry’s subjectivity which is 
juxtaposed with the bad treatment he receives at work. At the beginning we saw how 
he was represented as a solitary figure in the industrial landscape. Before Harry 
returns to the shop floor we see the attitude of the other workers towards him. The 
signs are here of a social critique of power relations in the work place, although this 
remains schematic. Harry’s immediate colleague/manager (his role is not entirely 
clear) is chivvied by another man, who never speaks directly to Harry. The man 
campaigns for pressure to be put on the boy to be more efficient. Another worker 
shouts through his complaints that Harry is not back from his coffee break. This 
conveys the idea that work targets are organised unfairly along a chain of command 
with pressure put on the youngest worker. The anxiety about work targets is strong 
whilst the slightly, absurd theatrical staging, used for instance in the continual 
interruptions of the man lifting the shutter, is also striking. 
 
Harry’s alienation from this set up is developed further in the following scene. Here 
we can see that he is only thinking of Monika. Out on his bike, at the traffic barrier, 
he gazes ahead dreamily, unaware that he is holding up the traffic. When he moves 
on, the camera rests momentarily on the blank space that has been vacated. This is a 
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small sign of empathy for Harry’s state of mind, resting momentarily on absence and 
the lingering sense of detachment from the routines and duties of work. Harry’s gaze 
into the distance is another instance of frontal staging whereby the camera 
concentrates on a character as if he is looking directly out and beyond the audience. 
There is no attempt to contextualise the space fully. This style parallels the way 
theatrical monologues achieve intimacy between a character and the audience. The 
film does not reproduce theatrical conventions but adapts these into a cinematic style. 
The lingering of the camera at this moment associates the character’s dreaming with 
a slower tempo that contrasts with the anxieties of his workplace. The act of 
projective identification is foregrounded because the character’s imaginary world is 
seen as a temporary escape from his material surroundings.   
  
The idea of an imaginary escape is developed further as Monika and Harry go to the 
cinema. The date film is melodramatic. The snippet we see involves two well-
dressed characters. The woman tells the man he may kiss her but they will never 
meet again. Monika’s tears and gaze suggest her total projection into this romantic 
tragic scenario, whilst Harry is detached from the movie, yawning, but also looks 
with anxiety towards Monika. When the lights come on the camerawork focuses on 
the couple and this continues through their exit. It is as if they are separated and like 
somnambulists in the dark, slightly awkward, still possessed, by the movie in 
Monika’s case, and its significance as part of the date in Harry’s case. Harry is 
anxious, but Monika thinks beyond to the glamour of the film. Bergman’s mise-en-
scene shows here how cinematic fantasy is reproduced in the world outside the film 
they have seen, as Monika’s attention is drawn briefly to a lighted shop window, 
which is like the glowing cinema screen. The imaginary world of the film was not an 
innocent beyond but one with connotations of status, signifying the possibility of 
commercial exchange, the pervasive capitalist mode of transformation. 
 
Typically, this political element is only hinted at. An industrial image, this time of a 
tower against the darkened sky, punctuates the focus on Harry and Monika, before a 
cut to them, sitting in medium close-up. This juxtaposition of an exterior location and 
an intimate interior is typical of the film’s assimilation of different elements, ranging 
from a keen eye for a physical environment to immersion in the private drama of the 
characters. In subsequent chapters we will see how Bergman maintains and 
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intensifies these concerns in more psychological works. The romance of Harry and 
Monika incorporates a self-referential element by referring to the film just seen. Like 
the woman in the movie Monika is in charge. After they kiss she evokes obsessive 
passion saying, ‘we are crazy about each other’. However, the lighting was more 
stylised in the movie. Here Monika’s face is highlighted but the surroundings are in 
darkness, which is a reminder of the couple’s precarious position in society. The 
concentration on Monika’s playful expression contrasts with the solemn atmosphere 
of the movie they have seen which further illustrates the spontaneity she represents. 
When she suggests that they move on due to the cold, it is revealed that they are 
outside and an atmospheric landscape takes over as the signifier of romance. 
 
Elements of melancholy and mourning 
Kleinian theory preserves a focus on artistic intentionality and artistic form39 and 
gives art a privileged role. Art, however must according to the Kleinian view deal 
with depression as well as joy. Since art is a symbolic activity emotions will be 
expressed in a manner that is inevitably indirect, but whatever the genre Kleinian 
theory stipulates the necessity of the depressive phase to achieve successful artistic 
expression. Nicky Glover provides a succinct summary of this: 
 
As in psychic health, there must be an awareness of both aspects. All 
successful (authentic) art must embody the deep experience of the artist - that 
is, his depression, whose working-through lies at the heart of all artistic 
creation. Indeed, it is not unusual to find that deeply moving art often stirs 
feelings of both rapture and melancholy.40   
 
For Kleinian anlaysis there is a sense of loss or damage that must be repaired. This 
can be compared with an emphasis in film theory on the way narratives work to 
resolve an underlying equilibrium or sense of lack. However, it is necessary to 
reiterate key differences involved in the Kleinian approach. In the latter, the sense of 
loss is attached much more directly to the emotional experience of the artist and the 
spectator. Disequilbrium is not thought about as fundamentally an ideological effect 
or as an inherent expression of a reality that the film, in some way, denies or escapes 
from.41 Instead, as we see in the art criticism of Richard Wollheim, there is a focus 
on primitive emotional states for the artist and the spectator, which are ultimately 
related to the infant’s relationship to the mother and to the quest for a constructive 
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development of subjectivity. Great value is placed on transformation of loss through 
creation and the possibility of a creative response to the artwork including an active 
participation in the text’s value. While other Bergman films like Wild Strawberries 
are permeated by a sense of loss and emotional damage from the past, in Summer 
with Monika this is more implicit. However, it is still significant. We learn that both 
Harry and Monika as young adults feel a sense of alienation that has been caused by 
unhappy family histories. This becomes more explicit as we see Monika’s 
dissatisfaction at home, and in the scene which reveals Harry’s loss of his mother 
through an early death. In this scene we see how mise-en-scene is used to evoke 
melancholy and how this is juxtaposed to the plight of the young lovers. 
 
Monika attempts to replace the lost maternal affection and support, as she playfully 
comforts Harry. The emphasis on maternal loss is emphasised further when Harry’s 
father returns interrupting the intimacy of Harry and Monika. Instead of Oedipal 
conflict we have a focus on the pathos of the father, still emotionally ravaged by his 
wife’s death. The staging of this scene develops this theme. The father enters, 
remaining in shadowy light as he crosses the room, passing the framed photograph of 
his wife. The couple in the foreground, Harry and Monika, are not just being pitted 
against a hostile environment but also one where fate is hostile. Whilst the attack by 
Lelle which follows shortly after this can be read as part of an Oedipal struggle, it 
also shifts the focus on to peer rivalry in the struggle for the possession of Monika. 
Lelle is objectified as a destructive element. He shows the impossibility of Harry and 
Monika completely expelling the negativity of their society.    
 
Existential rebellion 
As we saw in the previous chapter, for Sartre imagination must negate. It is an 
independent force not determined by perception but this does not mean it is nihilistic. 
Autonomy of imagination is apparent in the characters of Harry and Monika. They 
are both dreamers. The introspective destructive element in Harry’s rebellion against 
his work is signified at a symbolic level as he allows a decanter to drop to the 
ground. Gado notes the way Bergman’s style incorporates a subjective element in 
this example and throughout the film in a way that was inspiring for the Nouvelle 
Vague.42  The decision to leave society and head for the isolation of the island is an 
imaginative decision which negates and transcends the alienation the couple 
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experience in society. The decision to flee to the island is symbolic and throws the 
reality of the society into abeyance. Like one of Sartre’s acts of imagination the 
island only comes into being because the society disappears. Aumont notes how 
important rebellion against society is in this work and relates it to the earlier 
Bergman films about young alienated protagonists.43 As with these other films 
happiness is difficult to achieve. The island is ‘other’, a new world, but the 
progression to it is doomed because the couple have not fully confronted the 
destructive elements incorporated in the previous situation. In particular, the threat 
from Lelle, a character who attacks Harry from jealousy and molests Monika, 
remains, representing the paranoid-schizoid reality of a society permeated by 
division and conflict, which the couple try to escape. Lelle is the most threatening 
figure for Harry, but his animosity is part of the oppressive social norms from which 
they run away. Although paranoia may seem too extreme as a term, it is evoked in 
the sudden violence represented by Lelle and the way his threat is made latent. Part 
of the innovation of Klein’s thinking lies in showing how the paranoid-schizoid is 
part of everyday life and only full scale reparation can achieve liberation. Therefore, 
physical escape is not enough. For Sartre, liberation is also a momentous challenge 
and the couple do not achieve this. Bergman’s work implicitly confirms Kleinian and 
Sartrean analysis of the difficulties facing liberation from social constraints. 
 
For critics of Sartre, his emphasis on intentionality is a fall back on ego      
psychology, 44 but Sartre does not necessarily fit into this box. His work on the 
imagination alerts us to the way imagination and other modes of consciousness share 
the possibility of rebellion. As Betty Cannon makes clear, free will, for Sartre, may 
be guided by emotion, and/or imagination as well as reason.45 More fundamentally, it 
is important to recognise that Sartre’s notion of freedom evolved with a distinction 
made between reflective and pre-reflective consciousness. In this film the rebellion 
of Harry and Monika has a pre-reflective, spontaneous quality. The film does not 
map out a set of goals which they seek to achieve through an ego centred process of 
reasoning, but instead the emphasis is on their creativity in negating their oppressive 
circumstances. The bravery of choosing an indeterminate future rather than 
complying with an established order is central to the Sartrean account.46 
 
Correlating with Sartre’s philosophy of consciousness is his specific emphasis on the 
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difference between first person and third person accounts of experience. Matthew 
Eshleman makes this clear in his argument against the mistaken view that Sartre’s 
account of freedom is indistinguishable from an acceptance of chance as the ultimate 
background for our decisions. For Sartre, the first person consciousness is at some 
level unique: 
 
By an essentially first-person experience, Sartre means an experience (a) 
necessarily dependent upon our awareness of it, which (b) cannot be directly 
apprehended (intuited) by other observers. Thus, first-person experience is 
unlike many objects of experience, which exist independently of our awareness 
of them and can be straightforwardly examined by multiple observers, like 
material objects large enough to perceive through the senses.47 
 
In other words, for Sartre subjectivity, at some level, resists complete translation and 
is most directly expressed by the individual concerned. Rather than being nihilistic, 
or problematic, this feature of his philosophy provides a basis for ethics because it 
insists that any moral judgements applied externally to situation must be balanced 
against available first person testimony. Sartre, more than other existential 
philosophers like Kierkegaard and Heidegger continually attempts to connect this 
ontology of subjectivity with social analysis and social justice. Bergman exploits the 
disjuncture between different narrational viewpoints, to the extent that his films, 
implicitly critique the collapsing of first person experience into a third person 
objectivity. 
 
Escape to the island 
Summer with Monika provides good examples of Bergman’s interest in exploring 
variations in first person and third person narration and his reluctance to let the latter 
subsume the former. While the film opened with the omniscient narration of the 
waterside, suggested by long shots from different perspectives, the departure of 
Harry and Monika for the island is presented with apparently subjective camera 
work. Aspects of the narrative are left vague as the couple escape the mainland in his 
father’s boat. Contextual information from the story is minimised to facilitate 
identification with the subjectivity of the couple. For example, we do not see the 
reactions of their parents to this flight and the latter remain marginal to the narrative. 
Instead, the focus is on the couple’s experience. Echoing the style of the opening 
sequence, the shots reveal landscape rather than character, but the narrational 
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viewpoint over-runs into the subjectivity of the couple because the visual perspective 
during this journey appears to be that of the characters. The subjective viewpoint of 
the couple is suggested (by the camera’s position approximate to Harry and 
Monika’s position on the boat) although this is not actually confirmed, eliciting a 
more active interpretation from the viewer and conveying the enigmatic irreducibility 
of a subjective perspective. The sudden revelation of the open water suggests their 
newly acquired freedom. All dialogue disappears to be replaced by isolated sounds. 
The style is relatively simple, almost documentary like, continuing the aesthetic 
affiliation with neo-realism, but we can also recognise in the combination of realism 
and subjectivity a precursor of the intense subjective world developed in later works,  
reaffirming that Bergman’s films are always sensitive to private experience. The 
extended sequence of the escape to the island thematically conveys the couple’s 
escape from an oppressive social reality and cannot be reduced to the idea of Monika 
luring Harry away from security. The reliance on imagery without words is 
complemented by the lack of specific time references until Monika awakes on the 
island looking at a clock. As noted in the discussion of The Seventh Seal, Bergman 
explained some of his work through his interest in particular images and this passage 
also illustrates his willingness to let imagery take over at specific points.48 
 
Although the island is initially an idyllic escape, it becomes the location for the 
development of conflict already represented in the film. As we saw in Chapter 2, 
according to Klein, the death drive is manifested in a range of behaviour including 
greed, jealousy, hatred and violence. Klein’s bleak view of human nature insists that 
development is inevitably accompanied by these negative states. In this film, the love 
affair between Harry and Monika is juxtaposed with external threats principally in 
the form of Lelle and the oppressive work environment, which Harry has to endure. 
Kleinian ideas alert us to the way that in their love affair Harry and Monika find in 
each other a substitute for the negativity foisted on them by other external sources. 
Kleinian theory uses the binary opposition of good and bad objects directly in 
relation to primordial emotional states, and there is an emphasis on the dialectical 
development of these states. While Harry and Monika find solace in each other, 
becoming good objects for one another, and this is reinforced through their rejection 
of the society, they cannot, according to Klein’s insights, find a resolution to their 
difficulties until they confront and integrate the external negative threats. The 
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Kleinian perspective recognises how the death drive is located in society as well as 
being a psychic force. We can observe this as Lelle intrudes on the couple’s idyllic 
isolation. In the build-up to this a solemn, eerie foreshadowing of future events is 
conveyed with lingering shots as the lovers’ boat disappears into the horizon. The 
long take helps to express that this is the last moment before Lelle returns 
unexpectedly to reintroduce conflict. While Harry and Monika play innocently, Lelle 
appears suddenly. His point-of view replaces that of the omniscient observational 
long shot. Jealousy and destruction are introduced into the romantic isolation of the 
couple. The fight with Lelle has a theatrical quality with its exaggerated physical 
movements and lack of dialogue. The fact that Monika makes the vital blow by 
hitting Lelle with a saucepan undercuts but does not eliminate the idea that this could 
be a fight to the death. 
 
Shortly after the fight scene, the representation of Monika centres on her response to 
becoming pregnant. On the island we witness how Monika’s actions become more 
desperate. This is another point that demonstrates how a psychological emphasis on 
Monika’s subjectivity is combined with social observation. When shortly afterwards 
Monika leads the foray into a middle class house in search of food, physical 
movements are again foregrounded. Harry and Monika have been separated in the 
grounds of the house when Monika is apprehended clinging to a large slab of meat. 
Throughout this scene there is an absence of point-of-view camerawork but, 
nevertheless, we are aligned with the camera movement that responds to Monika’s 
actions, and this is very pronounced when she struggles to escape from the family. 
This is a distinct style from the norms of Hollywood cinema where identification 
with a character is more reliant on point-of-view. 
 
There was a suggestion of absurdity as well as a connotation of real violence in the 
struggle with Lelle. The element of absurdity returns because Monika’s presence in 
the bourgeois setting is so incongruous. Her savage rejection of any communication 
with the daughter maintains a theme running throughout the film whereby all 
character interaction is problematic. Monika’s autonomy is central to this theme. 
When she escapes from the family the camerawork is used to simply track her 
movements through the wild area adjacent to the house. In this passage, alongside the 
construction of suspense, there is a preoccupation with subjectivity, which 
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culminates in a montage of natural elements, including an owl from Monika’s point-
of-view. This sequence belongs to a tradition dedicated to evoking the position of 
primitive characters outside society and may have influenced François Truffaut’s 
choice of subject matter in L’Enfant Sauvage. (1970, d. Truffaut). The meaning of 
this imagery in Summer with Monika is not transparent. At one level, the passage 
represents Monika’s descent to a savage state mirroring the violence perpetrated by 
Lelle. However, this is not made explicit because the film does not have the same 
focus on cause and effect as classical narrative. Klein’s writings about envy, 
jealousy, and greed provide a perspective on the action here. While jealousy, 
according to Klein is driven by a sense of loss (the other has taken or threatens my 
possessions), envy suggests a primal descent into desire for what the other possesses. 
Monika moves towards this primitive state.49 On the one hand, Monika can be seen 
as trying to achieve a lost equilibrium necessary for survival. On the other hand, her 
mental state seems so desperate that it lacks this basis. She shows greed in a way that 
is completely justified by her precarious state but her actions also gravitate towards 
the form of greed that Klein believed was so destructive - an insatiable desire. The 
reason Monika gives for her desperate actions is the need to feed herself in a state of 
pregnancy. In the end, we see how this need is complicated by her cavalier 
existentialism. She desperately needs physical support but is unwilling to conform in 
the same way as Harry. 
 
Monika’s abandonment of Harry 
The couple argue desperately as Monika becomes helpless. When they are reconciled 
the feeling of reparation is unconvincing and this does not address Monika’s 
rejection of the world, which they must return to. The return journey to the mainland 
echoes the journey out with ellipses, through shots representing the sea and 
surroundings as they travel in to Stockholm. On this occasion, shadowy light 
expresses an ominous atmosphere but it is varied and delicate, maintaining a fragile 
state of transition. The final act of the film can be explained, therefore, turning to 
Kleinian theory and its account of the balance between splitting and integration. To 
an extent Harry succeeds in achieving integration because he finds a sympathetic 
work place, an outcome foreshadowed in the benign depiction of the workers 
congregating around the cafe, in the first part of the film. More significantly he is not 
destroyed by the loss of Monika. On the other hand, Monika shows an opposing side 
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of the situation since she takes on, in Kleinian terms internalises, the negativity 
located in society. She becomes identified with the external world that threatened 
their happiness before. 
 
This point leads to the debate about whether Monika is an existentialist heroine and 
inevitably this debate must take in Sartre’s efforts to include society and ethics in our 
reflection on this issue. We have seen that Sartre values negation against 
determinism. Monika embodies a resistance to definition. She vanishes from the text. 
However, as Cannon makes clear, Sartre does not celebrate freedom divorced from 
all conditions: 
 
If, for whatever reasons, I desire to escape my facticity, I may fall into the 
dishonest position of claiming that I am absolutely free in the sense of being 
able to do or be anything whatever or in the sense of having no connections 
with my past self. The dreamer who constantly expects a ‘new tomorrow’and 
the schizophrenic who completely ignores reality are examples of this form of 
bad faith.50 
 
Cannon explains that the concept of bad faith is used to criticise a consciousness that 
suffers the illusion that freedom is absolute as well as one that believes that this 
freedom does not exist. Monika’s hedonistic freedom embodies the first of these 
variations. Bergman intends to make this ambiguous and so we are left with both the 
impression of a powerful independence in Monika’s actions and, at the same time, 
the text demonises her abandonment of Harry and the baby. By taking on the story of 
female rebellion Bergman, at least implicitly, brings to the fore the potential for 
rebellion and destruction in any relationship. Today, it is easy to recognise the 
deficiencies of the film’s gender politics in its apparent criticism of Monika’s 
actions, but we can also see why this film maintains a progressive reputation. Monika 
resists final definition and is played with great charisma by Andersson. At the same 
time, the film brings to the fore the social context of her rebellion, including her 
alienation as a young mother (even if this is represented unsympathetically), the 
apparent corrupt influence of urban life, and the loss of innocence precipitated by the 
violence of Lelle. 
 
Sartrean analysis values the ability of a character to rise above his or her 
circumstances, but beyond this, Sartre’s exploration of existential psychoanalysis 
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provides the possibility of a more complete response to the film. Sartre seeks a form 
of integration through his own specific model of psychoanalysis. This involves 
reflection on past actions and events whilst avoiding objectification of this    
material.51 Harry goes through a comparable process as he casts his mind back to his 
time on the island. The film-making gives this moment enough ambiguity such that it 
does not signify unequivocally nostalgia or regret but rather an engagement through 
imagination with the past and emotion. The economy of the film-making prevents 
any further elaboration and thus maintains the sense of existential relation specific to 
Harry. 
  
The much talked about image where Monika looks directly at the audience is the key 
moment of this final act and the film as a whole. Quite rightly responses have 
highlighted this self-reflexive moment and the way it cultivates Monika’s ambiguity. 
This image relates to the theoretical perspectives I am pursuing. To start with it 
shows the emphasis on imagination as a process, which means engagement with 
absence, as Sartre argues, since shortly after this Monika disappears, only to reappear 
as a memory in Harry’s imagination. This image of Monika looking at the camera 
also returns us to her initial appearance as an image in the mirror, which strongly 
evoked an imaginary level beyond perception. In both images she is strikingly 
framed. Now Monika becomes a portrait framed by the film. This also illustrates how 
the imagination may be drawn into the projection of emotional characteristics that 
are not self-evident within the image. We are invited to imagine Monika’s 
personality, her treachery, insolence and independence. The emotion here is 
foregrounded because this is the moment that she signifies her autonomy and thus 
signifies Harry’s loss. The startling immediacy of this image as a result of Monika’s 
look at the camera and its autonomous position as a result of her subsequent 
disappearance also provide rich material for psychoanalytic interpretation. It is as if 
the image provides a direct route to the unconscious for film-maker and spectator. As 
Sánchez-Pardo, a theorist who applies Kleinian ideas to modernism, reminds us, the 
development of the snapshot and its cultivation as a moment in film was seen by the 
theorist Walter Benjamin as a new way of accessing unconscious optics. For 
Sánchez-Pardo, the isolated, fragmented image cultivated by modernism pursues this 
sense of fascination with emotion that is outside narrative control. The quotation 
from Benjamin is: 
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‘Evidently a different nature opens itself to the camera than opens to the naked 
eye - if only because an unconsciously penetrated space is substituted for a 
space consciously explored by man…. The camera introduces us to 
unconscious optics as does psychoanalysis to unconscious impulses.’52 
 
To be sure, the image of Monika differs from the snapshot in various respects, but it 
is also comparable to the effect identified by Benjamin because it signifies a kind of 
immediacy that is startling compared with the rest of the film, a sudden random 
visual access to Monika as subject. Bergman, throughout his work, in collaboration 
with his cinematographers, uses portraits and close-ups as moments which possess a 
strong level of autonomy, a force of their own which is not dependent on what 
precedes or follows in the narrative. This allows the viewer to imagine a character’s 
emotions more intensely. As we saw in Chapter 3, Sartre challenges our ideas about 
the representation of character interiority. His theory demands that we consider 
interior states dynamically in relation to intentions, motivations, and the external 
cues for these phenomena. This accords with way Summer with Monika presents the 
enigma of Monika’s motivation but also signals that this relates to a social context. 
As in Wild Strawberries and The Seventh Seal, Bergman’s images are incorporated 
very skilfully within the narrative, but at the same time they have an independent 
subliminal quality like that which Benjamin identifies in the snapshot. 
 
Sartre’s theory of the look not only discloses power relations, but also inter-
subjectivity and thus conveys the magical element of this moment, which was so 
fascinating for the directors of the Nouvelle Vague. Sartre also helps us to understand 
the narrative dislocation with his scepticism in Being and Nothingness about 
romantic love, the impossibility of reconciliation between two subjects, and the 
inevitable asymmetry involved in social relations, manifested in this case through the 
look. But, as already suggested, Sartre’s apparently pessimistic account of social 
relations is not the full story of his philosophy - it is merely the ground for a more 
authentic existence, and in this corresponds with the movement between from 
paranoid-schizoid to depressive relations as tracked by Klein. 
 
Monika is restored at the end of the film as a subject in Harry’s imagination. To start 
with this exemplifies the power of phantasy and imagination. The film respects this 
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power rather than seeking for solutions in the realm of perception. Sartre is 
fascinated by the freedom of the imagination to overcome temporal and spatial 
distance. Although he believes that perception is a more vital source of knowledge 
than imagination, when reality represents a lack for consciousness imagination can 
still disclose emotional knowledge.53 In a fairly obscure piece of Sartrean writing 
from early in his career entitled Faces, Sartre displays the same sensibility as 
Bergman in his fascination with the sheer emotional force that lies behind the visual 
appearance of a face. In her article about Sartre and magic Sarah Richmond draws 
attention to this example of Sartre’s writing, where it becomes clear that the face of 
the ‘other’ is not exclusively a threat or an object.54 Sartre’s dialectical philosophy 
allows us to recognise the positive force of Monika’s final appearance as image, after 
the apparently destructive close up of her enigmatic face. This is consistent with 
Klein who argues, as already noted, that phantasy contributes to knowledge. For 
Klein, phantasy restructures time and space. Sánchez-Pardo argues that this is a 
distinctive characteristic of the Kleinian theory, which explains its affiliation with 
various examples of modernism. Like modernist art Kleinian theory recognises the 
value of juxtaposing different fragments in a way that breaks continuity. For Klein, 
this means greater recognition of psychic material that is submerged in the rigid 
oppositions imposed by binary thinking. Focusing on the issue of spatial 
representation in modernism Sánchez-Pardo notes: 
 
Space in Kleinian theory is not something that has to be conquered but 
something that must be experienced in all its complexity. It is also a space that 
is empty enough to allow the (lost) object to emerge.55 
 
This is precisely what happens at the end of Summer with Monika as the space of the 
island is re-presented allowing Monika to return in Harry’s imagination. This image 
is melancholic because Monika has disappeared, but it is also constructive because it 
allows repressed emotion to be expressed. Thus, both Sartre and Klein lead us back 
to a fuller examination of how this image is integrated in the film. Whilst it can be 
read along Freudian lines as wish fulfillment of the male psyche, it is also implicated 
in a complex patterning that runs through the narrative evoking symmetry and 
asymmetry as part of the imagined restoration of loss, and carries the possiblity of 
insight alongside its obvious nostalgic qualities.       
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A possible problem with Kleinian theory, already noted in relation to Wild 
Strawberries in Chapter 2, is that it ends up endorsing a conventional morality 
through its emphasis on integration. Thus, Monika is demonised because she does 
not achieve the end point of reparation. In this sense the Kleinian approach appears 
to be at one with a particular reading of the film, which emphasises its conservative 
social message. Against this we need to recognise greater complexity in the film and 
in the theory. Firstly, the theory can be credited with revealing how the reparation 
narrative is constructed from a male perspective. However, secondly we need to 
remember that Klein’s theory does not regard the depressive position as a 
straightforward end point. In Klein’s vision we never attain this as a state of 
equilibrium but continue to experience the oscillation between emotional splitting 
and polarised desires on the one hand, and recognition of the other as an 
autonomous, emotional being. At the same time Klein recognises that the paranoid-
schizoid is an integral part of development. It cannot simply be defeated through 
rationality, but has to be experienced emotionally and art offers the possibility for 
this. Thirdly, we have the sense developed from the Sartrean perspective of Monika 
as partially a representative of freedom and transformation.56 
 
Bringing these theories together we can see that, for Bergman, Monika ultimately 
embodies ambiguity. Thus, Summer with Monika builds on the emotional 
complications and stylistic experimentation observed in Bergman’s earlier work. 
Despite its realist style it also looks ahead to the ambiguities of more overtly 
symbolic works like Wild Strawberries and The Seventh Seal. Perhaps even more 
clearly than these later works it reveals that ambiguity is not just a formalist value 
pursued for its own sake, but involves engagement with social and ethical issues. 
Sartre, Bergman and Klein are all convinced that engagement with social reality is 
enriched by art that accommodates ambiguity. Thus in their work we find a valuing 
of catharsis which differs in emphasis from both Aristotelian and Brechtian models. 
In contrast to such models a combination of Kleinian and Sartrean insights suggests 
that the audience are not distanced from Summer with Monika as they might be 
through Aristotelean pity or Brechtian distanciation. Instead we are engaged by a 
process, which lacks certainty in its conclusion due to the enigmatic agency of 
Monika as a figure in Harry’s imagination. Bergman filters his portrayal of Monika 
through the consciousness of his male protagonist, but arguably reaches a more 
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universal level when we consider how imagination and emotion are foregrounded in 
the narrative as a whole and as part of the viewing experience.  
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5    Revenge and reparation in The Virgin Spring   
 
The Virgin Spring, released in 1960, depicts the rape and murder of Karin, daughter 
of Töre and Märeta by wild goat herders, as she seeks to take the Virgin’s candles to 
Mass on the day of Christ’s sacrifice. The film was based on a Swedish 13th century 
ballad, ‘The Daughter of Töre in Vange’, which had many previous versions in 
countries using Romance languages.1 Steene points out that the version used in this 
film had a particularly Swedish identity because only in this country was the theme 
of Christian redemption added to the story.2 Bergman had been interested in the story 
since studying at university, and had even considered making a ballet from it, but 
finally worked with Ulla Isaksson’s script.3 
 
Despite generally positive reviews in Sweden The Virgin Spring  was met with 
anxiety by an editorial in a Swedish newspaper, which built on the sense of scandal 
already introduced by the censorship of the rape scene in the American version.4 
When Olof Lagecrantz criticised the film and the reviewers who had praised it, in his 
editorial, a debate ensued for one month.5 The film won an Oscar as best foreign 
picture but subsequently has received a mixed response from critics and historians 
writing about Bergman’s work.6 One way in which the film has been praised 
subsequently is its historical veracity. Geoffrey MacNab writes: ‘With relatively 
limited resources and a budget that was extremely modest by Hollywood standards 
he had managed to recreate the medieval world in an utterly convincing fashion.’7 
Some of the most sympathetic analyses of the film, such as that produced by Wood, 
praise the combination of a realistic style and symbolic elements.8 On the one hand, 
Wood observed the use of symbols in the film such as ‘the mystical number three’ 
used in a number of ways: the three goat herders, the three dead men heard by the 
beggar, the three branches felled by Töre. On the other hand, Wood appreciated the 
representation of material reality: ‘the sense of life lived close to the basic physical 
realities, with little to soften or screen.…Physical experience is consistently 
vivid…’9 This viewpoint contrasts with the generally negative reaction to this film 
described by Hubner: ‘Bergman’s popularity plummeted across Europe and America. 
The Virgin Spring was loathed as The Seventh Seal had been loved.’10 
 
Hubner also indicates that the film’s status was in fact part of a wider picture. For 
 174 
instance, she points out that the criticisms were directed at Bergman’s other films in 
this period, The Face of 1958 and The Devil’ Eye 1960.11 Hubner points out that 
there was a backlash against Bergman’s use of symbolism, but comments that in fact 
he had made diverse kinds of film before this spate of allegorical works. 
Summarising the reaction against the symbolism, which various critics thought tired 
and pretentious, Hubner quotes Penelope Gilliat from the Observer in 1961: 
‘Bergman is still sowing his wild strawberries and symbolic devices abound.’12 In 
contrast to this critical backlash my analysis will side with the sympathetic critics 
like Wood and argue that the film’s interest lies in its creative combination of 
‘realistic’ elements with a more imaginative symbolic style. In order to do this it is 
necessary to look in detail at the stylistic organisation of the film which includes 
recognising elements already noted in Bergman’s films: a style that draws on a range 
of cinematic influences including; silent cinema; an understanding of how elements 
held in common with theatre, including mise-en-scene and acting can be used to 
greatest effect; and a commitment to the idea of the open text traced in previous 
chapters to Bazin and the Sartrean concept of imagination. Various commentaries 
and elements of film theory will contribute to this positive re-evaluation of the film.  
 
Bordwell’s analysis of art cinema provides a useful starting point for contextualising 
the film. Bordwell’s focus on narration involves close analysis of film form. In his 
account of art cinema he states: ‘The art cinema motivates its narratives by two 
principles: realism and authorial expressivity.’13 This provides an initial match with 
the idea that The Virgin Spring is a combination of realism and, in the eyes of the 
negative critics, over-wrought symbolism, in which Bergman repeats his own 
formula. Bordwell explains that in the ‘art cinema’ realism included use of ‘real 
locations’, ‘contemporary alienation’ and in various examples a notably overt 
treatment of sexuality. ‘Most important, the art cinema uses “realistic” - that is, 
psychologically complex-characters.’14 With The Virgin Spring we will see how 
stylistic elements are designed to produce ‘psychologically complex characters’. 
Bordwell also insists on the significance of ‘ambiguity’ in the art cinema, which 
avoids clear-cut meaning. While this does not seem completely apposite for The 
Virgin Spring because the latter appears to have a more directly religious message 
than other Bergman works, nevertheless closer analysis reveals that this religious 
message is open to debate. One analysis which notes a certain amount of ambiguity 
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is that of Marc Gervais, who enthuses about the spirituality of the conclusion, and 
then suggests that this may be the voice of Isaksson rather than Bergman: 
 
…Bergman may well have had misgivings all along about the film’s lacking a 
voice steeped in contemporary irony, the Christian affirmation ringing out so 
strong that it excludes the Sartrean pole of the existentialist dialectic. We may 
indeed be hearing far more of Ulla Isaksson’s voice than Ingmar Bergman’s.15 
 
 
Gervais is one of many, who locate elements of ambiguity, unconscious and 
conscious, in this film’s final message. Steene, for instance, summed up The Virgin 
Spring as ‘a strange hybrid of a film, in which psychological modernisms - as for 
instance the Freudian approach to Märeta ... jars with the director’s ritual conception 
of the story.’16 Appreciation of ambiguity in the text is usefully supplemented by the 
concepts of alignment and affiliation used by Murray Smith. His analysis of cinema 
depends on recognising the way the text cues a moral response as part of the viewer’s 
imaginative and emotional engagement. Thus, Smith distinguishes between 
alignment, which refers to the viewer’s proximity with a character (through point-of- 
view shots, for instance) and allegiance, which describes our moral evaluation of the 
character. The latter means that the film affords the viewer an opportunity to think of 
the film world as a social microcosm such that an assessment can be made of how 
one character compares to another, and although this may be affected by alignment it 
does not have to be. As Smith explains: 
 
To become allied with a character, the spectator must evaluate the character as 
representing a morally desirable (or at least preferable) set of traits, in relation 
to other characters within the fiction.17 
 
 
This perspective puts content on an equal level with form as part of the film 
experience. Characters are made more or less sympathetic by, for instance, their 
actions towards others. In The Virgin Spring the revenge taken by Töre against the 
goat herders involves significant alignment with him. We witness his close 
relationship to his daughter, we have knowledge before him about the terrible crime, 
we are given a close view of his emotional response when he discovers the truth and 
we are given a fully detailed account of his preparations for the revenge. In following 
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his responses and actions formal mechanisms such as camera angles focussed on his 
movements produce a strong alignment of the narrative with this character. However, 
his decision to kill the young boy is designed by Isaksson and Bergman to challenge 
our allegiance with Töre’s revenge quest, and this emerges through Töre’s guilt and 
his relationship to other characters including the young boy he kills.  
 
Smith’s concepts of alignment and allegiance can accommodate much of the 
ambiguity in the film but in the precise attention to the way a cognitive response is 
elicited from the viewer we may miss the symbolic undercurrents of this work. For a 
number of critics psychoanalytical theory has a particular purchase on this film. For 
example, Wood says when discussing the final outcome of the narrative: ‘The 
motivation behind Töre’s revenge is slightly suspect, let alone the morality of the 
action: haven’t the goatherds done to his daughter what he subconsciously wanted to 
do...’18 Through the analysis I will show how Kleinian theory adds to this focus on 
desire and the Oedipal scenario. I will argue that the story of redemption can also be 
understood as a process of reparation. As in the case of Summer with Monika, it is 
important to recognise how stylistic variation and ingenuity deepens the emotional 
reach of this reparation. Thus, Kleinian theory is bound up with the skill and artistry 
of not only Bergman but all the creative contributions to this work. Kleinian theory 
as we have seen provides a particular perspective on ambiguity, noticing how this 
may express an overcoming of rigid Manichean boundaries of good and evil. The 
analysis will include observations of the lighting patterns in this work, which create a 
rich level of ambiguity. The usual starting point for analysis of the lighting is to note 
how Sven Nykvist replaced Gunnar Fischer as Bergman’s cameraman for The Virgin 
Spring and went on to create with Bergman a more realistic style of lighting.19 
Fischer had been very successful in incorporating symbolic lighting effects but, in 
this, Nykvist’s second film with Bergman, we can notice a symbolic level as patterns 
of light and shade connote a synthesis of morality and emotion that invites 
interpretation. The bright sunlight in which Karin is attacked makes the crime more 
startling. While Töre’s slaughter of the goat herders is carried out at dawn, with deep 
shadows conveying a sinister half-light that fits his actions. Nykvist and Bergman do 
not replicate the cliché of light signifying goodness, and shadows as threatening, but 
instead evoke shifting ideas of purity and evil whilst maintaining realistic motivation 
for the lighting effects. Thus, moral evaluation is made part of a process, not 
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represented as a given and not symbolised through melodramatic imagery. 
 
Kleinian theory is sensitive to the range of stylistic elements because it involves, as 
we have seen in relation to Summer with Monika, a focus on integration. The 
narrative must achieve coherence not at the level of wish fulfilment as in ‘the happy 
ending’ but instead aesthetic range brought into harmony can allow a more fruitful 
release of negative emotion. A fine example of aesthetic analysis informed by this 
sensibility is Wollheim’s analysis of Pablo Picasso’s work which argues that Picasso 
sought to balance a concentration on the power of the eye with a focus on 
representing ‘touch’ through, for example, depictions of shape and texture.20 
Bergman’s work is also concerned with achieving an internal balance that, 
nevertheless, allows the full expression of disequilibrium. A striking image, which is 
relevant here, is that of Töre having murdered the boy who holds his hands in front 
of his face, asking for God’s judgement.21 This conveys the theme of Töre’s split 
between Paganism and Christianity, but also has further significance. The focus on 
Töre’s hands is consistent with a close attention to physical acting throughout the 
film. Just as we find a fluid exploration of light and dark, disequilibrium and balance 
are expressed through the representation of the body as a complex source of meaning 
alongside other stylistic elements such as point-of view and dialogue. The creative 
orchestration of different elements in patterns of alternation, repetition, echoing and 
foregrounding found throughout Bergman’s work can be compared to the Kleinian 
belief in formal coherence and patterning as a medium for catharsis.22 The 
complexity is related to the artist’s need to release emotion, which in turns offers the 
viewer a cathartic experience.  
 
I will argue that, as with Summer with Monika, understanding this film as an 
expression of reparation involves recognising the representation of social conflict 
and injustice. We are drawn into a theatre of power relations within the family 
structure. More than in the Freudian model, but in a way that Klein attends to, we 
also recognise the symbolic significance of the mother. In fact social conflict and the 
position of motherhood come together in the role of Ingeri (played by Gunnel 
Lindbloom). This character, and her marginalisation, are striking additions to the 
original ballad and create a psychological context for the representation of the goat 
herders’ crime. Another significant change was that the miracle arose after the 
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revenge, whereas in the ballad it had been immediate: ‘They severed then her lovely 
head/A spring welled up upon that stead.’23 
 
The rape and murder scene in The Virgin Spring appears to show pure evil. For the 
period in which it was made it is a very direct representation of rape and murder. In 
this it is not as brutal as the original ballad but, nevertheless, aims to capture the 
horror in that original ballad through the level of visual detail. The self-conscious 
legendary quality of this crime reworked for the twentieth century suggests that 
Bergman and Isaksson were aiming for a grand symbolic statement about evil. For 
this reason I will refer to Klein’s discussion of evil in Othello, and Donner’s 
argument that this is a film dealing with the presence of evil in twentieth century 
Europe. Isaksson, the screenwriter, said that ultimately she wanted to inspire 
sympathy for all the characters, a clear invocation of the concept of reparative ethics. 
She stated: ‘The three criminals are not totally evil. On the whole we emphasise that 
the spectators have pity for all the people in this film.’24 This can be compared to the 
humanistic ambition of Klein’s writing about criminal psychology: 
 
 One of the great problems about criminals, which has always made them 
incomprehensible to the rest of the world, is their lack of natural human good 
feelings; but this lack is only apparent.25  
 
Thus, Klein sets out her belief about how criminality involves a distortion and 
deflection of positive instincts.  
 
However, the presentation of this scene could still leave the viewer in such a state of 
revulsion as to endorse Töre’s revenge. This is a prime example of the film’s 
ambiguity, its possibility of different readings. The Kleinian model, and the link 
between Ingeri and the crime mean that one possible reading is to understand the 
crime in relation to the unconscious phantasy of an attack on the maternal body.  
Klein supplements Freud’s emphasis on the power of male sexuality (the phallus) 
and its displacement, by arguing that there is even more obsessive unconscious 
obsession with the maternal body and its incorporation of /invasion by the phallus. 
This obsession is manifest in the enigma and neglect surrounding Ingeri’s pregnancy, 
Ingeri’s demonic fascination with the possibility of a sexual violation of Karin, the 
symbolism of the toad in the bread, and the psychotic combination of lust and 
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violence from the elder goat herders. The focus on the maternal body in Kleinian 
theory suggests that we should link these elements in the text. The Kleinian theory of 
integration leads to a subtle appreciation of the myriad ways in which this 
unconscious phantasy may be shaped through art to provide catharsis and self-
realisation, the latter being a process that parallels the freedom that Sartre invokes as 
an authentic response to alienation. It could be argued, however, that Sartre’s work 
leads to a stronger understanding of the social context of the violence depicted 
because of a stronger focus on individual motivation in the characters. 
 
Here I turn to the influence of Sartre and existentialism. This influence is not direct 
but has been noted by various commentaries. As noted, Gervais sees a curious mix of 
existentialism and the religious expression from Isaksson, but it is Donner who 
focuses more on the social message of the text. Donner, in his sympathetic response 
written in 1962, thinks that this is a work that represents destructive social forces in a 
way that shows the influence on Bergman of European modernists such as Sartre, as 
well as a range of Swedish intellectual influences.26 The psychoanalytic and 
existential elements represent instability in this historical setting. Donner argues 
convincingly that we need to look beyond the historical realism and consider this as a 
work that raises questions relevant to the world in which it was made. At the stylistic 
level he is critical of the dialogue but praises the impassive camerawork in the rape 
scene, which he feels successfully maintains the impersonal voice of the ballad. 
Within his analysis is also the idea that the use of static camera and long take involve 
Bazinian openness so that the viewer must play a more active role in interpreting the 
material. Donner argues that:  
 
The remarkable thing is that of all B[ergman]’s films The Virgin Spring comes 
closest to the European experience of evil. As a parable of our time’s 
destructive forces, the film is more successful than several of B[ergman]’s tales 
of the present.27 
 
 
Donner is not just talking about the representation of Swedish society but instead, at 
a very general level, about the trauma of twentieth century European history. He 
argues that due to Bergman’s lack of direct experience of the horrors of war, which 
directly influenced the work of European intellectuals like Sartre, Bergman needed 
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the artifice provided by a medieval context. For Donner, the relevance of 
existentialism lies in the representation of social conflict through the plight of 
individual characters. He makes a contrast between Bergman and Bertolt Brecht, 
arguing that the chief difference lies in the former’s focus on the individual’s inner 
world, which is nonetheless expressive of alienation from contemporary society.28 
We can see how this relates to Sartre’s insistence on intentionality, a 
phenomenological underpinning of his belief that subjectivity is, in some way, 
irreducible. In ‘Existentialism is a Humanism’ he argues that it is precisely this 
subjective isolation that we all share and thus forms an important platform for 
morality.29 There are some key moments in The Virgin Spring, which are particularly 
evocative of the existential focus on isolation, including Töre’s angst ridden speech 
to God. 
 
Paisley Livingston’s work on Bergman proves insightful here. He analyses specific 
images in Bergman’s work, which relate to Sartre’s theory of shame because the 
character shown looking in the mirror experiences a sense of exposure before the 
onlooker. Livingston argues that Bergman is preoccupied with the primacy of a very 
similar emotional state to shame, frequently manifested as humiliation. Drawing on 
Bergman’s comments in interview, Livingston points to the director’s belief that 
shame and humiliation can lead to a vicious circle, which institutionalises violence. 
In interview Bergman stated: ‘The person humiliated asks himself constantly how he 
will be able, in turn, to humiliate someone else. It is one of the most terrible poisons 
that exists today.’30 Livingston also says that this humiliation can be part of a process 
of re-orientation to society and suggests that both Sartre and Bergman recognise this: 
 
Sartre, in his dramatic descriptions of the violent conflict between 
consciousnesses, speaks of an ‘internal haemorrhage’ in which the order of the 
subject’s entire perceptual field is disturbed. It is correct to emphasize in this 
manner the critical nature of the interaction, but the crisis has a double nature: 
as confusion, it brings the momentary disruption of the self’s stability, as 
decision it suggests that emotions such as humiliation also serve to resolve the 
conflict.31 
 
 
Livingston argues that for Bergman the artist has a particular affinity with the 
emotional experience of humiliation, and can therefore articulate the social problems 
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involved, and may sometimes express the terms of a solution. He writes: 
 
Attempting to find alternatives to the various masks of humiliation, Bergman 
rejects the illusion of individualism and implies that a genuine realization of 
self occurs not in a flight from others but within the context of a community.32 
             
A parallel humanistic concern with the possibilities for progressive development 
allied to acute observation of alienation is part of the Kleinian tradition with its 
emphasis on achieving the ethics of the depressive position. Furthermore, Alford’s 
argument that Kleinian aesthetics encourages the viewer to compare the resolution of 
a narrative with his/her own situation applies here. This approach corresponds with 
Donner’s argument that the rape scene in The Virgin Spring is shocking in order to 
provoke the audience into reflection on their own society.  
 
Ingeri’s plot/Karin’s journey 
In the opening scene shadowy light is deployed to heighten mystery and the intensity 
of Ingeri longing for the intervention from the pagan Norse God, Odin.33 As Ingeri 
lights the fire the flames are like a hell being raised. Ingeri looks continually beyond 
the space into the abstract space of her imagination, but also to check whether she is 
alone as she tries to summon her God. There is a balance between the sense 
conveyed of Ingeri’s inner world, including her pregnancy, and her dreams of Odin’s 
assistance, with the observations of her external surrounding. The integration of 
diverse elements in the artwork provides a guide to this scene’s expressive range. 
The off-screen sound of the cockerel is used to signify the external setting and the 
hour in a way that engages the viewer’s imagination, whilst Ingeri’s look brings us 
back to the immediacy of her subjective experience. The intensity of Ingeri’s gaze is 
matched by her posture as she grasps the pole in her prayer to Odin. 
 
The juxtaposition of Ingeri’s imagined off-screen deity, and the medium close-up, at 
the start of the second scene, which depicts a statue representing Christ’s sorrow on 
the cross, conveys conflicting metaphysical ideas. The juxtaposition means that the 
figure of Christ seems momentarily to fill the imaginary space that Ingeri 
communicated with. As a result the internal conflict of two different beliefs is 
suggested at the level of image. In these opening scenes we are presented with a 
culture in which anxiety and obedience to a religious authority are key elements. 
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Töre and Märeta are first shown penitent in their appeal to the Lord. The atmosphere 
of submission is dramatised as we witness Märeta’s urge to pour hot candle wax 
across her arm as a sign of her respect for Christ’ suffering and Töre’s intervention to 
restrain her. According to Donner, the film represents Töre’s difficulty in living with 
his Christianity, 34 and on this reading part of the thematic tension resides in the 
representation of religious values in transition - Töre is an early convert to 
Christianity who reverts to more primitive beliefs in the revenge he exacts later in the 
story. Whilst the idea of conflicting religious systems is a key theme, from a 
psychoanalytic perspective we can see a comparison between Ingeri’s beliefs and the 
Christianity of Töre’s community. For Freud, the concept of the super-ego is an 
internalised authority figure that may be personified by God or another powerful 
figure such as the patriarch.35 Looking again at the opening sections of the film, one 
experiences not so much the contrast between Ingeri’s paganism and the Christian 
devotion of Töre and Märeta, but the comparison. In both situations the appeal is to 
an authoritarian master. This is conveyed partly through character movement. Ingeri 
looks up with a passionate face, searching for ‘service’ from Odin. In the succeeding 
scenes she carries out her chores ritualistically, her body directed by a system of 
rules she does not control. Töre and Märeta move ritualistically, devout in their belief 
system, whilst their faces are pensive.36 
 
Klein focuses acutely on the impact of the super-ego on the infant. In 1934 using her 
research on infancy to discuss adult criminality she wrote: 
 
In the early sadistic phase, which every individual normally passes through, the 
child protects himself against his fear of his violent objects, both introjected 
and external, by redoubling his attacks upon them in his imagination; his aim in 
thus getting rid of his objects is in part to silence the intolerable threats of his 
super-ego.37 
 
For Klein, anxiety is related to a threat from both an external and internal authority. 
It appears that Ingeri invests in the internal authority of Odin because she has been 
punished and victimised. Reduced to a slave status and ostracised, her response at the 
level of imagination is to a god who will produce even more punishment but visited 
upon Karin. This reinforces the idea that Odin is a rival super-ego figure to both the 
Christian God and the paternal authority figure of Töre. Since Karin has the aura of 
the fairytale princess Ingeri’s hatred incorporates what Klein and Freud identified as 
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the death drive, an externalisation of internal hatred in direct opposition to the beauty 
of Karin who is the main source of pleasure for her religious parents. 
 
Sartre’s analysis of power relations accords with this psychoanalytic analysis. As 
Livingston showed, in Sartre’s account of the look, in Being and Nothingness, 
alienation is created by the internalisation of the other. What is most relevant here is 
the role that Sartre assigns to shame. As Tarja Laine puts it: ‘For Sartre, it is through 
the experience of shame that the subject is revealed to him - or herself as existing for 
others.’38 For Sartre, a key to the experience of shame is that one is seen by the other 
and this feeling of being watched is translated into an awareness of shared humanity: 
being-with-others. In this sense shame can be said to have an ontological status, it 
lies at the foundation of being. Although shame becomes much more significant later 
in the transformation of the young goat herder, Ingeri, Töre and Märeta, it is evident 
at the beginning as the characters submit to an external authority. This is a shame 
culture in which the characters feel that they are overseen by the vision of a 
metaphysical authority. The screenwriter and Bergman challenge this with a more 
compassionate form of shame in the conclusion to the story, reworking the Christian 
theme of tragedy and redemption. As Klein explains in the quote above, and very 
regularly throughout her work, emotions take hold at an unconscious level and this 
impacts on the individual’s imaginative world, but also their perception of external 
reality. Ingeri’s emotions are governed by her imagination but also are the result of 
what she perceives, and this leads her to change as the narrative progresses. Thus the 
combination of realism and an imaginative symbolic style serve psychological 
exposition. 
 
Gado’s psychoanalytic account of the film argues that Ingeri is related to Bergman’s 
own sense of guilt. Ingeri’s progression toward shame about her hatred repeats, 
according to Gado, a continuous theme in Bergman films where characters play out 
an abiding sense of guilt, which is related to sexual impulses. Bergman, having been 
a favoured child, suffered acutely this sense of shame and translated this into his 
characters, both male and female.39 But we should also recognise that the film 
represents a wider sphere than Bergman’s psyche. Ingeri was added by Isaksson to 
the original ballad.40 An immediate consequence is to introduce stronger ideas of 
social and cultural conflict. Ingeri is in conflict with the rest of the household. 
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Shockingly her pregnancy is ignored, not even talked about. This is clearly a theme 
deliberately introduced by Isaksson, who previously worked with Bergman on Close 
to Life (1958), a film about three pregnant women in hospital, and the subject is 
handled skilfully so that the viewer is left to recognise the prejudice rather than 
hearing this overtly voiced. Ingeri is represented as wild, a lower form of being, with 
reminders of the savage state reached by Monika in the film of 1953.  
 
The introduction of the main characters creates an awareness of the power 
relationships in Töre’s household. When they gather for the evening meal the 
pictorial style echoes a religious tableau.41 The reverence of this shared space is 
undermined by the underlying sense of conflict manifest in the marginalisation of 
Ingeri, who is present like a Judas, and yet also like a grateful member of a slave 
class. Töre controls the situation but there are intimations of an underlying 
instability. Töre’s wife is haunted by the past and nightmares while Karin is talked 
about as a precious symbol, but one that might be tainted by proximity with her 
foster sister.42 The sense of religious purpose is the main source of hope as Märeta 
concurs with Töre’s decision that Karin should embark on a journey with the sacred 
candles.  
 
The degree of alignment with Ingeri in the first half is striking, but our allegiance is 
gradually transformed as the narrative progresses so that the character becomes more 
sympathetic. In the first half of the story the character of Ingeri is partly represented 
as a villainess, and emotionally we appreciate her hate and venom directed towards 
her foster sister. Ingeri’s story is just one plot line in the film, but we gain special 
access to her private thoughts from the outset of the film, as she summons Odin. As 
the story unfolds the viewer realises something, that the characters being represented 
are innocent of, namely Ingeri’s malevolence towards Karin including her decision to 
place the toad inside her sister’s bread. The viewer’s access to the consciousness of 
Ingeri is intensified where we share her visual perspective. However, the alignment 
is not always presented straightforwardly. For instance, early in the narrative we 
realise that Ingeri is observing the mother and Frida, a more senior servant, in 
conversation about Karin, but this is conveyed by showing Ingeri in the background, 
rather than through her point-of-view. This shot conveys Ingeri’s marginalisation 
whilst cueing our awareness of her jealousy and hostility to Karin as the two women 
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discuss the latter.  
 
Smith draws a distinction between films in which the allegiance is didactic and those 
where it is more gradual or subtle.43 Thus, the initial interplay between Töre and 
Märeta belongs to the more gradual variety of allegiance because it shows that each 
has protective feelings for their daughter. The presentation does not necessarily 
privilege Töre or Märeta as more or less sympathetic for the audience. Similarly, the 
presentation of Karin, with first her mother and then her father, refuses to convey a 
major conflict on which we are invited to take sides, but there are indications that 
Karin is spoilt and, on the other side, that she has a free and playful spirit. As the 
story evolves the emotional complexion of the film becomes complicated.  
 
In addition to intimations of incest, the film deliberately leaves hidden the 
circumstances behind Ingeri’s pregnancy, and why she is Karin’s foster sister. The 
whole sense of a traumatic past about which the viewer cannot attain omniscient 
knowledge contributes to the psychoanalytical dimension. The focus on the present 
means the past is experienced as a set of emotional repercussions. The initial issue 
facing the family is Karin’s late rise on the day. There is an explicit sense that she 
has already transgressed with her dancing the previous night responsible for her late 
rise, and will face her father’s anger. Märeta conveys to her daughter the disapproval 
of Töre, but Karin with a sense of conviction responds that her father will understand 
when he sees her in the magnificent dress reserved for the special occasion of her 
journey to the church. Thus, understood psychoanalytically, Karin seeks to establish 
herself as a valued object, for the male gaze in particular.  
 
The father’s response is genuinely caring, but male desire for Karin erupts in a 
massively destructive fashion in the later rape and murder, and this leads to the 
father’s violence towards the perpetrators. Thus, we can interpret the chain of events 
that link male desire and violence towards women. The theme of male violence and 
power is echoed in Ingeri’s worship of Odin. The suggestions of an incestuous 
relationship and the assertion of male power convey a Freudian scenario in which 
patriarchal power is dominant. This Freudian perspective is a matter of interpretation 
and perhaps the biggest reservation about it is the weight given to the role of the 
father. In fact, although Wood provides a Freudian reading perhaps he is more 
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convincing when he simply asserts that in The Virgin Spring: ‘…good and evil are 
like subterranean streams, potent, determining matters of life and death, but invisible 
and mysterious. No one is pure.’44 This observation is closer to Kleinian theory in 
which unconscious development is seen as a process in which the subject is 
overtaken by projections of good and evil and must work through this to recognise 
ambivalence and ambiguity.45 
 
Kleinian theory provides a useful extension of the focus on desire and the Oedipal 
scenario. The focus in Klein’s work on primitive needs related to the mother and the 
first experiences of food can be compared to the emphasis in this film on Töre and 
Märeta’s home as a source of nourishment for an extended family. Early in the film, 
Ingeri is instructed to prepare the milk, which then sits centre stage at the morning 
meal from which everybody feeds. As already noted, despite the nourishment 
everyone receives, under the surface there is a disturbance signified by Ingeri’s 
discontent as well as other signs of emotional trauma. This is carried forward to 
Ingeri’s decision to secretly insert the toad into Karin’s bread. In medieval life the 
toad symbolised the devil but also sexuality.46 This contamination of the food is vital 
to the film’s meaning since the rape and murder are linked to, if not caused by, the 
toad’s appearance. In Kleinian theory ‘introjection’ is a crucial concept, which 
conveys the process of internalising both good and bad objects.47 The toad, hidden 
inside the food, demonises this process and so, it could be said that, the way is paved 
for psychosis and the evil is externalised. Thus, Ingeri’s primitive appeal to Odin and 
the spell she hopes to achieve with the frog appears to succeed.  
 
Klein’s emphasis on female agency is also relevant. In this story female actions are 
immediately centre stage in the prominence given to Ingeri. As Cowie notes, her 
character retains a sensuality.48 Her hostility to Karin is wrapped up in feelings about 
how her own sexuality was exploited by the male dominated world. On their journey 
Ingeri confronts Karin, arguing that she too will receive the effects of male desire as 
a destructive power. Ingeri is a victim of the patriarchal society but has been cast 
aside. Her words to Karin express the view that Karin cannot escape the same fate. 
She alludes to Karin’s flirtation with various men. In this way female desire is 
incorporated as an element in a story, which is fundamentally about the demonic 
possibility of violence related to male desire.  
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Klein’s discussion of envy provides further understanding.49 Envy according to Klein 
is one of the most destructive emotions surpassing jealousy. While the latter is 
resentment about what the other possesses envy, according to Klein, goes much 
further in its destructiveness. The other’s possession of goodness must be destroyed. 
This aim is ascribed by Märeta to the devil, as she combs her daughter's hair. Asked 
by her daughter, why she talks of the devil while Töre does not, Märeta says: 
‘Because he is the seducer of the innocent. He strives to destroy all goodness.’ This 
appears to be a premonition of the attack on Karin whilst developing the theme of 
moral and psychological debasement, as well as characterising the devil in a manner 
akin to Klein’s account of envy.  
  
A key example for Klein is Iago. She draws attention to the way he finds it 
disgusting to look at love between other people (Othello and Desdemona) but in its 
place yearns and schemes for a debased alternative.50 In a sense this describes 
Ingeri’s hatred directed towards Karin. One scene, for instance, gives us a clear sense 
of Ingeri’s hostility aligned with her point-of-view, as Karin meets one of the men 
she danced with the previous night. This man may be the father of Ingeri’s child. 
Karin herself could be accused of stirring envy in Ingeri at this point through her 
flirtation but also the restriction of information means that Ingeri appears to be 
projecting her emotions on to Karin, even willing the archetypal princess figure 
towards an obscene alternative to the innocent affection she displays. Ingeri wants 
the sexuality of Karin’s relationships with men to become explicit and believes that 
in this process Karin will suffer. In this way her project could be compared with that 
of Iago as she seeks to ‘contaminate’ her rival’s mind leading into ‘deterioration’.51 
 
We also have to take into account the Kleinian awareness of how paranoid-schizoid 
processes including envy may be surpassed by a greater appreciation of ambiguity in 
the other. Iago is a key example for Klein because he is incapable of this 
development, as Robert Caper explains:  
 
Iago is perhaps unique in Shakespeare’s work because he lacks ambivalence 
and ambiguity and seems therefore more like a representative of pure, 
malicious envy as a psychological force - a part object - than like a real human 
being.52  
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Ingeri therefore is ultimately quite different from Iago. She simply appeals to a 
metaphysical entity instead of scheming and cultivating the envy in Karin that she 
herself feels. In this way the film shows the projection of envy, which in the case of 
Othello is hidden behind Iago’s efficacy as a villain. He is a villain who really 
intervenes instead of willing this from a supernatural entity. It is clear that Ingeri has 
doubts and anxiety about her malevolent wishes towards Karin. Meanwhile, Karin’s 
class privilege raises questions about how Ingeri was marginalised in the first place. 
Klein makes it clear how these emotions are developed through social interaction, 
fuelled by processes of projection by which characters superimpose their own 
emotions on to others. Desperate about her own pregnancy and its circumstances, 
Ingeri appears to displace her own internal problems on to Karin or, to be more 
exact, on to her vision of a pagan metaphysical retribution against her foster sister, 
thus inflicting harm on the parents and the social order that she is ostracised from. 
The mise-en-scene reinforces the contrast between the sisters : Ingeri’s poverty in her 
plain clothes and the special status of Karin in her dress which Märeta tells us ‘was 
stitched by fifteen maidens’ signifies the contrast between their different religious 
faiths and their social status.     
 
The imaginative and open-ended qualities of the film lay the ground for the 
transformation of Ingeri and ultimately the existential crisis of Töre. Diverse aspects 
of the style contribute to the aesthetic distance from the original ballad. The dialogue 
plays an important part in this opening up of characterisation in place of the direct 
economical omniscience of the original. In the original we are told: ‘First she was 
three herdsmen’s wife/Then she gave up her young life/They took her by the golden 
birch/and placed her against a branchless.’53 In contrast to this focus on the event a 
whole world of subjective nuances is introduced in the lead up to the crime. Karin 
agrees to make the journey to church telling her mother: ‘How demurely I’ll ride to 
Church. And Tawny’s hooves will trot as though on a pilgrimage.’ 
 
Karin has a playful air and a dreamlike naivety. In this, she parallels other young 
characters in Bergman films who express a different existential reality because they 
make us aware of their unique perspective.54 Here, it is as if Karin is momentarily the 
narrator, but her power and independence will be crushed by the savage reality that 
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she cannot anticipate. In other parts of the dialogue we can also find a pattern of 
talking that contrasts with the single omniscient voice of the original ballad, turning 
the characters themselves into intermittent storytellers. Treating his daughter with 
affection, Töre teases her with the punishment she should receive for her audacity in 
challenging his authority: ‘I’ll ride to the mountains with this wicked maid and 
imprison her in the mountain for seven years. When she is chastened I’ll take her 
back.’  Here Töre’s speech echoes that of a storyteller, whilst taking the story into the 
first person. In the scene that follows, the beggar who has travelled beyond the 
homestead, responds to Frida in the mode of a storyteller: ‘A bird on the wing finds 
food. A bird on the roost dies. I’ve seen women and churches.’ Here he is justifying 
to Frida his decision to flee the town, a brief allusion to some form of persecution 
about which we learn no more. 
   
In these examples the dialogue provides a background but also opens up a different 
perspective from the historical authenticity of the mise-en-scene. The cumulative 
effect of this, self-conscious, story telling speech links the medieval setting to a more 
modern, self-conscious, sense of narrative and narration. This relates to Sartre’s 
insistence on the central role of subjectivity in creating meaning. Isaksson made clear 
her desire to inject realism into the story through the dialogue, but these fragments 
also show an interest in modes of stylised, subjective narration that are different from 
the quest for verisimilitude.   
 
Another key to the film’s style is the mise-en-scene of the Swedish countryside and 
dwellings inhabited by Töre and his household. The landscape and setting for the 
main part maintain an impressive verisimilitude, although even an ardent fan of the 
film like Donner is critical of some of the interiors.55 However, the historical 
authenticity of the detail is not an end in-itself, but inevitably contributes to the 
representation of emotion and social context. Despite the patriarchal authority of 
Töre his household is not one of massively accumulated wealth and resources. The 
harshness of the setting is exemplified early on when we see Ingeri travel between 
the different buildings of this establishment, which are poised on a dramatic slope 
covered in thick mud. The graphic presentation of the diagonal line of the incline 
economically conveys the modesty of the farm’s status. When Karin and Ingeri set 
forth the landscape is in contrast magnificently expansive. As they leave the 
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beggar/storyteller’s words evoke the idea of legendary journey. Shown in long shot, 
we see the forests stretching in to the distance glowing in the sunlight. At this point 
the film appears to fit the mould of a classic National cinema in which landscape is a 
heritage background.56 Given the earlier intimations of foreboding, the freedom 
offered by the sunlit countryside, at this stage, appears only to be a temporary 
counterpoint to the evil that will emerge from it.  
 
The Kleinian preoccupation with restructuring Manichean patterns through 
emotional development parallels the aesthetic patterns developed through lighting in 
mise-en-scene. Throughout the opening sections of the film, intimations of purity, on 
the one hand, and foreboding on the other, are conveyed in such a way that the 
viewer cannot be sure where goodness and security lie.The collaboration between 
cinematographer and director is evident in the shifts in lighting engineered in some 
of the early scenes. After the flickering shadows, that surround the characters in the 
first scenes, bright light is introduced, as Frida releases a group of chicks that she is 
protecting in her dress. Frida talks about the way these chicks symbolise life. We 
cannot think about the optimism of the bright light here outside the context of a 
world that already seems troubled. Maybe, both Bergman and Nykvist draw on their 
respective experiences of religious upbringing in their inclination to incorporate 
Manichean oppositions in the lighting schemes, but they are also both committed to 
avoiding cliché. 
 
The fact that the lighting carries ambiguity is shown by the scene in which Karin is 
raised from bed by her mother. The bright light here contrasts with the shadows 
surrounding Ingeri in the previous scene. However, Karin’s status as the fairytale 
princess is slightly challenged by her arguments with Märeta about the previous 
night. Her mother is concerned that she may lose her purity. Karin herself shows 
signs of narcissism, gazing at her image in the water, and asking her mother not to 
block the light. The shadows of the mother and Karin in this scene are not 
pronounced. Karin stands brightly lit as her mother straightens the hair. However, 
when her father arrives and agrees to Karin’s request that Ingeri join her on the 
journey, shadows are cast across the face of both Töre and Karin. Again, care is 
taken to naturalise this with the accompanying mise-en-scene. Nevertheless, a mood 
of uncertainty is evoked through this light. The film-makers do not seek the sense of 
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inevitable doom that might seem appropriate to the authoritative voice of the ballad’s 
narration. Instead, as the film progresses, we are engaged more strongly by the 
moment, by possible and contingent shifts of meaning suggested through the lighting 
patterns.  
 
Without over-elaboration, the journey through the Swedish landscape conveys 
directly the mood of uncertainty, already represented by the lighting and dialogue as 
the women travel into the forest. Despite the realism of period re-creation, the 
journey suggests a dreamlike path towards the evil forces that await. This point can 
also be extended to the soundtrack, which at the start of the journey accumulates 
three elemental sounds. These include a mixture of diegetic and non-diegetic sources. 
So, as the women travel past the lake, we hear the sound of the cuckoo, gentle flute 
music and the sound of the water.57 Throughout the film, imaginative allusion, 
beyond what can be seen, is used in conjunction with a realistic style. However, as 
we approach the violent attack on Karin, it might be asserted that this principle is 
abandoned. I will argue, nevertheless, that the transition from a more expressive style 
to a reserved realistic detachment is used as a strategy to maximise an imaginative 
engagement with the material from the ballad.  
 
The journey continues interspersed with confrontations between Ingeri and Karin. 
Karin demonstrates more empathy than other characters in asking Ingeri about her 
pregnancy, the first time this is mentioned. Ingeri however is concentrated in her 
hostility and verbally tries to undermine what she sees as Karin’s haughty belief that 
she can escape predatory men. In this way the story relates gender to power and 
violence in the society. The next time they stop, Karin is provoked by Ingeri’s 
assertion that Karin will be sexually attacked. Karin slaps Ingeri across the face, an 
action which contrasts with the massive increase in physical violence, directed at 
Karin later.  
 
When the women arrive at the house of a one-eyed man various elements evoke an 
imaginative reading of the situation including the sudden appearance of a crow, in 
close-up, beak open screaming to the camera. This Bergmanesque motif (a crow is 
used in similar fashion in other works such as The Magician) contributes a sinister 
symbolism, incorporated in the narrative development. The forest dweller is 
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introduced looking out at his visitors from his abode daubed in animal skins. 
Following the representation of his point-of-view the man suddenly appears in frame 
taking Karin’s horse. Ingeri looks on as Karin crosses the water and her face, in 
medium close-up, registers extreme anxiety. This appears as a pre-reflective 
embodied state of anxiety, caused by guilt for her appeals to Odin that an evil fate 
should befall Karin. She rushes across the stream. The imagery of water foreshadows 
the final transformation of consciousness achieved through the miracle of the spring.  
Ingeri is still in a very divided state, unable to articulate the danger except through a 
fairytale mode of primitive superstition saying: ‘The forest is so black. I can’t go on.’ 
Karin departs, having arranged for Ingeri to stay with the old man for rest. When he 
asks whether Ingeri is in labour her melodramatic response, ‘No, much worse’ 
suggests a spiritual malaise brought on by her evil wishes directed towards Karin. 
From Ingeri’s visual perspective, we see Karin receding into the striped shadows and 
sunlight in the forest whilst the space she occupied is filled by bright light. 
 
Having accepted the man’s offer of assistance Ingeri finds herself in the strange 
space of his abode sitting on a throne like chair with water streaming in the 
background and a water gate in the foreground. Her expression returns to an 
awareness of metaphysical horror. The man talks to Ingeri now as if he has godlike 
power:’ I hear what mankind whispers in secret and I see what it believes no one can 
hear.’ He seems to offer the pact with evil that she desired from Odin. Ingeri’s look 
off-screen echoes her appeal to Odin in the first scene. She wonders about the off-
screen sound of thunder and the man tells her that it is ‘the sound of three dead men 
riding north.’ Rather than maintaining a narrative distance the film-making includes 
subjectivity because the sound of hooves is heard alluding both to metaphysical 
presence and Ingeri’s subjective state of belief in these evil powers.58 The man now 
appears far more sinister with his collection of strange objects including human and 
animal body parts. These, it seems, will be used for a primitive abortive operation on 
Ingeri or to cast a pagan spell. She is suddenly gripped by fear as he starts to hold 
her, and expresses her anxiety that he has made a human sacrifice for Odin, the very 
event that she appears to have called for. 
 
The theme of Odin’s power shows again the grip on Ingeri’s imagination of a 
powerful authority figure, now embodied by this man. For Klein, the paranoid-
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schizoid position involves such fierce attacks on the body in imagination that it is 
split into parts. Thus, through her apprehension of a human sacrifice Ingeri becomes 
more conscious of destructive power. The concept of projective identification is 
relevant because in this scene we see how the individual casts his/her apprehension 
of evil on to the ‘other’. The man appeals to Ingeri that they have long known each 
other. This expression of intimacy is like the action of a cult follower, but also 
conveys the idea that in their shared worship of Odin, the man and Ingeri are no 
longer independent people. Ingeri’s resources for expelling this invasion are 
stretched. There appears to be no resource of goodness for her to counter-pose to this 
fate. For Klein, anxiety is inevitable in the struggle to overcome an obsessive 
consciousness of being invaded by evil, and this is manifest as Ingeri breaks free. 
The film-makers clearly focus on the issue of gender here since the man’s actions 
convey the theme of violence against the female body. The fact that this theme does 
not become puritanical is because we are being presented with a process in which 
sexuality is not represented as dangerous, but instead its control by male violence is 
focussed on. The lack of puritanism is evident in the focus on Ingeri herself, her 
sensuous appearance and her emotional actions. The way this scene edges beyond 
dramatic verisimilitude towards a more surprising representation is confirmed when 
Ingeri escapes, and the drama is presented in a confusing manner such that the man’s 
face is suddenly in the foreground nearby, but passive like a totemic mask. As Ingeri 
rushes to reach Karin anticipation of tragedy is developed. Ingeri rushes after her 
foster sister, oblivious of the threat to her own child as she crashes through an area of 
woodland, thick with small plants and trees. From this we gain a greater sense of 
panic about the tragedy that will happen.           
 
The murder of Karin  
In the critical response of the Swedish newspaper editor, Olof Lagercrantz, to The 
Virgin Spring, there was an anxiety that the film-makers were substituting 
sensationalism for art.59 From a Kleinian perspective, however this scene is an 
integral element of the film’s representation, which implicates Ingeri and, if the 
interpretation is stretched further, the father and mother in the understanding of the 
crime. By refusing to fully deconstruct Ingeri’s paganism the film makes the 
psychological context of the crime more complex. Ingeri’s envy sits alongside the 
violence, lust and material craving of the goat herders. For Kleinian art theory, it is 
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vital that art becomes more serious than play, even though the latter already contains 
the key ingredients of artistic creativity.60 Thus, the crime juxtaposes Karin’s playful 
naivety with the violent instincts of the goat herders, and the artwork forces us to 
think beyond the confines of wishful subjectivity. Perception is reasserted as the 
apprehension of material reality which imagination failed to grasp. Karin and her 
parents in the trance of their religious subjectivity failed to anticipate the dangers of 
her journey. We will see how the camerawork draws on a realist aesthetic of long 
take, long shot, and static camera position to create a detachment, which allows the 
viewer to reflect on the deadly situation that leads to Karin’s death. 
 
At the same time, the focus on intentionality is crucial for the morality of the scene. 
Whilst we can see that the goat herders are poor and live outside the benefits of 
society, as represented by Töre’s establishment; the preoccupation with their actions 
and the intent behind them means that Bergman and Isaksson appear to share Sartre’s 
conviction that, despite contextual factors, humans are always, at a certain level, 
responsible for their actions. As Sartre puts it: ‘Man is nothing else but that which he 
makes of himself. That is the first principle of existentialism.’61 On the first page of 
this document Sartre explicitly contrasts his viewpoint with the naturalism of Emile 
Zola because he argues that an existentialist novel, unlike a naturalistic one, will 
confront the viewer with the responsibility of individual actions. 
 
The goat herders are initially seen in the background of a shot. Immediately they are 
defined by their perception of Karin passing in the distance. One of the brothers runs 
forward into medium close-up, so that as we perceive his face in closer detail the 
intensity of his gaze towards Karin is registered. When he moves forward and out of 
shot, the other two goat herders come to occupy the position he just held, reinforcing 
the idea of the look and their vantage point as a dramatic action in-itself. The shot 
which follows shows Karin in profile on her horse reposing as the sun falls on her 
face. Her state of rest rhymes with the brothers’ fixed viewing positions in the quality 
of stasis, but no other shots are offered to contextualise the spatial relationship 
contributing to the enigma of how the brothers will advance. Here, Bergman’s style 
draws on key components of cinematic form established during the silent era. 
Follower and followed is one of the most formulaic narrative structures, which was 
dynamically used through the development, in the silent era, of rhythmical cross 
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cutting and used ever since. In this case, dramatic involvement is developed using 
this technique, but there is close attention to the locale which contrasts with the 
theatrical-like interiors, seen at other points in the film, such as the one eyed man’s 
house from which Ingeri escaped. The goat herders creep up on Karin using their 
knowledge of the forest terrain. We see them look down again from high above as 
she passes below a hill. The camera position replicates the high angle but is 
significantly detached from their visual perspective. Here, alignment is not confused 
with affiliation. Condensation of the action means that suddenly the goat herders 
appear, passing Karin from the opposite direction rather than creeping up from 
behind. Thus, they give the appearance of meeting her accidentally. The moving 
camera, which alternates between her perspective and theirs, serves to create the 
irony that she is the one who stops, tricked into believing that they are innocent 
passers-by. In this way we are made more aware of their devious intentionality. 
 
Despite the emphasis on intentionality the dialogue contributes a symbolic layer of 
meaning, which complicates the focus on materialistic forces of aggression and lust 
with reference to family relations. When Karin’s attention is caught by the goat 
herder’s instrument, one of them explains that it belonged to his father, adding: ‘who 
got it from his father’s father.’ The goat herder exploits Karin’s pity for them and she 
becomes more maternal, wondering about who cares for them. The theme of sharing 
food is also reminiscent of the family picnic in The Seventh Seal, where death haunts 
the idyll. Klein’s concern with the way the baby’s nourishment is invaded by psychic 
conflict parallels Bergman’s awareness of how the basic need for food is transformed 
by powerful forces that overcome the symbolic meaning of food as spiritual 
nourishment. The brother without a tongue seems to inspire Karin’s maternal 
instincts, in particular, but this also brings to the fore Bergman’s fascination with the 
range of meanings that can lie behind non-verbal communication.  
 
Karin is still lost in a fairytale-like reverie, in which she jovially regales the brothers 
with exaggerated stories of her father’s wealth and her family status. The air of 
menace is introduced very suddenly so that it appears to break completely with this 
discourse. Karin innocently tells the brothers that they might be under the spell of a 
witch. There is a cut to Ingeri who looks on from a distant vantage point, her eyes 
expressing her intensity. As if her spell is enacted, suddenly medium close-ups of the 
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goat herders looking intently towards Karin register their malign intent. The 
abruptness of the juxtaposition with Karin’s discourse of privilege demonstrates that 
her fanciful words mean nothing in this situation and, yet also, it is as if the brothers 
are setting out to attack and destroy this privileged princess, reiterating the theme of 
Ingeri’s envy. 
 
The goat herders are not obedient to any rule or law. In this, the film convincingly 
represents medieval savagery. Further meaning is added through the folkloric 
dialogue. Again, the magic number three is present as the fair-haired articulate goat 
herder translates three questions to Karin from the black-bearded, tongue-less goat 
herder. The sinister double meaning of the sexualised address to ‘her lady’ suggests 
that the goat herders’ attack is accompanied by a consciousness of inverting Karin’s 
princess-like status. In the manner referred to in Klein’s analysis of Iago, there is a 
desire on the part of the villain to spoil the beauty they perceive. Thus, in effect, 
there is the suggestion of an attack on the dominant social order from these violent 
outsiders, including Ingeri whose intentions are ambivalently directed towards 
eliciting the murderous action. The psychoanalytic theory of violence as developed 
by Freud and Klein is also relevant here because of its insistence on understanding 
the relation between aggression and libido. Klein follows Freud and argues that 
sadism is a fusion of the life and death instincts.62 The goat herders are driven by 
specific materialistic aims, but also the nature of the crime is made more shocking 
because of the combination of sexual assault and murder. The deadly fusion of 
different instincts is made manifest because they all attack her together. This is a re-
working of the medieval ballad, which did not concentrate on the rape. Perhaps, 
Isaksson and Bergman cannot help but intimate psychoanalytic exploration of the 
relation between crime and desire and, as Donner suggests, they sought to shock a 
contemporary audience into reflection on the problem of evil.  
 
A criticism of the film when it was released was that the aestheticisation of this scene 
was particularly problematic.63 However, close attention to the role of the virtually 
silent soundtrack, the use of cross cutting, carefully chosen mise-en-scene, 
camerawork and cinematography are vital here. Analysis of these stylistic elements 
shows how the film-makers’ intention is to engage the imagination whilst depicting 
the viciousness of the attack in a realistic fashion. The medium close-ups reveal the 
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changes in expression of the goat herders which alarm Karin, who loses her playful 
spirit. She asks the youngest goat herder to cut the bread returning to the innocence 
associated with food. The blackbearded goat herder picks up the knife suggesting 
that the crime is imminent, an action which Karin sees with rising anxiety. At this 
point the youngest goat herder drops the bread and the toad leaps out. The alternation 
of shots shows the toad gleaming and alive, with Ingeri advancing to look on from a 
closer position, and each of the goat herders looking on at Karin and the toad. This 
alternation returns the emphasis to the evil symbol. The act of looking contrasts with 
the physical struggle that ensues. Thus, the sense of revulsion encapsulated by the 
toad’s sudden appearance sets the mood for the crime. But this symbolic creature 
also complicates the message. Whilst the signs are that the crime is driven by 
material instincts, the symbolic level is also explicit. All are transfixed by the toad so 
that it can be understood as a catalyst for the crime as Ingeri intended. 
Psychoanalytically, we can understand her insertion of the toad in the bread as 
representing a poisonous invasion which catalyses the destructiveness of the attack 
on Karin’s body. When Karin attempts to leave, the fair-haired goat herder takes 
control of her horse and, as she moves in the other direction, the black bearded goat 
herder blocks her route. As she tries to escape through the branches of a fallen tree 
all the brothers jump on her. 
 
The sexual assault by the brothers is shown in a number of medium long shots with 
some variation of angle motivated by the action. Nothing can be heard apart from the 
sound of the struggle. When the youngest is cast off he immediately tries to return, 
but stops transfixed by the sight in front of him. Shadow is cast on his face as his 
look is juxtaposed with the struggle and another shot that shows Ingeri, now 
traumatised. The rural setting remains an important pictorial element, a backcloth for 
the horrific crime. The mise-en-scene of rural tranquility provides a detachment from 
the crime, in contrast to Ingeri’s face, which expresses her traumatic involvement. 
The stone, that she seems to eat while watching, signifies her desire to attack the goat 
herders but this is arrested by her traumatic fascination with the spectacle. When she 
drops the stone, her face expresses abject resignation, a realisation that Karin’s status 
as the sacred virgin has been destroyed. Thus, the shots showing Ingeri, and the boy 
looking, mark the beginning of remorse, and a pattern of reparation, in which 
expression and actions reveal guilt felt by these protagonists, and their imaginative 
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sympathy for the victim. This illustrates how reparation goes beyond individual 
awareness of culpability, and re-orientates the individual to a social reality.   
 
Aware of how the film was criticised by some for its sensationalism, Donner defends 
Bergman’s impassive use of the camera as a response to the original detached tone of 
the ballad. At the same time, Donner argues, in effect, that this is film-making which 
carries the Bazinian ideals of neo-realism forward because a detached camera style 
and observation of social reality is infused with a more subjective individualistic 
sensibility.64  This focus on subjectve experience ultimately gravitates towards 
despair through the characters of Ingeri and the boy. However, before this the final 
stages of the assault involve imaginative use of naturalistic light, and it is notable that 
the final blow is heard but not seen. At the same time we see the economic 
motivation behind the crime as Karin’s body is ransacked. 
 
The talking goat herder threatens the boy that he must guard the goats while the elder 
ones leave the scene. Unexpectedly,a shot up to the sky reveals snow falling, which 
is related but not aligned to the boy’s point-of-view as we see him look up in the 
following shot. Thus, a shift in mood is orchestrated through mise-en-scene, 
representing a sudden change in the environment. Klein’s account of internal pain, as 
something the subject will feel compelled to expel, explains how the boy’s emotional 
state is manifested through nausea. The camerawork accentuates the focus on the 
boy’s reaction, showing in extreme close-up his face turn towards the body that lies 
on the other side of the tree. This turn echoes the final turn of Karin’s head. Memory, 
a key part of subjectivity in other Bergman works and closely related to the 
imagination, starts to play a vital role in the boy’s response to his surroundings. The 
deathly quiet throughout the scene focuses attention on the boy’s reaction and the 
idea of an internal response, which leads him to throw some handfuls of earth over 
the body. Young observes how the sudden and unexpected introduction of light 
snowfall at this point represents ‘a few flakes of benediction’65 
 
This is a striking moment of attempted reparation but whether there is a sign of 
divine intervention remains ambiguous. For Sartre, authentic self-realisation involves 
loss, which he describes using the concept of abandonment, a recognition of our 
isolation from the guidance of others.66 This is relevant because the boy is thrown 
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back on to his own resources. The sense of being, detached now from the guidance of 
external causes, parallels the Kleinian concept of an imaginative reach beyond the 
struggle for domination to a more empathic understanding of external reality. The 
snow falling introduces the idea of the external reality’s existence independent of 
human subjectivity, but this enhances the boy’s loneliness. Bergman and Isaksson 
might be happy for this experience to be understood in a more religious fashion as a 
foreshadowing of the miraculous appearance of the spring at the end of the film, but 
the scene also expresses how the boy embodies the existential isolation, which for 
Sartre is the starting point of authentic self-realisation.  
 
The most explicit continuity is now conveyed through the representation of the boy’s 
inner experience. Gaps in the narration leave this open for the spectator to respond 
to, rather than focussing precisely on cause and effect development. Therefore, 
despite the threat to the boy by his elder brother that he must stay with the goats, he 
is more moved by his dread of the body and runs away. Existential dread overcomes 
temporarily a command from the super-ego. The outcome of this is elided and 
suddenly in, dreamlike fashion, the three goat herders are at the gate of Töre’s 
establishment. The focus on the boy during this section of the film contrasts with the 
representation of his brothers. From a Kleinian viewpoint, the two elder goat herders 
have been possessed by destructiveness to such a degree it is as if they have lost all 
their subjectivity. They are still driven by a symbolic understanding because they 
have the motivation to travel, carrying their new material possessions, but this is just 
a mechanical operation dictated by the savage reality that appears to dictate their 
actions. Although they appear to be free of the moral dictates of the super-ego, in 
fact, their actions externalise their experience of a savage world. This logic is 
pursued by the film through the depiction of Töre’s revenge.      
 
The meeting at Töre’s gate contains elements of realism in the way the relationship 
between a medieval farmer and the outsiders is represented as one controlled by 
power. Töre’s character demonstrates authority and leniency but the over-riding 
impact is symbolic. The murderers are immediately facing the patriarch, a set up 
which demonstrates how this film differs from a more conventional adventure action 
drama. Throughout Freud and Klein’s writing we know there is a very distinctive 
awareness of pressure within the family structure. This psychoanalytic preoccupation 
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is present, at least in a varied form, in this narrative. Instead of a quest by Töre to 
find his daughter, a second journey in the narrative, there is instead a compression so 
that now the goat herders, strangely unaware that they are at Karin’s home, occupy a 
place rather like being children to Töre and Märeta. 
 
The ambiguous signification of the goat herders as sons/outsiders parallels the trials 
and confusion for subjectivity that Klein and Sartre chart in their focus on processes 
of internalisation and externalisation. The focus on the boy’s inner world emerges 
most strongly because of the simple directness of the film-making. Mise-en-scene 
conveys the memory of the crime, whilst the parents are clearly unsuspecting of 
these three guests. For example, the mother sits knitting from a large bundle of 
material that resembles her daughter’s hair, a prop inspired by the ballad. When the 
storyteller suddenly narrates the story of the May Queen who did not return, the 
boy’s head turns nervously to his brother. Töre’s return into the room and the 
mother’s inquiring glance convey simply, through facial expression, Karin’s 
continued absence. When the goat herders are invited to the supper table the image 
repeats the earlier meal in its evocation of the Last Supper.  Now, Ingeri is not 
present but Judas like guilt is manifested through the boy’s anxiety. To the words of 
the prayer he moves nervously recognising perhaps the prayer spoken by Karin. The 
boy’s nervousness is kept in check, as he is gripped by the black bearded goat herder. 
Bergman’s preoccupation with close-ups of the face is central to the representation. 
Unlike the earlier supper scene this one involves point-of-view shots, dominated by 
the perspective of the young goat herder. The boy looks at the mother, father and 
Frida, and their expressions reinforce his sense of foreboding. They are like 
tyrannical super-ego figures to him, but he has not internalised the savagery of his 
elder brothers, and cannot contain the anxiety evoked by the memory of the meal 
with Karin, and the subsequent crime, which leads to his sickness. At this stage the 
parents have no overt suspicions, as made clear by Märeta’s offer of help to the boy, 
so that the film effectively concentrates on the separation of his emotional trauma, 
whilst building suspense about the point when the parents will realise the goat 
herder’s guilt. 
 
The maternal care for the boy offered initially by Frida accentuates the way he is 
split off from his brothers.67 For Klein, splitting is an inevitable psychic process. The 
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elaboration here of a different mentality from that occupied by the murderers appears 
to be embedded in the boy’s own feeling of shame. Sensing this but not the cause 
Frida offers the simple answer that the Lord is merciful. But this does not end the 
process. The boy’s mind continues to reel with troubled thoughts although a 
contemplative air is co-existent with this anxiety as he gazes up from his bed. As 
Johns Blackwell has noted, the bed is a crucial prop in Bergman’s work.68 It is like a 
platform and used as a pretext to convey a dreamlike elaboration of subjectivity. The 
boy’s gaze-up, like that of Ingeri, and his look at the snow, suggests metaphysical 
presence, a contemplation of the world beyond human action. A specific religious 
interpretation is elaborated as the storytelling beggar looms over the boy, narrating a 
metaphorical account of fear and punishment in hell. Whilst religious, it is striking 
that poetic words are used as the beggar includes similes to convey his philosophy, 
and the boy’s contemplation of these words can be read as a flight of imagination. 
The image of hell is conveyed more as imaginative description than as a strict, 
biblical threat.  
 
Töre and Märeta’s conversation in the next scene alludes to recrimination and past 
traumas. Märeta’s anxiety is expressed through the contorted tension that takes over 
her hands, gripped in prayer. The physicality of Birgitta Vallberg’s acting as Märeta 
continues in the following scenes, which lead to the discovery of the criminals’ guilt. 
She hears a sound off-screen reminding us of Karin’s cry and perhaps, further back 
in the film, the cry of the crow. Suspense is conveyed by the darkness of the passage 
where she passes the storyteller, who conveys that the goat herders are attacking the 
boy. Active maternal concern for the boy remains an essential element even when 
Märeta is on the verge of discovering that her daughter is dead. The intensity of 
emotions is realised slowly using a long take as Märeta touches the blood on the 
boy’s face. Preoccupied with this, apparently wondering whether the same people 
committed violence against her daughter, she walks back. In an attempt to placate her 
anxiety the light-haired goat herder offers the dress. Märeta’s response is marked by 
her downcast eyes, which absorb the true significance of this object. The dress is in 
some ways a peace offering designed to allay the mother’s suspicions of violence. As 
such, however, it is an unsuccessful reparative act. The materialistic nature of this 
offering is marked as Märeta says that her husband will decide a fair price. This links 
the process of economic transaction, which dictates the goat herders’ actions, with 
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the father’s decision to exact vengeance. The film does not seek to explain a social 
system, but it suggests an explicit connection between violence, emotion and 
materialism. Märeta conveys a mixture of feeling as she reveals to her husband the 
evidence. She is concerned for his safety, but this merely marks her desire that his 
actions should be accomplished. The single action of throwing the dress on the bed, 
and telling him about the bloodstains (which we do not see) focuses us on her 
motivation for revenge.    
 
Töre’s revenge 
In this section von Sydow’s acting and the stylistic elements that have been used 
creatively throughout the film are combined to give a masterful representation of the 
intensity with which the father avenges his daughter’s death. Livingston argues 
persuasively that violence in Bergman’s films is ritualistic and the director is 
preoccupied with the parallels between such a ritual and art.69 Although Livingston 
leaves The Virgin Spring out of his account, this scene is a perfect example. Despite 
the suspense, greater attention is paid to the emotional content and the way Töre’s 
ritualistic actions convey a single-minded purpose, a performance that must be 
enacted drawing on an enormity of inner strength as well as physical strength. First, 
Töre confronts Ingeri. Ingeri’s confession is ignored and she is simply instructed to 
assist him in his preparations by getting the knife. Overt symbolism is used as Töre 
wrestles with a single birch tree on top of the mountain. This emphasises his physical 
power and his inner struggle. It also expresses the idea of ritual because in the 
following scene he washes vigorously using the branches of the tree, a meticulous 
preparation, like an actor getting ready for his performance rather than a character 
only driven by the goal of extinguishing his enemies. Throughout the preparations, 
the minimal amount of dialogue means the sound of dawn birdsong, along with the 
faint light of this hour, contributes to the atmosphere. This includes a personal 
element from Bergman who frequently expressed his sense that the early hours have 
a special significance in their capacity for horror (Bergman refers to this time as ‘the 
hour of the wolf’, as will be seen in the next chapter). The scene with the birch tree is 
like the moment when the boy was alone and it snowed. It carries a sense of the 
individual’s isolated existence in the universe/natural world. But it is also important 
that Ingeri is present as the assistant at other moments in the preparation and that 
Märeta is present during the killing. As noted before, Bergman’s films will often 
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show a character preoccupied in a subjective state but witnessed by another.  
Subjectivity involves the experience of estrangement as one registers the look of the 
other, but what occurs in these scenes is not a sense of shame before the other but 
rather a diametrically opposed effect, namely the witness plays a role in confirming 
the individual’s quest because they are emotionally complicit with his sense of 
purpose. 
 
The quietness of the hour contributes suspense. As Töre enters the room where the 
goat herders sleep the sound of the door is isolated and when he steals across the 
room we may contemplate what will happen if they awake. When he reaches the 
other side he simply sits and then plunges his knife loudly into the table. This gesture 
foregrounds not just his confidence but also the ritualistic nature of his actions. A 
quick attack on the goat herders in their sleep is not his desire, but rather the catharsis 
of an execution in which they fully face his wrath. Töre embodies the strength, and 
ferocity, which Ingeri appeared to desire from Odin, and this comparison is 
strengthened because the knife is adorned with a Norse-like handle. As he waits, the 
juxtaposition of conscious intent and dream reality is suggested as the goat herders 
sleep. The struggle when they awake is brief demonstrating Töre’s supremacy. The 
focus on a bodily confrontation is accentuated through close camera shots, which 
then yield overtly symbolic images. The black bearded goat herder is shown after his 
death, face inverted (an image used elsewhere by Bergman).70 The light-haired goat 
herder struggles hard so that both he and Töre are shown in close-up in the flames of 
the fire, an example of how realistic mise-en-scene is combined with a symbolic 
representation to represent hell. When it comes to the boy a different tone is 
expressed. He runs to Märeta, who tries to protect him, but Töre in his fury grabs the 
boy and he is thrown against the wall, a blow which kills him. Töre bends over the 
body and shakes the boy, his face cast in shadow and the boy’s lit. Töre’s look 
switches between the bodies of his victims and his hands, clenching his fists and 
closing his eyes.71 His lips quiver and his face is fixed in a state that suggests some 
disbelief. ‘God have mercy on me’ he says. Märeta runs and kneels over the boy.  
The sense of shame that emerges in this action scene complicates the catharsis of 
Töre’s victory. The skill in the acting and mise-en-scene is not to spell out this 
shame, but instead to signify it as a stirring within Töre that is minimally represented 
through his physical movements and expressions. Equally, the lighting continues to 
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play with the fluidity of a realistic range of shadows and illuminations whilst 
incorporating the suggestion of a moral code of good and evil. When the characters 
emerge outside in the morning light, the catharsis of Töre’s success is undercut by 
the solemnity, and the long shot shows the household in a state of shock. Töre 
continues to be purposeful having insisted that they must search for Karin’s body. 
 
Now the journey is repeated, but this time there is a variation of the elements. For 
instance, again, we see the crow next to the one eyed man’s dwelling, but from a 
different angle. The whole household walks but the use of medium close-ups focuses 
on the state of shock and grief rather than the landscape depicted in the original. The 
dialogue is minimal. Märeta’s speech builds on the earlier allusions to a 
dysfunctional family, traumatised before the death of Karin, saying: ‘ I loved her 
more than God. Then she turned to you and I began to hate you. The guilt is mine.’  
But Töre replies that the guilt is shared. This scene involves the transition to a spirit 
of Christian redemption through a shared sense of shame and Töre’s insistence that 
he will build a church for God on the spot when Karin lies. 
 
The Christian sentiment gives the film a thematic coherence so that the psychological 
strife and the crime are united behind the theme of a desire and hope for a more 
benign authority. However, the expressiveness is focused on physically manifested 
angst. When Ingeri leads the parents to the body they both bend over her outstretched 
body in love contrasting with lust shown by the goat herders in the assault. Töre tears 
himself away to express his dismay to God. This is primarily a physical expression 
focussed on his hands as if to say that the material world is damned without some 
divine intervention. When the spring emerges next to Karin’s head, which is held by 
her parents there is no further dialogue. Close-ups of Töre and Märeta are used to 
convey their awe at this miracle, whilst Ingeri is shown in medium shot receiving the 
flowing water as a cleansing force. Märeta is calmed by the miracle and brings water 
to Karin’s blood stained face. With very little non-diegetic sound in the film, the use 
of music marks this moment as an elevation from the tragic events of the material 
world, and the camerawork is used to depict the response of the household and, from 
an aerial position, their shared reverence for God’s intervention. 
 
This scene involves expressing serious doubts about the power of God. It seems to fit 
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with Bergman’s questioning of the religion with which he grew up. As Töre says to 
God: ‘You saw it. The innocent child’s death and my vengeance. You permitted it. I 
don’t understand you.’ 
 
The commitment to building the church and the introduction of the choral hymn on 
the soundtrack, nevertheless, present a religious resolution. Despite all the emphasis 
on psychological forces and embodied consciousness the conclusion defers to faith 
and metaphysics. This seems to be the clearest reason why Bergman talked 
negatively about his own work, not just saying it was a poor imitation of a Kurosawa 
film but also highlighting the religious element as inadequate with ‘a totally 
unanalyzed idea of God’ and criticising ‘the introduction of a therapeutic idea’:72   
 
the idea of making something out of the old folk-song ‘Herre Töre of Venge’s 
daughter’ was a sound one. But then the jiggery pokerry began - the spiritual 
jiggery-pokery.73 
 
 
This is a fairly damning critique but Bergman does not analyse the complexity of the 
work. Another statement from Bergman, in a different interview, is more useful here 
and somewhat contradicts the above self-criticism: 
 
In The Virgin Spring the welling of the spring was not meant as simply the tidy 
expression of a religious miracle. The spring was the medieval symbol of the 
water of feelings. I didn’t see how it was possible to allow the picture to end 
without the spring, for if the father had merely gone home and there had been a 
great silence, there would have been no release for the feelings of the people of 
the story, nor for those of the audience.74 
 
 
The adoption of the spring motif therefore has various levels. In addition to religious 
sentiment and concern with narrative catharsis Bergman was inspired by the real 
spring located in the churchyard of Karna in Ostergitand. Thus, the film’s response to 
history and myth involves a bricolage of different influences, a point that is even 
more apparent when we consider that, despite longstanding interest in the original 
ballad, ‘The daughter of Töre in Vange’, it was Isaksson who transformed it with the  
script. Given Bergman’s ambivalence about the religious message it is important that 
Isaksson had an established interest in Christian existential themes as well as her 
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focus on women.75 
 
Bergman’s explanation of the spring as an emotional release for the audience is on 
the face of it relatively conventional. The audience required a resolution and an 
uplift. But it is in contrast to a more mainstream cinema that a symbol was selected 
for resolution rather than an extended narrative development/set of actions. This 
allowed concentration on emotion and is in keeping with the repeated use of 
symbolism throughout the film. Moreover, Bergman’s explanation maintains an 
openness in relation to the emotional meaning. Given that this symbol is an answer to 
such traumatic events, the comparison with a Kleinian emphasis on the value of 
symbolism is clear. The Kleinian analyst Segal quotes from the art historian Roger 
Fry to convey the significance of symbolism in art:  
 
I think that form, be it musical, visual, or verbal, can move us so deeply 
because it symbolically embodies an unconscious meaning. In other words, art 
embodies and symbolises and evokes in the recipient a certain kind of archaic 
emotion of a preverbal kind.76 
 
A psychoanalytic theory of the unconscious allows the symbol to be understood as 
something without a prescribed meaning. Kleinianism more than Freudianism 
focuses on infantile emotions and, thus, for Segal symbolism is not just about wish 
fulfilment, but expresses conflict involving even more primitive emotions. While the 
spring may seem to play the role of wish fulfilment, such a view ignores the fact that 
this miracle fails to remedy the damage and trauma represented by Karin’s death. It 
does not have this efficacy and may leave the spectator with questions: why is God 
manifested now and not earlier? Is God in some way ever present but detached from 
causality? This element of ambiguity differentiates the integration in this text from 
one that just provides a happy resolution. The desire to raise questions remains 
important for both Bergman and Isaksson. 
 
A further understanding of the role played by this symbol can be developed drawing 
on Sartre’s theory of the imagination. As Andreas Elpidorou argues, Sartre made it 
clear that abstraction can serve to bring forward an emotional response.77 For Sartre, 
the spectator does not just respond at the cognitive level, but the derealizing action of 
the imagination is given content through an emotional response. On this reading one 
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can see that, for Sartre, abstraction may heighten the emotional force of an artwork 
or allow the expression of emotion alongside other types of content. This provides an 
insight into the emotional force of the symbol because not only does it have 
relevance to religious imagery and knowledge, but also could allow, in the intimation 
of infinity, a free projection of emotion into the space vacated. The style and content 
aims to provoke an imaginative response from the audience. The film raises 
questions about society, including the role of primitive emotions, and the causes of 
violence. These questions, alongside belief in the power of art show that, as 
Bergman’s work advanced towards the 1960s, it continued to share ideas with Klein 
and Sartre. Although Bergman continues to experiment with a range of styles 
through the 1960s, by the time we reach Persona and Hour of the Wolf, a more 
experimental approach emerges. I will turn now to the latter film, which relies more 
intensely than The Virgin Spring on enigmatic symbolism.   
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6     The destruction of the artist: Hour of the Wolf 
 
Hour of the Wolf (1967) started as a project for Bergman three years before its 
eventual completion. It is unusual for a Bergman film to take so long, but the 
director’s health problems, and then the inspiration to make Persona, were 
responsible for the delay.1 Bergman also made clear that the personal nature of the 
story led to complications in the production including the decision to edit out much 
of the opening prologue.2 The original title, The Cannibals, is instructive of 
Bergman’s intent in representing an artist surrounded by an aristocratic entourage 
who effectively devour him, and the way damage is enacted by malign elements that 
possess the artist’s imagination and eat away at his sense of identity. The story 
begins in digressive fashion with a figure, that we may suppose is the director, 
recalling how he received the diary of Johan Borg, an artist who disappeared, from 
his wife Alma. This is fictitious3 although it obliquely refers to autobiographical 
elements in the film, including the pregnancy of Liv Ullmann who plays Alma (with 
Bergman’s child). The story goes on to tell through a range of flashbacks how the 
artist Johan Borg (played by Max von Sydow) disappeared on the island of Baltrum. 
I will provide a detailed analysis of the film, but before this I will look at reasons 
why this work in particular justifies psychoanalytical and philosophical analysis. 
 
Critical responses 
In the previous chapter we saw Bergman’s preoccupation with the emotions of 
shame and guilt. It is thought by various commentators that these are even more 
extreme in their ferocity in Hour of the Wolf. For instance, Cowie comments on the 
finale of the film: ‘Forced back into insecurity, the Bergman artist figure finds 
himself assailed by waves of humiliation, guilt and shame.’4 Cowie argues that Max 
von Sydow is used ‘as Bergman’s alter ego, the artist as fugitive….In Hour of the 
Wolf  he is a painter,  Johan Borg. In Shame, a violinist’.5 
 
We can also reach back further in to Bergman’s career for affiliations. For instance, 
John Simon notes the way this is a film about the artist and madness, thus positioning 
it alongside such Bergman works as Prison.6 These groupings revolve around 
Bergman’s authorship, and yet at one level Hour of the Wolf signals a sense of crisis 
around this whole concept with its story of the self-destructive artist unable to 
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maintain a relationship with reality. After the doubts directed towards Bergman’s 
allegorical style at the end of the 1950s, the director had regained favour from 
Cahiers du Cinéma through Persona in particular.7 This was partly because, like the 
journal itself, he appeared to be calling into question an uncritical humanism. The 
humanistic expressionism and symbolism of films like The Seventh Seal was 
challenged with a pared-down critical challenge to metaphysics in his trilogy of films 
in the early 1960s, Through a Glass Darkly, Winter Light and The Silence. This trend 
can be seen continuing with Persona, where psychological complexity calls into 
question easy humanistic assumptions about character and narrative meaning. Formal 
experimentation at the expense of narrative accessibility appears to be maintained 
with Hour of the Wolf. The Cahiers critic Jean-Louis Comolli was most impressed, 
not by the range of expressive devices in the film, but instead by the way a kind of 
sleepwalking authorship evolves, allowing the film to achieve its true destiny as 
dream, through the submersion of individual agency. He wrote: 
 
The film unfolds like a dream in progress, ‘in-itself’ a kind of dream, resisting 
predetermined course, switching direction at will. Which gives credence to the 
idea of the film as an independent object, freed, at last from the constraints of 
narrative and form which, powerlessly, its ‘author’ would wish to impose on it: 
the film as living organism, a fabrication, of course, but also something which 
in a sense fabricates itself.8 
 
Intriguingly, British critics were very appreciative of Hour of the Wolf for its visual 
flair and imagination.9 However, looking more widely at the film’s reception shows 
that Bergman was equally being taken to task for over bearing authorship. Critics in a 
number of countries echoed the earlier concern of Cahiers in relation to The Virgin 
Spring and his heavily symbolic works that Bergman was narcissistic, indulging in 
melancholic reflections on his role as an artist.10  
 
While the film has been predominantly read as both a representation of artistic 
process and as Bergman’s exploration of personal issues, Bergman himself offers an 
enigmatic assessment of the artist: 
 
What Johan Borg wanted to say was that he is faced with a ‘must’; an unending 
torment, toothache. He can’t escape it. There’s no question of a gift from on 
high. No otherworldly relationship. It’s just here.  Disease. A perversion. A 
five legged calf. He takes a very brutal view of the situation.11 
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Some commentators respond to the way this is conveyed in the text as an expression 
of nihilism. For Wood, Johan’s demons represent a negative version of artistic 
creativity and not its true realisation. ‘The point is made quite unequivocally that the 
demons are inimical to artistic creation - their emergence in the first stretches of the 
film corresponds to a decline in Johan’s art.’12 Thus, the film, for Wood, has a 
message about a negative psychological experience but is not offering this as a full 
account of what art involves. Livingston goes further in stressing the expression of 
nihilism. For Livingston, Hour of the Wolf is a grotesque displacement of The Magic 
Flute narrative, a nihilistic reversal of the latter’s expression of the power of art. A 
more positive evaluation is produced, however, through the expansive process of 
relating Hour of the Wolf to other texts, and contexts. Thus, even Livingston feels 
that this morbid account of the artist gains in value when we compare it with the 
superior narrative of The Magic Flute, including Bergman’s 1975 film production of 
the opera.  As both Wood and Livingston stress, The Magic Flute is made a part of 
Hour of the Wolf itself with the puppet production of Wolfgang Mozart’s opera. 
Livingston states that Hour of the Wolf: ‘like all of Bergman’s negative moments, 
must be perceived in a larger context.’13 Wood identifies Alma as representing 
Pamina and thus a representative of wholeness for the struggling artist 
Johan/Tamino, but recognises that Johan is diverted towards destruction.14  
  
A horror film with psychoanalytical themes 
Hubner suggests that Hour of the Wolf lends itself to psychoanalytical interpretation 
more than other Bergman works.15 She discusses the relevance of psychoanalysis to 
horror: 
 
Psychoanalytical discourse is common to both horror movies and dreams. In 
reading meaning from both, film critics, directors and audiences have looked to 
the unconscious, suggesting that dreams and horror films can be read as the 
return of the repressed. Alter egos, split personalities, monsters and 
werewolves have been read as creatures of the Freudian ‘id’…16 
 
One way Hubner develops this is through reference to sexuality: ‘Hour of the Wolf 
draws on the werewolf tradition of fission and conflict, traditionally associated with 
notions of confused sexuality.’17 The departure from realism becomes more forceful, 
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when eventually Johan is surrounded by a community of unreal characters in the 
castle of Baron von Merkens. They are like a collection from the horror genre, 
carrying some of the names from The Tales of Hoffmann, a favourite for Bergman.18 
The indication of horror-like excess, through elements that suggest vampirism, and 
the dual identity of man and wolf (the title), make the case for a focus on 
unconscious and sublimated material for an understanding of this film more 
compelling. As Wood observes: ‘What is surprising is Bergman’s use of the 
traditions of the American horror film, from Whale and Browning to Hitchcock.’19 
Supernatural images proliferate, as the story reaches its climax, including a moment, 
where the baron walks up the wall, like a fly, and another moment where a woman 
removes her face and drops her eyeball in a glass. Hubner, like Wood, recognises the 
creativity involved in the bricolage of horror references.  
 
In this chapter I want to argue that the horror conventions are used to represent a 
merger between the artist’s imagination and his oppression by a group of aristocrats. 
The imagery of Johan’s tormentors as vampire-like creatures adds to the sense of 
alienation, which is shown through the application of Kleinian and Sartrean 
perspectives. In the previous chapters we considered films with a marked tension 
between the subjectivity of the characters and external reality. In Hour of the Wolf it 
is as if the unreality of Johan’s world takes over. This threatens any sense of 
integration, that for Klein depends on a closer relationship between phantasy and 
reality. Discussing how emotional development involves a modification of the 
process of splitting, Klein writes: ‘as the adaptation to the external world increases, 
this splitting is carried out on planes which gradually become increasingly nearer and 
nearer to reality. This goes on until love for the real and internalized objects and trust 
in them are well established.’20 As we have seen, Sartrean theory also calls for 
recognition of the gulf between consciousness and reality such that pathological 
imagination is a failure to fully understand this division. These theories are relevant 
to the depiction of Johan’s alienation because through the film we see him become 
swallowed up in an unreal world. Thus, Bergman uses the conventions of horror to 
represent a loss of reality for the main protagonist. At the same time, reality is 
referred to because the eerie figures, who take over Johan’s mind, dominate the 
artist. For Bergman this is a real issue. Throughout his career he received good 
support from the Swedish film industry but he also had to struggle with the logic of a 
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capitalist market. For instance, The Seventh Seal was only made after the critical 
success of Smiles of a Summer Night.21 
 
Sartrean and Kleinian ideas also help with an understanding of Alma’s role in the 
film. Johan’s wife represents a reparative philosophy and an authentic project distinct 
from Johan’s fatal flaws as she tries to help and understand his situation. Much of the 
film reveals that, while he is oppressed by a grotesque elite, she is victimised in their 
relationship. At the same time she achieves greater detachment than Johan and is not 
engulfed by the hallucinatory world he falls into. For Gado, who writes from a 
Freudian perspective, all of the supernatural happenings in the story are an 
‘embarrassment’, lacking dramatic purpose and only designed to express some 
elements of Bergman’s psychological turmoil.22 Gado reads the film as a 
supernatural nightmare from start to finish, but this underplays the internal tension 
between narrative coherence and a dreamlike logic that resists explanation. Many 
critics, including Gado, recognise that Alma represents a counterpoint and alternative 
values to the world of nightmare that envelops Johan, but not sufficient attention is 
given to her prominence as a narrator and as a spectator. The film presents a 
degenerative spectacle as Johan visits the castle, having apparently shot his wife, but 
this episode is framed by a focus on Alma as an empathic presence and, furthermore,. 
this passage is not the only example of a strikingly framed episode in the film as a 
whole. The whole film presents labyrinthine shifts in the sense of reality, which 
creates the potential for a creative exploration of alienation.   
 
Livingston argues that we can trace a significant influence on Bergman’s work in 
general from Eino Kaila, a Finnish philosopher and opposes this to the tendency to 
discuss Bergman’s work vaguely in relation to existentialism.23 Livingston draws 
many interesting parallels between Kaila’s ideas and Bergman’s work, including the 
psychological consequences of corporal punishment on a child (we will see how 
important this is in the film), but it can be noted at the outset that some of these ideas 
overlap with those of other thinkers. Of particular interest for this thesis is the idea 
that Bergman shares Kaila’s interests in magical thinking and the way individuals are 
driven by irrational motivations. These are both explicit themes in the early work of 
Sartre.  For example, Sartre conveys the obsessive dynamic of emotion with 
reference to ‘magical thinking’. He writes: 
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... when consciousness is living the magical world into which it has 
precipitated itself, it tends to perpetuate the world, by which it is captivated: 
the emotion tends to perpetuate itself.24 
 
This focus on magical thinking in A Sketch for a Theory of the Emotions describes an 
irrational world, which Johan appears to perpetuate. This is like the example of 
emotions, which feed on themselves, provided by Sartre’s account of The Imaginary. 
Relating Bergman to a more general philosophical background than the influence of 
Kaila is necessary. As argued in Chapter 1, Bergman, Klein and Sartre share an 
enduring conception of the individual and the role of imagination. While this 
conception is pushed to the limit of comprehensibility in Hour of the Wolf, there is 
not a total collapse but instead an expression of how the individual’s imaginary 
world is inevitably permeated by social reality. In order to understand how Bergman 
maintains an awareness of social power we must look in detail at the film’s style and 
content. 
 
The atmosphere of total breakdown in the film is signalled through enigmatic details 
that derail a coherent sense of time and space culminating in the ambiguity of 
Johan’s disappearance: he appears to have vanished into the environment. However, 
Bergman keeps alive a coherent conception of a world in which experience accords 
with our concepts through the character of Alma. As the narrator, Alma is able to 
offer an explanation of what happens that does not fundamentally challenge our 
conception of empirical reality. Fundamental to the coherence of her explanation are 
concepts of time and space. The whole story is her flashback and her articulation 
emphasises key points that give the temporal and spatial quality of the story some 
plausibility even if they do not fully restore convincing realism to the narrative. 
Despite her common sense Alma is also affected by Johan’s psychic breakdown and 
disappearance, but this is dialectically incorporated in her position as someone who 
witnesses and empathises with her husband’s problems. Through Alma we 
experience the relationship between the real and imaginary.  
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The power and dangers of imagination 
By drawing on Klein and Sartre, and the films analysed so far in this thesis, we see 
that Bergman’s work does not evoke a strict opposition between artistic freedom, on 
the one hand, and a preoccupation with external structures, on the other. Consistent 
with this balance Hour of the Wolf represents the power and dangers of imagination. 
Kleinian and Sartrean theories share ideas in common with an article about 
Bergman’s work which relates Hour of the Wolf to two more Bergman films, From 
Life of the Marionettes (1980) and The Devil’s Wanton (Prison). In this article 
Marsha Kinder argues that Bergman is reworking a recurring nightmare from his 
childhood. The nightmare is a condensation of the classic fairytale structure of Little 
Red Riding Hood and mythologies of the werewolf. Kinder suggests: 
 
These two myths are reverse sides of the same cannibalistic fear - of devouring 
the mother, or being devoured by her gaping red mouth. That’s why Bergman’s 
murderous nightmares always evoke the relationship between parent and 
child.25 
 
According to Kinder the film is not determined by these folkloric structures, but 
remarkable for the way Bergman produces an aesthetic that provides existential 
challenges to the audience, involving them in his ‘hallucination’. She talks about 
how Bergman ‘shifts from coded surrealistic visuals to a richer phenomenological 
experience of the dream.’26 Klein’s account of a surging psychotic oscillation in the 
consciousness of the infant between being devoured and devouring, or attacked and 
attacking, compares with the reference to these early horror tales and also mythology 
about vampires. Klein refers herself to these stories in her account of the destructive 
impact of the super-ego: 
 
...in the small child we come across a super-ego of the most incredible and 
phantastic character. And the younger the child is, or the deeper the mental 
level we penetrate to, the more this is the case. We get to look upon the child’s 
fear of being devoured, or cut up, or torn to pieces, or its terror of being 
surrounded and pursued by menacing figures, as a regular component of its 
mental life; and we know that the man-eating wolf, the fire-spewing dragon, 
and all the evil monsters out of myths and fairy-stories flourish and exert their 
unconscious influence in the phantasy of each individual child, and it feels 
itself persecuted and threatened by those evil shapes.…I have no doubt from 
my analytic observations that the real objects behind those imaginary, 
terrifying figures are the child’s own parents.27 
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For Klein, this means that all real objects encountered by the child, including people, 
are potentially transformed by a super-ego detached from reality. Klein shows how 
this dynamic takes over the individual. The film’s account of the artist’s self-torment 
can be thought of as a self possessed by demons in a way that compares to Klein’s 
account of how the self may be attacked from within by bad objects. Klein’s 
principal focus is on anxiety more than desire, and for much of the film this appears 
to be what eats at Johan Borg. Like other psychoanalytical interpretations of the 
work, Klein’s account suggests that Bergman is not just narcissistic, preoccupied 
with his own demons, but attempting to express an experience, which has cultural 
and social dimensions. Kristeva makes clear in her account of Klein, that the 
individual’s struggle with anxiety is life long, and thus desire becomes inevitably 
caught up in the search to alleviate anxiety. As Kristeva clarifies, for Klein it is when 
the death drive takes over that we become disassociated from pleasure, and, from the 
life drive.28 
 
In the interview about Hour of the Wolf Bergman refuses to pin down the 
psychoanalytical message but he does refer to Sartre: 
 
Sartre has said how inhibited he used to be as an artist and author, how he 
suffered because what he was doing wasn’t good enough. By a slow 
intellectual process he came to realize that his anxieties about not making 
anything of value were an atavistic relic from the religious notion that 
something exists which can be called the Supreme Good, or that anything is 
perfect.29 
 
Bergman then goes on to make a comparison with his own work: ‘When my top-
heavy religious superstructure collapsed I lost my inhibitions as a writer.’30 Sartrean 
theory provides a philosophical overview, which nonetheless maintains the role of 
contingency and individualism. The phenomenological method involves recognising 
the experiential qualities of the text rather than subsuming them under determining 
categories. This is why Sartre’s ideas are compatible with Kinder’s argument that in 
Hour of the Wolf Bergman ‘moves his audience from external observation and 
analysis of the events to a fuller participation inside the hallucination.’31 Sartrean 
theory can be used to explain how subjectivity is evoked whilst attending to the 
disintegration of Johan’s consciousness. 
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Sartre pulled back from dismantling individual identity completely, and maintained a 
degree of essentialism in Transcendance of the Ego and Being and Nothingness, with 
an idea of subjectivity alongside a transcendental philosophy of freedom.32 Sartre’s 
anti-naturalism is also relevant to Bergman because it leads to an appreciation of how 
the self may be thought of outside common sense and the boundaries of empirical 
science. Bergman declines a common sense or straightforwardly 
scientific/psychological explanation for Johan’s downfall. We recognise that the 
latter is a deeply flawed character, but the impossibility of substantive identification 
with him means that the film is more concerned with reflection on the conditions of 
his malaise. Bergman himself is once again a harsh critic of his own work, 
suggesting that he should have focussed on the transference of Johan’s difficulties to 
Alma.33 However, if Alma had also been fully afflicted (she shares Johan’s vision of 
demons and so is partly afflicted) Bergman would have lost an important source of 
thematic tension in the opposition between Alma’s nurturing character and the self-
indulgence of Johan. 
 
Analysis of the film; the prologue 
The film begins with a simple direct statement of its subject. The inter-titles, which 
inform about the diary and the artist’s disappearance, initiate a digressive, self-
reflexive, credits sequence, in which we hear a film crew. This beginning, which is 
followed by the director’s instructions to his crew, heard against a black screen, 
compares with other self-reflexive 1960s art films like those of Godard, with its self-
conscious, experimental reference to the film-making process. However, this opening 
flows into the second shot where Alma makes it clear that she is talking to the 
director. Bergman has said he felt it important to contain development of an interplay 
between a documentary-style reference to himself and the fictional world, and thus 
from the original script the material referring to his role was reduced.34 The 
rendering of this connection as elliptical means that an omniscient perspective is 
undercut, thus heightening ambiguity, but nevertheless the establishment of this 
perspective contributes substantially to Alma’s authority which will be confirmed by 
her character and actions throughout the story. 
 
In the transition from the credits, the director evolves as a fictional character. His 
presence, although still unseen, provides a focal point after the digression of the 
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credits, in which noises and indistinguishable conversation allow the viewer to 
wonder what is going on and/or enjoy the imaginative freedom of eavesdropping on 
the daily routine of film production. The unseen director of the second shot makes 
camera position a psychological element in the story. All of this relates to Sartre’s 
philosophy of imagination. For Sartre, imagination negates the world but 
consciousness is immersed in it. Since consciousness is not securely detached it must 
be the case that knowledge is perspectival, restricted by the viewpoint of the 
individual subject, and thus dispersed across a range of different perspectives.35 
Sartre recognises the role of elements in consciousness including pre-reflective 
consciousness as part of the way the individual determines his or her own reality. 
This intuitive, contingent linking is presented at the outset of the film. The 
relationship between the film’s representation of fiction and its representation of 
reality is neither arbitrary nor surreal. Instead, it is a sketch of an enigmatic 
connection that refuses complete disclosure. 
 
The second shot shows a thatched cottage with windswept tree, and basket of fruit in 
front of it. Into this mise-en-scene Alma walks. A digressive naturalistic quality is 
evoked, with Alma talking directly to camera, and stating that there is nothing more 
to say. She has given the director her husband’s diary, but she continues, thus 
blurring the boundaries between the representation of events and the representation 
that will follow. Her speech foregrounds a consciousness of time as she mentions the 
hour at which she arrived at this location with her husband, and the fact that now she 
is expecting a baby in a month. Bergman’s attention to temporal organisation 
involves a deviation here, such that temporal reference points are established and 
then undermined at different levels in the rest of the narrative. When Alma says, in 
this opening scene, that she and her husband lived together for seven year, the 
information is planted for the audience who may become puzzled later in the 
narrative by the time frame of Johan’s affair with Veronica Vogler. If, as is stated 
later, Johan was with Veronica for five years and there was a public scandal, how are 
we to understand Alma’s innocence, her apparent lack of knowledge about 
Veronica? This is just one of many enigmas that are distributed through the text. 
Bergman creates a troubling sense that temporal cues are floating free from other 
elements in the film. Aligned with this is the inverse notion that if we lose our 
understanding of time there is a kind of breakdown in reality. Previously, in the 
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nightmare sequence in Wild Strawberries with its handless clock Bergman 
experimented with a distorted apprehension of time as signifier of mental confusion 
and terror. 
 
The absence of Alma’s husband in this second shot helps to build curiosity about his 
character, based on Alma’s description of key elements in his personality: she talks 
about his preference for silence, his ease with her but no-one else, and their arrival at 
the cottage. The long take is animated by camera movement, which responds to 
Alma’s movement towards the camera. This builds the idea of a dialectical 
relationship between character and narration and furthers the idea of the authorial 
consciousness immersed in the phenomenological reality of the narrative. It is also 
suggestive of a psychoanalytical relationship as Alma’s speech is like a confession, 
introducing an other (the director and/or the audience), for the first time, to the 
details of a private trauma. The long take and camera movement give Ullman’s 
performance a stronger profile. When she pauses reflectively we experience the 
longeur, and a sense of her focus on an inner world, before she resumes her 
recollection. Already marked as excessive (the director has all the information 
already), the direct address is intimate, foregrounds emotion, and prompts 
imaginative questioning. The audience will be struck by her sense of loss but also 
they might wonder about the back-story? How is Alma here to tell the story? Is this 
Alma or an actress playing Alma? 
 
From the Sartrean viewpoint, we can see that Alma’s ambiguous status, like Monika 
when she addressed the camera, is a further demonstration of the need to understand 
consciousness and the external world as co-existent rather than giving priority to one 
over the other. Alma’s connection to the extra-diegetic, emphasised through direct 
address, is not used to comment on the meaning of the fictional world, but reminds 
us again of the way consciousness remains contingent across different situations, and 
this challenges the viewer to produce meaning. From the Kleinian perspective, the 
representation of gender is significant. The off-screen controlling male director is 
offset by the knowledgeable, maternal presence of Alma. Where knowledge and 
authority lie appears as ambiguous as the divide between fiction and non-fiction. 
Through Alma, a nurturing empathic character is foregrounded as powerful source of 
information and understanding.   
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When Alma talks about her husband we already gain a sense of his inner world. He is 
an artist carrying an atmosphere of melancholy. It has already been noted how 
Kleinian theory can be affiliated with an aesthetic of melancholia and how object 
relations theory is part of Klein’s attempt to reconstruct the grieving psyche. In what 
follows we can read Johan’s personality into the form and content of the film, but we 
can also read a kind of diagnosis, a move towards the reparation sought through 
analysis of object relations. Later in the narrative Johan is tormented in relation to 
other people. They lose their definition as characters with a separate life and become 
the bad objects of his psyche, an experience that is captured through a range of 
expressive film techniques. Meanwhile, Alma is the good object, the nurturing, and 
patient wife. It is not just people who represent Johan’s turmoil, but also his 
environment. In fact people become an element of the environment very explicitly 
later in the film. 
 
 
Arrival on the island 
Following Alma’s introduction, we go back in time to the couple’s arrival on the 
island. The long take style is maintained through the four shots in this sequence. The 
direction suddenly has a more external quality, looking on without participation, but 
it is affiliated with Alma’s act of recollection. The intimacy of the previous scene is 
eclipsed and there is no dialogue. Juxtaposition through editing is a factor since there 
is a strong contrast with Alma’s conversation in the previous scene with the silence 
motivated by Johan’s taciturn character. He symbolises, amongst other things, art’s 
potential concentration on the visual, and in this respect is akin to Mrs Vogler in 
Persona, for whom silence is an existential choice. Stripped of noise and dialogue we 
observe the action in more detail as the couple arrive by boat. The rocks of the island 
stand as impressive testimony to the couple’s decision to choose this landscape over 
other people.36 Alma and Johan are left by the boatman and the shot is held, like the 
early Lumière film of a boat leaving the shore, but formal control is manifested 
because the climax of the shot coincides with the boat’s disappearance behind the 
dark mass of a boulder in the foreground. The concentration on the solitary squeak of 
the wheelbarrow highlights the quietness of the location. There is a naturally strange 
quality to the situation in that we have been told it is 3 o’clock, and yet it is 
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completely light in keeping with the Swedish summer, but in contrast to the rest of 
the film, much of which happens in darkness. 
 
Johan and Alma are presented as explorers of the environment, seeking a way out of 
society, like Monika and Harry. Thus, the landscape becomes significant 
psychologically. For now, the harshness of the terrain and the purity of the light are 
good objects due to the incipient sense of the artist’s mission. A mini-climax that 
compares to the boat’s disappearance into the depth of the image, occurs as the next 
scene ends on a poetic note. Alma and Johan disappear into the cottage and are seen, 
through the doorway, embracing in silhouette, by the light from a window at the 
back. The camera distance highlights the mood of aesthetic contemplation, which in 
Kleinian terms carries the possibility of psychic wholeness.37 Continuity across the 
episodic structure of the narrative is provided by the motif of light because in the 
following shot we find the couple basking in the sunlight. But these are transient 
moments. In Kleinian theory the individual forms relationships with part objects, but 
the striving for greater integration is confronted with numerous obstacles, including 
the phenomenon of splitting. Nature appears to promise integration, but in 
Bergman’s work we know that it will be difficult for this promise to break through 
the forces of alienation. When Alma poses for Johan, it is as if at this moment he 
turns to her for integration. She has an ideal nature for Johan, which must be crushed 
by his inner demons. His possession of Alma through representation only offers a 
temporary solace from his psychic turmoil. This arrangement of artist and model 
carries the promise and idea of integration, but it cannot be sustained and serves male 
subjectivity.   
 
Alma is objectified because of Johan’s precise instructions, and when she bares her 
shoulders, there is an echo of Monika’s provocative appearance on the island. 
Although we see Alma pose we never see the drawing, so that the viewer is kept at 
some distance from the artist’s idealisation of the woman. There is another temporal 
reference as Johan suggests that he wants to draw Alma every day. This sense of 
time arrested contrasts with the confusion about time that emerges in the rest of the 
story. Temporarily we have an idea of the artist finding sanctuary in his work. 
Related to this, however, is the point that this is, in fact one of the few moments of 
intimacy between husband and wife and one of the only moments in which he shows 
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sexual attraction towards her. This is significant in relation to the character of 
Veronica. As we shall see, Veronica appears as a kind of femme fatale, but arguably 
the way Johan’s obsession with her leads to his disintegration is not a problem 
exclusively driven by his desire. In the brief moment of tenderness with Alma and 
the eroticised encounters with Veronica, we see the hope for Johan that idealisation 
of the woman may resolve the psychic conflict that torments him. Kleinian theory is 
distinct on this issue from Freudian orthodoxy because for Klein sexuality is an 
impulse designed to combat the death drive. Robert Hinshelwood quotes Klein to this 
effect: ‘ “the sexual act serves to restore the mother’s injured body and thus to master 
anxiety and guilt.” ’38 Hinshelwood goes on to say: 
 
The implication is that the person (or ego) is in a position to struggle with their 
own impulses in a way that is not deterministic. Love is a state to be struggled 
for, and sex a strategy in that struggle. Eroticisation is not simply a mechanical 
discharge of libido.39 
 
To be sure, Johan’s lack of fidelity to Alma is an issue in his disintegration, and the 
idealisation of Veronica represents a split in Johan’s consciousness that comes to 
separate him from Alma, but following the Kleinian emphasis, the process of 
splitting can be read as an outcome of the death drive and not as an inevitable 
consequence of sexuality alone. 
 
The emergence of Johan’s inner world 
The following scene registers a change of mood and a more critical representation of 
the way Johan’s self-obsession as an artist excludes his wife. When he returns to the 
cottage, the image of the obtrusive sheets blowing on the washing line expresses an 
element of discord in his consciousness, which contrasts with Alma’s joy at this 
return.40 Alma looks bewildered at his mood; and the fade that accompanies the end 
of the scene, which momentarily leaves her in twilight, registers the film’s descent 
towards darkness. In the following scene long take and close-up concentrate attention 
on Alma’s unease as she sits in the lamplight while Johan restlessly moves around, 
and then reaches across Alma for a bottle of spirits. The emphasis on Alma means 
that we are made aware of the objects of her consciousness in counterpoint to 
Johan’s account of his internal demons. Johan is the disturbing object, which 
occupies Alma’s thoughts as we can empathise with her unease. Although Johan 
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does not give a name, at this stage, to the time of night, he makes it clear that the 
hour before dawn is in some way significant. The development, in a later scene, of 
the idea that this time has a special status, as ‘the hour of the wolf’, shows attention 
to time itself, but also reveals awareness of the way an uncanny and disturbing reality 
is located behind the façade of normality. 
 
For Johan, the hour before dawn is filled with horror and coincides with a sense of 
personal crisis.41 His loss of control is related to his identity as an artist. His paintings 
manifest the unruly content of his mind. Johan’s malaise ushers in a more febrile 
gothic imagination, unconstrained by taste and decorum. This is the onset of madness 
and what Livingston and Wood see as the nihilistic alternative to the artistic 
transcendence of The Magic Flute.42 The refusal of Bergman to identify with one 
character and one narrational perspective, nevertheless, allows the greater freedom, 
which Wood acknowledges, and draws on Bergman’s empathy with gothic 
imagination, including the influence of horror films. In other words, this is not a self-
indulgent endorsement of Johan’s gothic sensibility because the tension between 
Alma’s perspective and Johan’s actions already creates some critical distance. 
 
As Johan laments the horror he finds in his own work it is significant that these 
paintings are not presented to the viewer. This absence foregrounds the process of 
projection involved in responding to art. In Johan’s dialogue the boundary between 
the work and subject matter blurs, reminding us of Sartre’s insistence that 
imagination involves a relationship with an external reality, real or completely 
fictitious. Johan despairs about the work and its subjects simultaneously, consumed 
by his feeling that his paintings represent a grotesque world. He offers explanations, 
regarding one portrait as evocative of Papageno from The Magic Flute, but this 
comparison does not give him joy. Thus, Johan’s paintings put us in a psychological 
space in which the work represents the demons who terrorise him. These are his bad 
objects, an internalised world in which his desires are destructive, linked by paranoia 
and fear. His fears produce isolated images without connection ranging from a fear 
of birds to a possible fear of homosexuality. This is an excessive form of splitting in 
which the representation of negativity multiplies, creating a sense of inward futility. 
 
While the pictures are shown, Alma’s face and responses are in the foreground. 
 227 
Afterwards, as Johan speaks, we see her face trained on him, but there is no reverse 
shot, so that Johan becomes a shadowy figure. Only able to sleep by daylight, he 
seems to be connecting himself with the monster of the title. Johan strikes a match 
and asks Alma to think about the slowness with which a minute passes. Here, the 
passing of time is signalled by the sound of the clock ticking and various declarations 
from Johan, including his assertion that a minute can be like eternity. The sense that 
he is tortured by this time lag is a reversal of the joy with which he contemplated 
painting his wife for eternity. Alma also looks into the void and speculates about 
their love, about the possibility of total union in which identity dissolves. The theme 
of time passing is elaborated to incorporate imagination of their lives in the future as 
age obliterates differences, but Bergman, like Sartre, is more interested in charting 
the illusions of love than producing sentimental effects.43 Alma’s hope for the future 
is fragile alongside the fragmenting psyche of her husband. While Johan is 
traumatised about the pictures, which explore the wilder regions of his psyche, Alma 
knits, looks after the washing and, after he falls asleep during her romantic speech, 
she helps him to bed. All of this reinforces a realistic sense of how, in this 
relationship, the wife serves the artist, and obsession with his subjectivity creates an 
oppressive situation. 
 
Alma’s discovery of the diary 
Alma is also launched on an exploration. For this to happen she must participate in 
Johan’s world of disturbing objects. The pictures are just the introduction to this type 
of being/object. The couple will be confronted by a range of characters that appear to 
live, but then negate life, reverting to an object-hood that mirrors the drive to 
destruction. These people/objects, like the process of art can also be seen more 
fluidly as potentially parts on a journey towards greater understanding, creativity and 
self -realisation, which brings home the significance of Klein’s analysis of internal 
objects, but also deepens the idea of the artist’s malaise suggesting that his demons 
correspond with powerful social forces that cannot be escaped. 
 
The concentration on Alma’s reactions, conveyed through Ullman’s subtle 
performance, forms a pattern through the narrative. In the scene which depicted 
Johan’s return to the cottage and the image of the flapping sheets a key moment 
involved a shot of Alma attending to the sound of her husband’s approach. The next 
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day we see Alma aware of something off-screen, but without a sound to tell us who 
or what the arrival is. Thus, continuity is provided through a concentration on her 
perception, but around this a web of enigmatic phenomena emerge. In this scene 
Alma is confronted suddenly by the incongruous figure of a smartly dressed old lady 
who talks in a fluent, pre-meditated way about Johan. Now, Alma looks shocked.  
Bergman with his acute awareness of stage entrance as a dramatic moment makes the 
lady’s appearance suggestive of magic or perhaps nightmare. The lady appears to be 
merely incongruous on the remote hillside, but actually when she makes a slip of 
tongue referring to herself, as 216 years old, this plants a seed for the transition to the 
supernatural story of vampires later in the film. She seems to know that Alma has 
just looked at Johan’s pictures and encourages Alma’s absorption into Johan’s 
nightmare world, but this also launches Alma’s quest for further knowledge. The 
demonic old lady asks for Johan’s pictures to be preserved - he should live with their 
destructiveness instead of destroying them. She also instructs Alma to read Johan’s 
diary. 
 
The reading sequence includes three episodes imagined by Alma, in which other 
characters suddenly appear before Johan. Between these appearances we see Alma’s 
attention to the text as she discovers about her husband’s secret life. A montage 
aesthetic organised around Alma’s imagination leaves us with questions about 
whether these characters are inter-related, how they relate to Johan’s state of mind 
and how they represent external reality. In the first, a man, who introduces himself as 
the baron (played by Erland Josephson), walks up to Johan as he is painting and 
invites the couple to dinner. The baron makes it clear that he and his wife admire the 
artist’s work. This declaration at least coheres with the narrative of Alma and Johan’s 
arrival on the island. In the second episode we see Johan on a stony stretch of 
ground, narrating his state of distress about his work and his health. The appearance 
of Veronica, (not named at this stage, played by Ingrid Thulin) occurs slowly as we 
see just her legs walking towards Johan whose face is in close-up. The attention 
given to character entrances heightens mystery and, in this case, heightens 
Veronica’s sexual mystery. Tom Milne relates the imagery of the baron’s arrival in 
the previous shot to the strange arrival of Veronica: ‘... a car crawling over the 
horizon, a girl picking her way through the rocks on a sun-bleached beach, look 
momentarily like weird, threatening insects.’44 This comment captures the imagistic 
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quality facilitated by the montage aesthetic that adds a different dimension to the 
narrative development. When Veronica starts talking we are plunged into the middle 
of a situation, which conveys their explicitly sexual relationship. The dialogue 
reaches beyond what we know, providing fragmentary details of Veronica’s fears 
that antagonistic characters have watched her (or them) and are writing to her in a 
threatening way. Veronica is a good object for Johan in the sense that her arrival 
overcomes his anxiety about his work. But the affair also signifies trouble in her 
references to an external threat and through the initial reference to her bruise. The 
effect of the fragmentation is to heighten enigma and provoke an imaginative 
interpretation from the audience and this is guided by alignment with Alma’s 
perspective as we return to her, the character who imagines this scene. 
 
Thus, we proceed to the third fragmentary diary entry in which Johan is being 
pursued. This is another variation on the convention of the stage entrance because 
through alternating shots this flashback picks up the action in the middle of the scene 
with both Johan and another man, Heerbrand the psychiatrist walking briskly across 
a stretch of the island landscape. Johan striding across the countryside is pursued and 
turns to strike down Heerbrand, annoyed by his psychobabble. Beyond the allusion 
to a clash of values between art and psychiatry the sequence has an absurd quality. 
When the psychiatrist remains on the ground in order to stop his nose bleeding, it is 
as if Johan has expelled an invader from his consciousness.     
 
The sequence of the three diary entries has similarities with the nightmare passage in 
Wild Strawberries because the surreal, and symbolic episodes convey a hidden side 
in Johan’s past. Like the memory content in Wild Strawberries, we are left to assume 
that what is seen actually happened in the story and is not a figment of imagination. 
In both films imagination of the past has an explicit spectator; but in this case the 
spectator position is layered because it is not just Johan’s memories, but also Alma’s 
imaginative recreation of the scenes and she remains reticent. This creates a more 
detached and passive point-of-view, which strengthens the work’s focus on character 
relations rather than ego psychology. This perspective is consistent with both 
Kleinian innovations in psychoanalysis and the Sartrean focus on intersubjectivity 45 
because it challenges the mastery of the individual ego and provides a tangible sense 
that neurosis has to be understood in a wider context of social relations. Thus, 
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imagination figures in both the form and the content as a way of accessing further 
knowledge about the context surrounding the characters. 
 
Johan’s confessions to his diary are enigmatic as we are invited to make associations. 
Is Johan’s lover the wife of the baron? Does the woman’s bruise and the physical 
attack on the therapist indicate Johan’s propensity for violence? The fact that these 
questions are, at least partly, answered by later narrative developments testifies to 
Bergman’s commitment to an aesthetic of narrative integration, but he is also 
inspired by singular images and fragmented happenings. These episodes, like 
curtailed stage entrances, provide, in film terms, a surreal montage but a dialectical 
tension is maintained because Alma herself is mysterious. The minimalism of her 
expression means that her reaction is not expressed, and in the following scene her 
energy is transferred into domestic detail when she asks Johan to consider various 
details of her use of the household budget: the cost of a toothbrush, for example. This 
is a level of reality that Johan does not wish to engage with. So, while the story 
emerges, based on Johan’s private revelations about his past, a confessional mode 
familiar from Bergman’s work, a parallel development involves epistemic ambiguity. 
We are drawn into questions about each of the central characters. We are also drawn 
into questions about whether the narrative details fit plausibly into a realist aesthetic. 
The viewer is invited to share knowledge with Alma, which creates a perspective on 
the action, which follows. From this perspective we can start to appreciate that 
Johan’s problems are related to the public scandal of his relationship with Veronica 
and his lack of autonomy in a world where he depends on the patronage of powerful 
elites. 
 
 It is necessary to hold on to the development of Alma’s character whilst noting that 
the film displays a fascination with the symbolism, surrealism and eroticism of 
artist’s private life. Action gravitates to the baron’s castle but point-of-view shots are 
given an interesting role in the introduction of this scene. At the end of the meal 
scene Alma replies that she knows they have been invited to the castle that night. 
This, in effect, reveals that she has acquired information from Johan’s diary. But a 
confrontation does not ensue. Instead, the transition to the castle is managed through 
a mysterious combination of point-of-view shots. After Alma’s revelation she gets up 
from the table, but Johan gazes intently in the other direction. The following shot 
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shows the baron talking directly to an interlocutor who we can infer is Johan because 
of the editing pattern. It is revealed immediately, however, that he is talking to both 
Johan and Alma because the camera moves to indicate the baron turning his attention 
from one to the other. We might wonder why there is a formal pattern linking 
Johan’s gaze off-screen, and his implicit point-of-view in the following shot. The 
viewer can provide their own interpretation, but this strategy shows how the film is 
organised around conceptions of subjectivity. These are sufficiently complex to 
unsettle any straightforward identification between the audience and Johan. Johan’s 
gaze is prominent at this point because we are being drawn into his inner world, but 
we also become aware of the way Alma is integrated into the position from which the 
point-of-view perspective is seen. Thus, Alma remains integral to the narrative 
development and the first shot at the castle asks the audience to imagine the 
subjectivity of both Johan and Alma. 
 
An evening at the castle 
The subjective camera and a wide-angle lens create a distancing effect as each of the 
baron’s entourage greets the guests. Further elements create a sense of unreality. 
When the baron introduces his wife there is a jump cut whilst the rest of the 
introductions, to his mother, brother Ernst, Lindhorst and Heerbrand are conveyed 
through camera movement around the space occupied by the hosts, and through their 
movement and look towards the camera. These introductions are similar to the earlier 
stage-like entrances representing Johan’s diary entries, but this section creates 
another imaginative dimension. The aristocratic party are like figures in a dream 
world, objects or fragments that have drifted from their original context while the 
subjective camera unites the vision of Alma and Johan. Like the camera work that 
showed Alma at the beginning without showing the director, the diegetic look here is 
represented but not established with a reverse shot. This conveys an indeterminate, 
because unseen, subjectivity immersed in a dreamlike, phenomenal reality. Because  
point-of-view is usually related to one character the unity of this set up becomes 
more dreamlike and part of the innovative approach to narration within the film. 
 
The unusual style reinforces the shift that has occurred in the narrative. Previously 
the film conveyed the couple’s isolation and in particular Johan’s melancholic 
withdrawal from social reality, apparent in his silence with Alma. Now, as we enter a 
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world that promises to reveal more about the secret world of his diary and his art, a 
more social environment emerges. The effect of the camera work is to show that the 
hosts crowd in on their guests. This creates an interesting conjunction of  
psychological and social representation.46    
 
The representation of Alma and Johan being psychologically dominated at the dinner 
table by their hosts is significant for the idea that the latter become internal objects 
primarily for Johan, but also for Alma. The aristocratic entourage impose a 
fragmented discourse on to the consciousness of the guests. This effect is represented 
through the continuous unpredictable shifts in attention and focus. The combination 
of elided conversation, circling camera movement, and whip pans, constructs the 
feeling that Alma and Johan are overawed and out of place. Amongst this bricolage 
of elements are static shots, including one of the baron looking on enigmatically at 
his guests. The static shots of the couple further develop the idea that they are 
captives of a situation that overwhelms. In one shot Johan is shown from the back in 
darkness. In another, Alma’s expression is one of blank bemusement. 
 
Meanwhile, the conversations give the impression of the narcissism of the rich and 
powerful hosts as they talk about their own medical, and financial problems. The 
fragments of conversation about physical ailment and decline signify a sadistic 
subtext with gothic undertones. Corinne, the baron’s wife, talks blithely about 
Veronica, and feigns naivety whilst alluding to Johan’s relationship with her. When 
the mother refers to her fangs, there is another suggestion of the horror already hinted 
at. When Lindhorst talks about 'hatred in her eyes', we do not know if this is a 
sadistic description of Alma’s look as she is forced to respond on the subject of 
Veronica. The laughter at Lindhorst’s remark can be read as reinforcing an 
enjoyment at the expense of Alma, or alternatively as another enigma playing on our 
lack of narrative knowledge. At the end of this sequence, the physical movement 
from Johan as he drinks a glass of wine and wipes his fingers, with the candles 
burning in the foreground isolates his figure in juxtaposition with the group-
dominated environment. This nightmarish experience of the party relates to the 
Kleinian critique of groups, which suggests that they reinforce splitting. As Alford 
puts it: ‘If one takes Klein seriously, one will not, however, be terribly optimistic 
about the emergence of a reparative morality among elite-or any other-groups. 
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Groups tend to remain stuck at the paranoid-schizoid stage.’47 The group exudes a 
sense that they form a reality in their own right, but the exclusion of others is 
conveyed through the experience of Alma and Johan. 
      
Bergman shows himself drawn to the position of outsider but, as my previous 
chapters have indicated, for him this role is not a fixed identity and can be occupied 
temporarily by a couple, an individual or only retained through fleeting moments of 
imagination. Here the representation of the oppressive elite is highly expressionistic.  
Bergman represents only part of the wider economic structure beyond the life of 
Johan and Alma. We are given fragments about this group of characters, which 
intimates that they are part of a reality that is fading. Like the couple they are cut off 
from the mainstream of society. They may have emotional and commercial power, 
but their dependence is on a privilege that is not explicitly connected with 
contemporary social organisation and this means that they possess a quality of 
unreality. The ghoulish members of the upper class are not just representatives of a 
subjective madness, but also represent a society where psychic divisions naturally 
coexist with social and economic inequality. The Kleinian concept of splitting also 
represents this interplay, between social and subjective alienation, because it 
unmasks stategies, which are used to achieve a false sense of integration. Bergman’s 
style of film-making, in this sequence, repeats the sense of fragmentation conveyed 
in relation to Johan’s psyche, and Alma’s attempt to imagine his diary. This attention 
to fragmentation parallels the Kleinian argument that splitting is inevitable at the 
level of the individual and society. Begman’s focus on fragmentation also seems to 
accord with the Kleinian emphasis that individuals and groups will deny and 
perpetuate the unreality of this process of splitting. To understand the unreality of 
this process we must engage with it and this involves emotion and imagination as 
well as understanding. 
 
In the section at the castle there are key moments that unify Alma and Johan, such as 
the point at which they kiss on the walk through the castle grounds, but they are also 
split and this is focused on in their response to art. The puppet show of The Magic 
Flute captivates the whole crowd, and provides the kind of absorption in a shared 
experience that was lacking around the dinner table. The puppet show is a 
microcosm for art. It is a personal symbol for Bergman who grew up playing with his 
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own miniature theatre, and whose love for The Magic Flute is well documented, not 
least through his later film of the opera. As Lindhorst, a keeper of the baron’s 
archives, explains, this opera unifies aesthetic pleasure and disturbing emotions. 
Lindhorst is suddenly a civilised host who even singles out Alma as ‘the guest’. 
Alma’s viewing of the scene from The Magic Flute is highlighted through editing, 
camera scale and her dreamlike expression.  Her empathic response is shown in 
close-up. In contrast, when Johan is called to talk about his response he chooses to 
present his own philosophy of art, an existential rejection of value, a viewpoint that 
the hosts enjoy. 
 
Considering the scene as a whole is vital to the understanding of the film. Kinder and 
Beverle Houston say that Bergman is preoccupied with art achieving a ‘balance’ of 
the conflicting forces facing the artist. These conflicts involve ‘a precarious balance 
between genius and madness, between passion and reason, between spontaneity and 
control.’48 They argue that Mozart’s opera is included because it is ‘the supreme 
example’ of a work ‘that successfully maintains this balance’49 The inclusion of a 
performance within the performance of his films is used regularly by Bergman (for 
instance the theatre troupe perform in The Seventh Seal), but as already indicated 
Hour of the Wolf appears to be self-reflexive at many levels. The choice of scene 
from The Magic Flute returns to the idea of a protagonist’s emotional upheaval, 
isolated in the midst of the night, and the absence of the loved one, suggested by the 
story of Veronica. Across these ideas the focus on Alma is significant because the 
achievement of integration shifts from the idealised world of the performance to the 
experience of spectatorship, which is similarly confronted with the challenge of 
splitting and the need to achieve meaningful integration. In the dark, Alma’s face 
shown in close-up more frequently than those of the other characters absorbs the 
information as Lindhorst informs the audience about Tamino’s anxiety. Tamino 
yearns for an answer to the question - does Pamina live? - and the affirmative reply 
comes from the chorus. Across this articulation of a happy ending there is 
consciousness of division as Lindhorst pauses, in his explanation of the play, 
between the syllables of the word Pamina. Johan’s face is shown in a mirroring shot 
alongside Alma’s with both of them half covered in shadow. The opera is, thus, 
related to the idea of overcoming division but the latter persists in the visual 
presentation of the spectators. 
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It is also striking that in this scene we are made so aware of Lindhorst as the 
controller of the theatre, whilst Alma, and, to a lesser extent, Johan and the others are 
spectators. This conveys the idea of art as an interaction with both formal control and 
emotional projection as key components. This understanding of art’s dual capacity 
for manipulation and regeneration is important as a contrast to Johan’s state of mind. 
When the play ends, Johan speaks of art’s irrelevance to the real world. For the 
crowd of aristocrats, he sounds like a true intellectual because he paradoxically 
negates his own role as an artist. But Johan’s words raise questions: does he say this 
simply to please his audience? Is this a mask? Alma thinks he is being inauthentic, 
excusing his drunkenness as he tussles with the countess, who has scratched him 
with a rose. Thus, across the whole scene the focus on Alma is not simply to make a 
comparison with Pamina, but instead to elaborate her position as a spectator and 
active agent, providing a route for the viewer which is detached from Johan’s 
identity as an artist. 
  
In the room of the baroness the couple are invited to look at Johan’s portrait of 
Veronica and the baroness talks about Johan’s relationship with this woman. The 
feeling of entering a labyrinth of mirrors where identity loses certainty is matched at 
the level of mise-en-scene. We do not see the portrait of Veronica but the baroness, 
in a sense, takes her place, reinforcing the pattern of sublimation and transference 
involved in this text. When Johan turns round to the baroness she points to her 
bruise. However, Alma, at the edge of the frame on the left, is reflected in the mirror 
on the right. Thus, in a situation where self and image are confused and Johan’s 
desire and violence cast a shadow over his sense of self, Alma’s association with an 
integration of image and reality is reinforced. It is easy to assume that the driving 
force behind this film is a fascination with the surreal and the irrational or an 
overpowering fascination with the death drive. However, in order to understand how 
the narration offers detachment we must continue to note the representation of Alma. 
 
The fact that we do not see Veronica’s portrait returns the dramatic focus on to the 
couple. Both are presented in portrait form, half in shadow. The expressions convey 
incomprehension, but also, in Alma’s case fear, which she confirms verbally. Alma’s 
self-expression becomes even more forceful as they travel home. The long take 
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allows us to see Alma’s beseeching face as she protests about the baron’s entourage 
and their attitude to her, but her expression is transformed as she gets no response 
from Johan. A match on action emphasises her move away from Johan, as her fear 
intensifies. His passivity and weak attempts to comfort her are not sufficient. The 
windswept landscape expresses their tumult, and the negativity, now associated with 
his character, is shown more fully as he walks away to the cottage. 
 
Alma’s faith in Johan means that she projects hope and faith towards him, but we see 
how this hope is contradicted. Violence is an integral part of human nature in the 
Kleinian scheme, but the transcendence of violence can be achieved through 
recognition of negativity, a detachment of negativity from experience. This is not a 
linear process. Although Alma has progressed from seeing demons in her husband’s 
psyche to a more complete sense that he is haunted, she is still bound to him. She 
listens to his difficulties, which leads to more explicit understanding of his 
alienation. 
 
 
The Hour of the Wolf 
Johns Blackwell criticises the way Alma is represented as passive and transparent 
whilst male subjectivity is mysterious. She argues that the film expresses fears about 
homosexuality and the female body and retreats from the radicalism of Persona. 
However, she acknowledges that it does ‘avail itself of some disjunctive strategies 
that contribute to a feminist reading…’ 50 My argument is that the positive role I 
have attributed to Alma works with ‘disjunctive strategies’ as a means of 
understanding the artist’s isolation in society, but also as a means of criticising his 
obsession. Bergman's decision to reintroduce the title suddenly prior to the next 
scene reveals his formal innovation and parallels the moment in Persona when we 
are suddenly shown the film reel, a moment that according to Linda Rugg represents 
a breaking of psychic integration.51 Nevertheless, the moment of fracture in Hour of 
the Wolf relies on a very simple convention and is related to silent cinema. Bergman 
explains this moment as one in which he tries to wake the audience.52 Putting these 
observations together we can account for this moment as another example of 
Bergman’s project to represent fragmentation, at a general level, alongside the 
process of splitting represented in the story of Johan. The scene that follows burrows 
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deeply into Johan’s madness, but also allows the viewer to gain detachment, and this 
is achieved in narrative terms through Alma. 
 
The sequence should be sketched initially. It starts with Johan telling Alma how he 
was abusively punished by his father. Secondly, he tells how he killed a young boy 
who taunted him whilst he was fishing. Thirdly, Heerbrand arrives at their house and 
provides a gun ostensibly for Johan to kill wild animals on the island. He also invites 
them to the castle. Fourthly, Alma reveals that she knows about Johan’s affair with  
Veronica from reading his diary. Finally, Johan appears to shoot Alma and rushes off 
to the castle.   
 
At the start of this scene, Alma is passive as they sit in the depths of the night. Johan 
provides the narration. The reliance on verbal description cues a possible visual 
imaginary for the spectator. This impulse towards the imaginary is made even 
stronger because Johan’s story relates how he experienced imagined horror. The 
threat of an unseen creature in this cupboard is an early form of one of Johan’s bad 
objects or demons. This story, thus, contributes to Alma’s acquisition of knowledge 
about her husband’s neurosis. The creature in the cupboard evokes the cruelty of the 
parents, and this theme continues with the violence of the father which follows, as  
Johan recalls the beating he is given when he leaves the cupboard. Perhaps, the 
creature in the cupboard represents a subliminal mix of fear and desire, which is 
displaced by the violence of reality. The imaginary dimension remains ambiguous 
and more potent for this. Johan’s paranoid-schizoid state emerges more explicitly. 
Instead of concentrating on the way the violence exceeds his understanding he 
confesses to masochism in the beating. In Sartrean terms he relinquishes his freedom 
and is masochistically involved in his earlier suffering to the point that this negativity 
is projected on to the external world and becomes a dominant totality. 
 
Johan’s story about his imprisonment by his parents in a cupboard was a key 
autobiographical episode for Bergman. When asked if he ever experienced being 
beaten as a child Bergman replies: ‘How I ever got out alive passes my 
understanding. In the original script I’d intended to show the whole episode taking 
place.’53 A powerful case can be made that this episode is structured by a real 
engagement with society in the form of violence within the family. As Bergom- 
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Larsson argues, following Donner, humiliation is of central importance in Bergman’s 
work. Bergom-Larsson continues:  
 
It is against this background of harrowing experience and conflicts, conscious 
and unconscious, that Bergman’s confrontation with the bourgeois 
authoritarian family must be seen. He has experienced it with his nerve-ends, 
and it does not cease to fascinate and at the same time repel him.54 
  
 
The incident in the cupboard clearly refers back to Bergman’s own experience of 
punishment as a child. The linking of this story with the immediately following one 
that Johan tells us of his encounter with a boy, conveys a complex psychological 
relationship, in which the child lives on as a presence within the adult. We have 
already heard about Bergman’s lifelong fascination with the motif of the murderous 
nightmare encapsulated in the condensation of the Red Riding Hood story and 
werewolf mythology. According to Kleinian ideas we need more than an existential 
cutting free of the past. Johan needs to find the internalised violence. This erupts in 
the second story. Johan becomes the Oedipal tyrant but the violence is played out 
through a series of views and objects without words as we watch his encounter with a 
boy next to the sea, an encounter which shows Johan batter the boy to death. The boy 
creeps up while Johan stands alone fishing. The drama is orchestrated by alienating, 
discordant music. The absence of dialogue represents this as Johan’s subjective 
experience. The overexposed look and the obtuse angles heighten the alienation. 
Horror returns because the boy is like a vampire child and thus connected to the 
oppressive social world represented in the castle. The viewer is forced again to step 
outside a naturalistic interpretation. As Kinder and Houston put it: 
 
The boy like the other demons is clearly a projection - a combination of the 
frightened child in the closet and the demon who threatens to bite off his toes: 
Johan is both the authoritarian father with the whip and the child receiving the 
beating.55 
  
Alma’s comprehension reaches a certain level before it is terminated in the chaos of 
the material: with her lack of understanding fear returns. A curious stasis takes over. 
We might expect, based on earlier Bergman films, a more concrete response or 
outcome to the revelation that Johan has murdered a child. The conflict has been 
articulated in highly dramatic form, but the resolution remains elusive. The formal 
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preoccupation with appearance and reality comes to the fore. Suddenly Heerbrand, 
the curator, another member of the baron’s party, knocks at the door and gives Johan 
the gun. This is symbolically an object that allows Johan to use violence without 
compunction.Whilst Heerbrand’s first appearance in the diary showed Johan’s 
determination to expel the psychiatrist’s analysis from his consciousness, now he 
accepts the latter’s invitation to use the gun. 
 
We do not see the results of the shooting, but the three shots fired by Johan cut the 
bond with Alma more decisively than before. They are about intention rather than 
result. Johan’s actions usher in a self-determined path in which he follows his own 
desire. At this point however it is not certain that Johan is doomed. As Philip Mosley 
points out:  
 
The sequence of the Hour of the Wolf itself is the final break in the Alma/Johan 
relationship; he begins to see her too as a ‘demon’ and it is at this point that he 
tries to shoot her. However, it is not at his point where his doom is clearly set 
out. There is still the hope that this mad act might bring him to his senses.56  
 
Existential analysis is not just concerned with the authentic, but also bad faith, and 
thus provides the means to recognise Johan’s illusions. Johan’s odyssey after 
shooting his wife releases his imaginary world. While up to this point the spectator 
has been confronted with gaps and absences provoking an active imaginative 
interpretation, now he/she may be overwhelmed by the subliminal imagery. Thus, 
Johan’s odyssey cannot escape emptiness. Freed from his relationship with Alma, 
Johan’s demons take over. Each character promises to be a sign on the way to 
Veronica, who is the goal and the origin of his desire at this point. In these exchanges 
we see more and more fragmentation. 
   
Johan’s return to the castle 
When Johan meets the mother of Baron von Merkens she entrances him with her 
foot. She is another representative of Veronica, the idealised woman he pursues but 
cannot obtain. He is now in a world stripped of empathic emotions, devoid of the pity 
exhibited by Alma. Next, the baron confesses that he is another lover of Veronica. As 
unresolved conflicts are put centre-stage, the veneer of civilisation maintained by the 
aristocracy continues. It is absurd as the baron suddenly reveals his ability to defy the 
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rules of gravity walking up the wall and across the ceiling, reinforcing the 
established association of the aristocracy and vampires. An old lady removes her 
face, and places her eyeball in a glass. When Johan passively accepts make-up this 
highlights his loss of identity. Voyeurism is a key component in this paranoid-
schizoid world. According to the Kleinian theorist Segal it is also one of the 
phenomena which artists are drawn to in their engagement with the fractured    
psyche.57 In this sequence it becomes a more prominent theme as the baron promises 
to be close by, watching Johan with Veronica. When Johan finds Veronica it appears 
to be a sublime fulfilment of his desire. She lies on a bed, which looks like a stage, as 
if her body has been preserved for him. The close camerawork that follows as he 
touches her skin down to the foot can be interpreted as an objectification of the 
female body. It is like one of his images, but this is a dream only founded on his 
desire, and when Veronica suddenly springs to life, her laughter and savage desire is 
excessive, shocking. Her independence is shocking for Johan, and her laughter is 
echoed in the assembly who watch, as Johan with his clown like make up looks 
devastated by the public humiliation. Sartre emphasised most strongly in his theory 
of imagination the gulf that can emerge between perception and imagination. We see 
continual oscillations in Johan’s trip to the castle which present variations on this 
division, most notably in the way Veronica is transformed from corpse to animated 
laughter, and in the switch from their isolation to the revealed presence of a mocking 
crowd whose laughter cements Johan’s humiliation. In other words, Johan is 
continually surprised by the phenomena he confronts, as apparently empirical 
realities are revealed to be deceptive. Johan’s desire is apparently just part of a wider 
plot controlled by others. Thus, as he caresses Veronica we see his possession of her 
and as he turns to the crowd we see that he is possessed by forces outside his 
influence. In Kleinian terms, this paranoid-schizoid pattern of oscillation contrasts 
with the concern and empathy offered by Alma.   
 
Bergman has made it clear that humiliation and shame are key emotional states for 
him. The scene with Veronica also returns to his fascination with the set-up of a 
theatrical performance. The fact that Veronica is only presented in this way reminds 
us of Monika’s naked appearance as a key symbolic moment. Without Alma’s 
presence Bergman’s work would be more self-indulgent. In this film she is the key 
element that retains a link with the presentation of a recognisable social world. She 
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can only speculate on what would have saved her husband. She has the role of 
questioner, which for Bergman despite his aesthetic opposition to theorising is a 
valued activity, a philosophy for everyday life. The abrupt end, with Alma in mid-
sentence undercuts the idealisation of her character, reinforcing the realism of her 
discourse, and returns to the opening set up in which there is an emotional interface 
between Alma, director and spectator. Bergman’s message is made clearer because 
Alma remains a quiet character, unrealised. Her love for Johan is unconditional. 
Looking for him in the woods she found him, but now time and space are fragmented 
and he cannot be recovered. This landscape is the mise-en-scene of Johan’s abjection 
and his loss of freedom with the baron’s entourage. 
 
The ambiguity of the film’s conclusion reinforces the connection with philosophical 
and psychoanalytic discourses. The work of Sartre and Klein provides a particular 
understanding of Bergman’s reach towards these discourses. The fact that Johan’s 
downfall is related to his own imagination has been set up and played out in the 
focus on his obsessive character. While Sartre insists that the imaginary involves 
subjective creation, he also insists that it involves engagement with external 
phenomena. The excesses of Johan’s imagination accord with this because they are 
also the representation of an oppressive social situation in which the artist is defeated 
by his dependence on powerful elites. Johan’s imagination provides an expressive 
and distorted representation of this elite, the alienation of his emotions and the 
collapse of his marriage. The imaginative excess also reveals childhood terror and 
the fear of annihilation. In the character of Alma we also find a dialectic between 
recognition of the values and dangers of imagination. She participates to an extent in 
Johan’s nightmare, but remains moderate and grounded. This can be understood as 
the result of an exclusive focus on male artistic subjectivity. However, Bergman’s 
other work backs up the argument that he does not restrict himself to the imaginative 
life of his male characters. As I have shown, the character of Alma can also be read 
as representing the value of empathic imagination and the possibility of linking 
imagination and reality.   
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7     Conclusion 
 
In this chapter I will start by noting a few debates and alternative readings in relation 
to the key films analysed. I will acknowledge some of the complications facing the 
convergence of two distinct theories employed in my analysis. Following these 
points, I will consider in greater depth how some of Bergman’s more general 
observations on his work relate to the content of the theories used, before returning to 
a final statement of the core points arising from the approach I have adopted.   
 
Issues and points for further debate  
The combination of Kleinian and Sartrean theories expands upon the established idea 
that Bergman’s cinema involves a mixture of realism and more symbolic, 
expressionistic techniques. For both theorists the imagination plays a central role in 
consciousness and is a key to understanding the relationship between the individual 
and society. The application of Kleinian and Sartrean ideas has pointed to issues for 
further debate. For instance, we have seen how a Sartrean response to the character 
of Monika may involve condemnation based on her selfish abandonment of Harry 
and the baby or a degree of empathy for her rebellion based on its negation of an 
oppressive social context. With The Virgin Spring ambiguity was noted in the 
symbolic representation of divine intervention. The argument that this is an image 
which can be subjected to humanist appropriation, as an aesthetic investment in the 
ambiguity of the image itself, is clearly open to further discussion given Bergman’s 
changing attitude to religion. Another point for debate arises because the Kleinian 
focus on integration is wedded, in my analysis, to an appreciation of the empathic 
qualities of Alma in Hour of the Wolf, a reading which tempers the apparent turn to a 
more experimental mode signalled by this film and, also, Persona. However, I have 
not argued that Kleinian and Sartrean ideas provide definitive readings of Bergman’s 
work. Their critical relevance has a specific focus. Kleinian work puts across the idea 
that art gains from the artist’s confrontation with psychic conflict. On this score 
Bergman’s work has been shown to succeed in a range of films. The analysis of how 
this conflict is translated into film form and narrative has also drawn on Kleinian 
ideas of integration and a synthesis of control and expression in Bergman’s handling 
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of the film medium. Sartrean theory has been used to show how fascination with the 
products of imagination is used by Bergman in a creative way to represent 
oppression and the possibility of freedom for his protagonists. Both Sartrean and 
Kleinian ideas work most effectively as an extension of Bergman’s intuitive pursuit 
of psychological and philosophical themes. 
We also have to note that the work of Bergman, Klein, and Sartre involves historical 
transformation. It has been argued for instance in The New Kleinian Dictionary that 
Klein placed more emphasis on the negative qualities of epistemophilia in her early 
work, and that later, in 1935, she emphasised a more positive value for this instinct, 
speaking of ‘the way the capacity to learn and to work may be hampered by 
depression and despair about damaged objects.’1 In other words she increasingly sees 
greater integration of this instinct as part of the reparative process. In the case of 
Sartre, his turn towards Marxism in the 1950s provides a different set of criteria for 
evaluating fictional characters. This was already apparent in What is Literature?, 
which argues that artists must engage with social injustice. The ongoing vitality of 
debate about the concepts of each thinker including the relationship between their 
early and later work testifies to their continued relevance. However, the broader 
historical perspective of their engagement with social circumstances outlined in 
Chapter 1 suggests that despite significant changes in their work a degree of 
convergence can be recognised. Through the discipline of film analysis general 
points of convergence have been clarified involving an inclusive aesthetic, which 
seeks to express conflicts whilst retaining an ideal of autonomy in the imagination. It 
has been argued that in this respect the Bergman films analysed parallel concerns in 
Klein and Sartre through his representation of character, development of narrative, 
the creativity of film form and the way the audience are engaged in imaginative 
interpretation of the material. 
 
The analysis of key works from Bergman has revealed continuities and 
discontinuities in style and theme. One of the clearest accounts of film style at a 
general level is provided by Bordwell’s account of different cinematic modes 
including European art cinema. The three films analysed in depth fit with key 
elements of this mode identified by Bordwell including the prevalence of ambiguity, 
 247 
alongside the theme of reality and illusion, and an investment in characterisation.2 
Close analysis combined with reflection on Kleinian and Sartrean ideas has shown 
that in Bergman’s work the formal concerns of art cinema are wedded to 
philosophical and psychoanalytic interests. In relation to Sartre, the tension between 
recognition of reality and imagination as an autonomous power was explored in my 
film analysis. In relation to Klein, the most persistent point of comparison was the 
way each film represented a movement between signs of psychic fragmentation and 
the expression of a reparative trajectory. This trajectory was located in the characters 
and in the form of the film itself.  
 
Both Sartrean and Kleinian perspectives relate to Bergman’s preoccupation with 
internal worlds, represented through character subjectivity and overt authorial 
narration. At the same time, Kleinian and Sartrean perspectives share Bergman’s 
concern with recognising social reality. While Sartre and Klein themselves can be 
criticised for not focussing sufficiently on social reality, it is clear that each theorist 
seeks to establish a connection between the world of imagination and social context. 
For Sartre, this connection is focussed initially on recognising a tension between the 
individual and the external world, which maps on to a tension between the individual 
and their social context. For Klein, the individual has to overcome self-destructive 
tendencies by progressing through the depressive position. This requires a               
re-orientation to the external world through internalised objects and consequently her 
theory points to the obstacle of self-destructive tendencies within the external world. 
The fact that these theorists express a connection between the individual and social 
reality, which is often oblique, makes them even more relevant to Bergman because 
we can recognise that he also includes recognition of social reality as a significant 
element despite his forceful emphasis on the world of imagination. 
 
Bergman’s comments on his art  
In the course of the analysis I have referred to Bergman’s insights into his own work. 
More general comments made by Bergman in interviews can now be briefly 
considered to get a measure of how his insights relate to the theoretical perspectives 
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and stylistic analysis used in this thesis. In an interview with Jean Beranger in 1958 
Bergman makes it clear that he is still religious, but marks out his divergence from 
his upbringing by stating that his belief is not connected to the Church and relates his 
faith to a critique of ‘materialism’: ‘Integral materialism could only lead humanity to 
an impasse without warmth.’3 In the same interview Bergman makes clear his 
aspiration to communicate at a universal level whilst recognising that his identity is 
indissolubly linked with Swedish culture: 
An artist cannot express himself fully and thereby succeed in touching the 
public in other countries except by remaining attached to all the particularities 
of his native soil.4 
At this stage Bergman shares at a very general level the humanist opposition of Klein 
and Sartre to a world dominated by materialism and searches for value at a universal 
level.  
 
By 1965 Bergman’s pronouncements on art and his own reasons for making art take 
a more sceptical turn in the form of his acceptance speech of the Erasmus Prize in 
Amsterdam. Here he turns to the idea that his art originated in his childhood 
dreaming, which he suggests was characterised by a self-centred rebellion against the 
external world. ‘A contact-seeking child, beset by fantasies, I was quickly 
transformed into a hurt, cunning and suspicious day-dreamer.’5 At this point in the 
speech, Bergman’s words echo the distinction between dreaming and art developed 
in Freudian and Kleinian thought, and he considers how he had to progress from this 
solipsistic interest to a more social domain. ‘The need to get people to listen, to 
correspond, to live in the warmth of a fellowship, remained.’6 However, from this 
Bergman takes a sceptical turn saying: ‘Now, to be completely honest, I regard art 
(and not only the art of cinema) as lacking importance.’7 He offers the image of a 
dead snakeskin still moving due to the activity of parasitic ants. Art proliferates but it 
is like the dead snakeskin deprived of its essence whilst Bergman continues, one of 
the ants. However, as with Hour of the Wolf, Bergman’s negativity here masks a 
dialectic. In his brutal honesty he seeks to recover a sense of art as his destiny, his 
personal project, removed from the pomp of expressing universal truths. He also 
obliquely places himself in a changed world where the dynamic of increasing 
freedom for artists, through the expansion of the media and technological 
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developments, raises new questions about the artist’s place in society. Thus, 
Bergman articulates a more existential Sartrean sense of intractable individualism 
while clinging on to the idea that this identity cannot be reduced to a commercial 
function (of course he acknowledges his need to make a living). This piece also 
conveys a hidden potential for imaginative creation beyond the elite world of his own 
success and recognition: ‘There are film-makers who live their films and would 
never abuse their gift by materializing them in reality.’8 
Aware that he is treading a thin line in self-justification Bergman concludes by 
claiming that ultimately the benefit of being  ‘an artist for one’s own sake’ is that this 
places himself  ‘on an equal footing with every other creature who also exists solely 
for his own sake.’9 This rhetoric may seem like a dismal retreat from his earlier 
ambition to express a universal message and themes through imaginative 
representations of his own culture and psyche, until one recognises that Bergman’s 
position shares characteristics with the revision of humanism in other strands of 
modernist theory. Arguably this idea links with Sartre’s attempt to reformulate his 
philosophy as a democratic ethics in ‘Existentialism is a Humanism’, with the search 
to link individuals by virtue of their shared experience of isolation and confrontation 
with meaninglessness. This sentiment was located in the representation of the boy in 
The Virgin Spring, but also in the concern with isolated characters in all the films 
selected for this thesis. If Bergman does not go as far as Sartre’s programmatic 
rhetoric of inclusion it is because Bergman also hints at the therapeutic value of art 
for himself, so that through art he co-exists with his internal world. ‘I revolve with 
the objects I have captured for myself and am cheerfully or melancholically 
occupied.’ There is a recognition that others (the audience) cannot be coerced into 
this process but that the artist is still connected, part of  ‘a fairly large brotherhood 
who exist… in selfish fellowship…’10 
This speech is rather like a performance, an extension of Bergman’s persona as a 
showman. A more measured perspective emerges from Bergman on Bergman, the 
most extensive interviews given by the director. When asked by Björkman about 
whether he felt, at the outset of his career, ‘solidarity with the social, cultural, and 
philosophical currents of the mid-forties?’  Bergman agrees, going on to say: ‘Then 
came existentialism - Sartre and Camus. Above all Sartre. Camus came later, with a 
sort of refined existentialism.’11 Bergman does not expand much on this, 
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acknowledging later that he was far from being well read in existential philosophy, 
but the idea that existentialism expressed a position with which he could identify can 
be read into his commentary in this set of interviews. As I noted earlier it is in these 
interviews that Bergman compares his final rejection of religion to Sartre’s 
experience. However, Bergman fashions his affiliation with existentialism to his own 
concerns. He is insistent on his detachment from politics, at least during the first half 
of his career and his ongoing preoccupations with religion. He pushes any sympathy 
with existentialism away from political engagement by proclaiming his hostility to 
any concept of ideology and puts this in the present tense. When Björkman says: 
‘You give an account of your experience of the world. But you don’t make films 
programmatically?’ Bergman responds: ‘No, never tied to an ideology. I can’t. For 
me nothing of that sort exists.’12 However this position seems to be slightly modified 
in a later interview: ‘I’ve stated firmly and clearly, that though as an artist I’m not 
politically involved, I obviously am an expression of the society I live in. Anything 
else would be grotesque.’13    
 
Whilst comments on Sartre are fleeting, references to psychoanalysis are minimal 
and references to Klein are non-existent. However, we have seen how Wild 
Strawberries overtly courted a process of engagement with past emotions and the 
unconscious through the character of Isak and how Klein’s concepts apply to films at 
different points of Bergman’s career. Without taking on board the concepts of 
particular psychoanalysts Bergman’s reflections on his work suggest that he 
recognises a connection. It has been pointed out that in an interview with Björkman 
and Olivier Assayas in 2006 Bergman suggests that his initial writing involved a 
feeling that it was a pleasurable and therapeutic activity. Bergman refers to a period 
in 1941 when he was allowed to suspend his military service and stayed at the house 
of his grandmother.14 Here he found peace through writing. He mentions that his 
mother was also living there, which contributes to the idea of a creative element in 
his relationship to his mother, and he goes on to say he felt that in the writing he 
could escape from the tensions of the war. About the writing he says:  ‘ “it was a 
completely new feeling that I had not experienced before, this business of just sitting 
down and writing in longhand and seeing the words emerge. I liked it a lot… It was 
just an enormous… comfort.… Something opened up for me….” ’15 As Steene 
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remarks: ‘Bergman’s statement points to the therapeutic function that the creative act 
would come to have for him. The transformation of a subjective world into artistic 
form, be it as a play, a script, a piece for television, or a novel, was to become a 
continuing form of psychological purgation, without which he says he probably 
would have gone mad.’16 
One interpretation of Bergman’s representation of emotional reality in his film-
making career is that despite his focus on characters’ feelings he remains detached. 
We saw an apparent example of this in Hour of the Wolf when the idea of a detached 
creator controlling his characters and their emotions was alluded to in the puppet 
performance by of The Magic Flute. In interview, Bergman acknowledges his own 
actions manipulating characters and audience. However, as we have seen there is a 
complex interplay between the representation of characters’ emotions and more 
detached representation. We saw how, for instance, Hour of the Wolf is focussed 
primarily on psychic conflict in the experience of Johan and Alma. Bergman comes 
closer to expressing an affiliation with psychoanalysis when he focuses on emotion 
and the idea of emotional structures permeating social relationships. This emerges 
clearly when he discusses humiliation. Like Klein he demonstrates, here, awareness 
of a repetitive pattern in which destructive impulses are perpetuated at an 
unconscious level across society. 
 
For the most part, Bergman is most comfortable talking about his films as a creative 
process. In interviews through his career a repeated question has concerned his 
feelings about cinema and theatre. Implicit in the application of Kleinian and 
Sartrean ideas is the idea that the distinction between art forms is at some level 
transcended in favour of a focus on imagination itself. At the same time it has to be 
acknowledged that detailed analysis of Bergman films required specific attention to 
film form. Bergman himself produces different answers at different times on the 
relationship between cinema and theatre and his preferences. The conclusion I draw 
is that a philosophy of imagination gains in insight by avoiding too much reduction 
to the specific art form in question. More conclusively, it is clear that Bergman’s 
films involve a creative combination of different film styles, ranging from the silent 
era to his more disjunctive style in Hour of the Wolf and this extends to a creative 
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combination of theatrical and filmic devices including in particular his infamous use 
of close-ups and lighting. All of this refers us to the importance of his working 
relationships with key personnel such as the cinematographers Gunnar Fischer and 
Sven Nykvist. The creative link between Bergman’s film and theatre work is most 
apparent in his focus on acting. Bergman suggests that on both stage and film set he 
seeks to position the actor so that ‘they feel they are at their best’.17 What Bergman 
appears to be expressing here is the cultivation of the actor’s image of 
himself/herself. And this takes place in an intimate working relationship with 
Bergman who says that he ‘must always function as a kind of radar’ using his 
‘intuition’ to focus on the actor’s feelings.18 Bergman conveys in this interview that 
both film and theatre must cultivate the audience imagination. Bergman elaborates 
this in relation to Persona. In this film the nurse Alma recounts to her patient 
Elisabet Vogler, an actress who has withdrawn from all conversation, a shocking 
story of her participation in an orgy. Bergman explains that he chose only to show 
Vogler’s reaction: ‘…the only thing we see, practically the entire time, is the face of 
Liv Ullmann (in the role of the actress, Elisabet Vogler), who eats the scene. She eats 
with her lips what she is being told - and it is a very erotic scene. If you had tried to 
re-create the scene with the two boys and the two girls, it would have been merely 
disgusting. Now, it’s very erotic. It’s strange, isn’t it.’19 
Bergman in effect suggests that he can achieve chemistry with his actors and his 
audience through emphasis on the emotions and images that are not self-evidently 
contained in perception. 
There are examples where Bergman’s interview material has been considered more 
directly significant from a psychotherapeutic perspective. The psychotherapist Ira 
Progoff provided an article, in a 1968 edited collection of essays, which drew its key 
ideas from a television interview with Bergman. Progoff’s approach is Jungian but 
shares certain concerns with Kleinian and Freudian thought, as well as Sartre’s 
account of the imagination. Progoff attaches great importance to the way Bergman 
conceives of his pictures as ‘dreams’. This suggests to Progoff that Bergman 
‘intuitively grasps the symbolic dimension of dream imagery’. He is interested that 
Bergman feels that: ‘ “The dream is never intellectual”… “But when you have 
dreamt, it can start your intellect…It can give you a new way of thinking, or 
feeling”…’20 Progoff’s account of the interview draws attention to the way Bergman 
 253 
makes creative use of his own ‘demons’ and seeks to ‘integrate’ such material. 
Although Progoff’s emphasis is clearly Jungian, in his idea that Bergman references 
a ‘symbolic dimension  {which} is an all pervasive, universal ground of 
transpersonal meaning’21; there is a proximity to Klein in the idea that Bergman’s 
demons are within him. And that art provides a means of release. Bergman is quoted 
as saying: ‘ “I always have been interested in those voices inside you.” {….} “I think 
everybody hears those voices and those forces.” “And I have wanted to put them in 
‘reality’, to put them on the table.” ’22 As Progoff notes, Bergman says that his aim is 
to ‘ “treat the inner demons not as though they were unreal imaginings but to treat 
them as facts, and therefore to relate to them in a serious way.” ’23 
 
Concluding points 
Thus, Bergman’s interviews provide some material which suggests the relevance of 
Sartrean and Kleinian ideas. However, these theories were not introduced merely to 
clarify the intention of the artist. Instead the motivation in exploring convergence, 
and points of difference between Bergman, Klein and Sartre is that this allows a 
dialogue across disciplines and specialist fields of knowledge which may exceed the 
director’s self-analysis. In particular, it suggests that Bergman’s work is more than 
an aesthetic achievement. Taking on board Sartrean ideas, we can see how Bergman 
provides challenging representations of social reality through his portrayal of the 
tension between individual subjectivity and social forces. By looking at films from 
different periods of his career, variations on this project have been made clear. In 
Summer with Monika the film is driven by the tension between the young lovers as 
dreamers and their alienation in society. In The Virgin Spring the division between 
subjectivity and social context is represented through a range of characters. Centrally 
we have Töre’s dialogue with a hidden God, accompanying his brutal revenge of his 
daughter, but the subjectivity of the female characters is equally significant including 
the juxtaposition of Ingeri’s imaginative search for the infliction of malice against 
Karin, and the real source of the crime in the form of the goat herders’ instinctive 
attack. Finally, we have seen how in Hour of the Wolf Johan’s downfall results from 
his own demons and, on the other hand, is an allegory of an oppressive social 
arrangement, in which the artist is fatally dependent on a cannibalistic aristocracy. In 
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all three films the isolation of the individual is articulated through access to their 
imagination, which hints at solipsism but decisively marks the inevitability of a 
social horizon that must be confronted. 
Drawing on Kleinian ideas we have seen how the idea of imaginative struggle for 
reparation is applicable to Harry at the end of Summer with Monika. While some 
reconciliation with social reality is achieved through this conclusion Monika remains 
enigmatically an image representing the deeper reality of his romance with her and 
their split from society. Monika’s disappearance conveys the failure of reparation 
and thus Bergman reminds the audience of the difficulties in a transition to this 
resolution. The tension between feelings of persecution and guilt are vividly 
demonstrated through the character of Töre in The Virgin Spring, but also in the 
transition made by Ingeri and the youngest goat herder. These remind us of the path 
of reparation described by Klein and the difficulties in overcoming ‘the death drive’ 
in all its forms. In Hour of the Wolf Johan like Monika represents a failure to achieve 
reparation, but empathy is projected through the narration of Alma. Thus, characters 
in these films play out themes and issues, which connect with Kleinian concepts.  
In work from Sartre and Klein I pointed to an emphasis on the relationship between 
the real and the imaginary. For both theorists a sense of reality played a vital role in 
tempering the excesses of imagination. The dialectic between the real and imaginary 
was noted at various levels in the three films analysed in depth. This included noting 
the way Harry and Monika’s dreamy escape from society fails; Karin’s tragic 
discovery of the real intent of the goat herders in the context of her idealistic 
pilgrimage; and Alma’s role mediating between the Johan’s nightmare world and a 
more plausible sense of reality in her account of how the couple arrived on the 
island. Drawing on the example of The Seventh Seal in Chapter 3 it was recognised 
that Bergman mastered a polyphonic style representing interlocking but disjunctive 
character trajectories. In the films analysed we can see that there is the suggestion of 
a developing pattern in the characterisation from a focus on the couple to a more 
disparate engagement with a greater range of characters. With Summer with Monika I 
noted the focus on the subjectivity of the two protagonists. Wild Strawberries and 
The Seventh Seal showed that despite the concern with an individual protagonist and 
his inner world Bergman also explored a flow between and across different 
subjectivities. In Wild Strawberries this is organised around the focal point of Isak’s 
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consciousness, but the narrative trajectory involved the evolutions of his thoughts 
and feelings about others to a more socialised state. In The Seventh Seal the central 
focus on the consciousness of the knight was explored by Bergman, but also the 
enigmatic conclusion of the film involved reference to different character 
perspectives including those of Jof and his wife, Mia. Looking at The Virgin Spring I 
suggested that a comparable range of characters gives rise to a stronger sense of 
dispersed subjectivities including the brutal mindset of the elder goat herders, and the 
anguish of Töre, Ingeri and the younger goat herder. In Hour of the Wolf a return to a 
focus on the couple, Alma and Johan, with concentration on the latter’s mental 
complexity was considered. It was shown that an even stronger sense of split 
subjectivities resulted in a diminution of coherence in the diegesis. Despite this 
pattern moving from concentration on the couple to a more pluralistic conception and 
finally a sense of disintegration, the idea of a linear development in Bergman’s 
organisation of his characters should be treated with some caution. Other work on 
Bergman has explored the idea of different patterns across his work including films 
made before and after those in this study.   
 
For example, at the beginning of Chapter 3, I noted Steene’s categorisation of 
Bergman’s work. However, Steene does not seek to impose these as rigid categories 
and her organisation allows perceptive observations of contrast between the 
categories. Thus, she notes that in The Seventh Seal the juggler Jof is ‘a naïve 
visionary’ who suffers abuse from the crowd; whereas in the films headed  
‘Exploring the Role of the Artist and/or Directorial Persona’ there is a more acute 
development of the idea that the artist is a figure to be persecuted and as in Hour of 
the Wolf this can culminate in the artist’s destruction.24 It is also worth noting here 
that in this category Steene includes such early films as To Joy made in 1949 which 
focuses on a classical music composer, and The Naked Night in 1953 which focuses 
on a circus troupe. In fact, Steene’s group 4 is the most diverse category in terms of 
the historical dates of the Bergman productions. 
A brief survey across the different categories reveals that one of Bergman’s repeated 
strategies is to use artists as characters. For example, in addition to the early films 
included we can point to the role of the blind composer in Music in Darkness, and 
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the ballerina in Summer Interlude. This is not to disagree that both of these works 
focus on the young couple but it does reinforce the idea of Bergman’s determination 
to represent creativity through his characters. At a general level, detached from close 
analysis of film style, Bergman’s use of creative/artistic figures provides an 
impression of the role he assigns to imagination across his career. We find that 
Bergman retains a desperate need to give imagination an active presence in the 
diegetic world. However, this is not a transparent and uniform attempt to find a 
vehicle for his own beliefs but rather part of a more complex process such that the 
audience are presented with creativity in many forms. This disparate use of the 
artist/creator as character means that throughout Bergman’s work there are 
suggestions of a relationship between creativity and social reality. Furthermore, there 
is great variation in this pattern. We have seen how the role of artist may be 
represented through more minor characters including for instance the storyteller in 
The Virgin Spring. We have also seen that the role of the one who imagines or 
dreams is not reserved for the artist but ranges from the religious anxieties of the 
knight in The Seventh Seal and the introspection of a retired doctor in Wild 
Strawberries, to the pagan beliefs of Ingeri in The Virgin Spring.  
Connected to Bergman’s continued use of characters involved in the act of 
imagining, I have explored the way his films convey a mixture of realism and more 
expressionistic and symbolic techniques. In the close analysis of Chapters 4, 5 and 6, 
the theme of reality recognition was evident in the way excursions into a more 
imaginative register, principally through the representations of character subjectivity, 
are ultimately in all three films framed by a return to a more ‘realistic’ mode.  
However, this was achieved with a distinct level of ambiguity. In Summer with 
Monika we end with Harry’s subjective image of Monika, but this is a memory 
juxtaposed to his presence as a father holding his baby. In The Virgin Spring the 
miracle of the water manifests a metaphysical intervention, but is restricted to a 
naturalistic image. In Hour of the Wolf Johan’s disappearance is enigmatic, but 
Alma’s narration provides at least some explanation. As Bordwell makes clear, 
ambiguity is highly valued in the art cinema, and this is consistently apparent in 
Bergman’s work. The appreciation of this through Kleinian and Sartrean perspectives 
reveals that this is not just about Bergman’s creativity with film form, but also is 
relevant to psychoanalysis and philosophy. The imagination consistently plays a role 
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in Bergman’s work representing the internal conflicts of the psyche, the possibility of 
creative freedom and the continuing relationship between the individual and his/her 
reality.   
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FILMOGRAPHY 
 
Films by Ingmar Bergman analysed, discussed or referred to in this thesis: 
 
Hets    1944 (screenplay), Frenzy; Torment (US)  
Kris     1946, Crisis 
Musik I Mörker    1948, Music in Darkness; Night is My Future/Music in Darkness 
(US)  
Hamnstad    1948, Port of Call  
Fängelese    1949, Prison; The Devil’s Wanton (initial American title) 
Bris-Filmerna    1951-3, Breeze soap commercials  
Sommarlek   1951, Summer Interlude; Illicit Interlude (US) 
Sommaren Med Monika    1953, Summer With Monika; Monica: The Story of a 
Bad Girl/Monica/Summer with Monica 
Gycklarnas Afton    1953, Sawdust and Tinsel; The Naked Night  (US) 
Sommarnattens Leende    1955, Smiles of a Summer Night  
Det Sjunde Inseglet    1956, The Seventh Seal  
Smultronstället    1957, Wild Strawberries  
Nära Livet     1958, So Close to Life; Brink of Life (US)  
Ansiktet    1958, The Magician/The Face; The Magician (US) 
Jungfrukällen    1960, The Virgin Spring  
Djävulens Öga    1960, The Devil’s Eye  
Såsom I En Spegel    1961, Through a Glass Darkly  
Nattvardsgästerna    1963, Winter Light/The Communicants; Winter Light (US)  
Tystnaden    1963, The Silence  
Persona    1966, Persona  
Vargtimmen    1968, Hour of the Wolf  
Skammen    1968, Shame  
Trollflöjten   1975, The Magic Flute (TV opera)  
Ur Marionetternas Liv/Aus Dem Leben Der Marionetten (Germany)     1980,  
From the Life of the Marionettes  
Fanny Och Alexander    1982-3, Fanny and Alexander  
 
All films made in Sweden unless stated. Original release title followed by English 
title and then information about American titles where applicable (information from  
‘Foreign Titles of Ingmar Bergman Films’ in Steene, B. (2005) Ingmar Bergman : A 
Reference Guide, Amsterdam : Amsterdam University Press, pp.353-368). 
 
Films by other directors 
 
The Phantom Carriage, d.Sjöström, 1921, Sweden 
Citizen Kane, d.Welles, 1941, US 
Paisa, d.Rossellini, 1946, Italy 
L’Enfant Sauvage, d.Truffaut, 1970, France 
  
 
